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
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## THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM










GENERAL KORNILOV



A. F. KERENSKY

# THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

## *THE KORNILOV RISING*

BY

A. F. KERENSKY

Former Prime Minister of Russia, Minister of  
War and Marine and Commander-in-  
Chief of the Russian Army

*WITH FRONTISPIECE*



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## A. F. KERENSKY'S PREFACE TO THE KORNILOV AFFAIR

DEAR FRIENDS,

I send you the stenographic copies of my fundamental statement on the Kornilov affair which have been saved from destruction, with supplementary remarks and explanations which I have now made. I place this manuscript at your disposal and ask you if possible to publish it, but exactly in its present form. This is necessary, though I myself see all its imperfections from a literary point of view. But this is not a literary production, not "memoirs" for history, not the fruit of my unfettered creative faculty. This is only a document, a bit of real life, a document which can give to those who are really anxious to discover the truth about the Kornilov affair, more information than a whole volume of "memoirs," because, without forcing any one to form an opinion, it gives every one the opportunity of acting on the lines of a commission of inquiry, of doing the work of such a commission himself, sorting out the most important facts of the Kornilov affair, and drawing his own conclusions about it.

To enable the reader to judge fairly is my only desire. My latest notes supplement the statement received by the Commission of Inquiry with additional matter which may in part have been forgotten by or unknown to those who will read the official report of my examination.

Certainly in these notes I have been unable to confine myself all the time strictly to the mere facts of the case, and to the narrow limits of the story of Kornilov's attempt, though I tried my best to refrain from all digression,

and especially from argument and deductions. I tried to restrain myself because I found that for me at this moment any other language than that of facts and documents was out of place.

Why? You know that better than I. You know better than I how the enemies of the February revolution, my enemies from the Right and from the Left, took advantage of the Kornilov affair, and how large was the number of those whose faith weakened before the persistent attacks of my slanderers. It was not for those who deliberately slandered, not for those who deliberately lied, that I wrote. It is impossible to convince them of anything. They themselves knew perfectly well that they were distorting and making a mockery of the truth.

I wrote for those who knew little or nothing, who in the end gave credence to what was so insolently described as "truth" in the Kornilov affair. I do not want to convince them. Let them, dispassionately and calmly, after acquainting themselves with the facts, not from the words of others, but by their own reasoning, discover the truth for themselves if not of the whole Kornilov affair, at least of my connection with it.

It is not personal interest that urges me at this terrible time to think and to write of the Kornilov affair. No; I have seen and studied too many people, not to know the real value of popular love and hatred. At the time when I was at my height, and the crowd bowed before me, I quietly said to my friends: "Wait, and they will come and smite me." So it always has been, and so it always will be. No personal motive, I say, but a public one impelled me to write. For now, when the enemies of Russia and of the freedom of all peoples have attained their shameful aims, when our Motherland lies prostrate in the mud, dishonoured and lacer-

ated, when utter despair has seized those who have any honours and conscience left — now those who have attained their aims must not be allowed to justify their Judas-like crime by hypocritically imputing it to “the treason of others,” and the memory of the great Russian Revolution, ✓ which created a new life of truth and sincerity, must not be shadowed by even the smallest doubt as to the honesty of those who strove for it in life and death.

I want to say a few more words about General Kornilov. I have written many things against him. But I do not desire that more should be found in my words than I intended to say, and that is why I feel obliged to say emphatically that I have never doubted his love for his country.

I saw not in bad intention but in a *lack of understanding*, and in great political inexperience, the cause of his actions, which menaced Russia with such a vast upheaval. I saw, and many times I tried to check him, instigated as he was by the cunning enemies of freedom, or by mere political sharpers.

I did not succeed; the man who in his own way loved Russia passionately was doomed by some power to bring about the victory of those who hated and despised her.

A. KERENSKY.

PS.—A few words about the stenographed copy. I gave evidence on October 8, 1917. It took several days to decipher the notes of the evidence, and only five or six days before October 25th I received it to revise and sign. I had not time to do so. The final official text of my evidence before the Commission of Inquiry was not ready when the Bolshevik havoc began.

Having at length an opportunity to look through this text, I felt I had the right to correct it editorially and stylisti-

cally, to shorten it here and there, and in some places to add a few additional words, of course without changing the meaning and tone of the evidence; in two places I found it expedient to change slightly the order of the account, so as to bring together separated pieces of evidence about the same point.

I think that the publication of the whole original official report of the Inquiry will be useful also as a picture of the judicial examination of one whom General Alexeiev called the "Master of Destiny." It will enable every one to recall that period, still near but already so distant, when judicial inquiry and courts of justice were absolutely free and independent of those in power, that brief chapter in the history of Russia when "this bourgeois prejudice" in favour of impartial justice was not trampled on to speed a return to the traditional Moscow period of "Shemiaka trial."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The name of Prince Demetrius Shemiaka of Halitsh (1420-53) stands in Russia for a dishonest, venal, partial judge.



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## INTRODUCTION <sup>1</sup>

AFTER the breaking of the Russian front near Tarnopol on the 19th of July, 1917, it was decided to replace the Commander of the South-western front, General Gutor, and later also the Commander-in-Chief, General Brusilov, and the choice fell on General Kornilov. Kornilov's good qualities and defects were both well known to the Provisional Government, but at this moment his good qualities made him the only suitable candidate. His defects, especially his impetuosity in success, did not then seem to offer any danger; moreover, the views that he professed seemed to exclude the possibility of a conflict. He advocated the cessation of a further offensive; he, alone among the generals, attributed the responsibility for the failure not only to the soldiers, but also to the officers. He spoke with sympathy of the army elective organizations, of the commissaries, and so forth. Therefore the appointment of Kornilov was due to serious considerations in his favour, and not at all to "irresponsible influences" on the Premier, Kerensky.

But after his appointment Kornilov immediately revealed his dangerous side. In his telegram accepting the duties of Commander-in-Chief he made a series of demands regarding reforms in the army. These reforms were acceptable in their essence; they were even approved in principle, and were already being worked out by the Provisional Government *before* Kornilov's nomination, but

<sup>1</sup> This introduction gives a résumé of the events discussed in the book.

Kornilov presented his demands in an inadmissible form. He interpreted his rights as Commander-in-Chief in an even broader way than did the Grand Duke Nicholas, and he assumed towards the Provisional Government such a tone as compelled Kerensky to propose his immediate dismissal to the Provisional Government. Kornilov was, however, permitted to retain his command, partly to avoid changes in the High Command at that critical moment, and partly because his conduct was ascribed to the influence of adventurers surrounding him at Headquarters. After the events of the beginning of July, 1917 (the breaking of the front and the Bolshevik rebellion in Petrograd), the Provisional Government, supported by the whole of the country and in particular by the democracy, quickly took a series of energetic steps, including the restoration of capital punishment at the front, and occupied itself in further planning for the reorganizing of the army. In spite of this, Kornilov, supported by Savinkov, started an energetic campaign against the Provisional Government. On his arrival in Petrograd on the 3rd of August for the purpose of giving the Provisional Government an account of the military situation, Kornilov brought with him a memorandum in which he demanded a series of army reforms, but the discussion of the proposed changes in the army was delayed, and Kornilov's memorandum was handed to the War Ministry to be brought into agreement with the proposals of the War Minister. In this way was prevented the publication of Kornilov's memorandum in a form so exceedingly sharp and tactless that it would inevitably have led to his retirement.

In the meantime the attack on the Provisional Government by those in favour of "decisive measures" was being continued. Kornilov's memorandum of the 3rd of August was handed over to Savinkov, the Deputy Min-

ister of War, for the purpose of co-ordinating it with the plans of the War Minister. Savinkov, who all the time was attempting to carry on a personal line of politics without taking into consideration the directions of his chief, the War Minister, wanted to benefit by this occasion and, with Kornilov's help, to force the Government to accept quickly, *en bloc*, a program of most serious military measures at the front and at the rear without these measures having first received the sanction of Kerensky, the Prime Minister and the Minister of War, and even without previously reporting to him about them.

This attempt, made immediately before the Moscow Conference, did not succeed, but still it created great excitement in political circles. This excitement might have manifested itself at the Moscow Conference in an acute form, and the Government took measures to save the unity of the country and to safeguard the army from all possible disputes. Finally, the Moscow Conference went off without a hitch. General Kornilov made a speech which did not realize the expectation of the extremists, as it differed from the War Minister's speech enunciating his program only by its tactless form and a brief allusion to the necessity of "measures in the rear, at the front, on the railways and in the factories."

The regeneration of the fighting capacity of the army was the task of the Prime Minister, Kerensky, from the very first moment when he took over office from Gutchkov. It was necessary to liquidate the tendency of army reforms which had been carried out during the first two months of the Revolution, but in striving with this object the War Minister, Kerensky, could not permit the too harsh and premature steps which were demanded by the irresponsible partisans of "strong power." Such steps could give only

a negative result in the unbalanced conditions in which the country then was. After the Moscow Conference, Savinkov admitted that the plan of reforms traced by the War Minister coincided in the main lines with his and Kornilov's wishes. He admitted also that his conduct during the period just before the Moscow Conference was a breach of discipline, and after this the Prime Minister recalled the order for Savinkov's resignation.

But all the danger from the activities of too hasty "reformers" was nothing in comparison with the terrible consequences of the *secret* intrigue which was carried on at the same time at Headquarters and in other places with the object of making a forcible *coup d'état*, and which already by the time of the Moscow Conference had attempted to accustom Russia and Kornilov himself to the idea of the military dictatorship of the latter. Information about conspiracies began to reach the Provisional Government as early as July, 1917; the break through near Tarnopol deeply touched the feeling of national pride; moreover, after the abortive Bolshevik rising many thought that a courageous and well organized assault on the Government was sure to succeed. Parallel with the open propaganda of the idea of a military dictatorship, secret work was going on. At the first stage separate conspirative circles were organized in which some military elements took an active part, among them a part of the members of the Main Committee of the old Russian Officers' League. Later, these circles united, and the technique of the conspiracy improved. Some dubious persons, such as Aladin and Zavoiko, were accepted in their midst; they formed the link between the military conspirators, the civil politicians, and the financial circles that were supporting them. In this way a real organization was created, which later took such a definite shape that



General Alexeiev could menace it with revelations at the trial of General Kornilov, should the civil participants, who remained unknown, withhold financial help from the families of the arrested conspirators. At one time the partisans of "strong power" sent out feelers to Kerensky; not meeting with any sympathy there, they directed their attention to Kornilov. "Kerensky does not want to be a dictator; then we will give him one," said V. Lvov. At the moment of the All-Russian Conference in Moscow on the 12th-25th of August, the idea of Kornilov's dictatorship was already quite ripe, and the preparation of the *coup d'état*, anticipating the sympathy of the Conference, was in full swing. A "reliable" Cossack detachment was summoned to Moscow, and the officer-cadets who were guarding the building where the Conference took place were given notice that a proclamation of dictatorship was possible during the Conference. A whole series of organizations, before the Conference, carried threatening resolutions to the effect that Kornilov must not be dismissed. A ceremonious entry of Kornilov into Moscow was being organized; various public men "introduced" themselves and presented "memoranda." A pamphlet was distributed in Moscow entitled "Kornilov — The People's Leader."

Contrary to the expectations of the conspirators, the desire of all parts of the population for union and the force of the Provisional Government became so evident at the Moscow Conference that all plans to profit by the Moscow Conference had to be postponed; on the other hand the conspirative preparation of the *coup d'état* became more intense. A few days later Aladin attempted through the intermediary of Prince George Lvov to obtain an audience with Kerensky; having failed, he and his friends deter-

mined to use V. Lvov for this purpose, knowing that his position as a former member of the Provisional Government made it possible for him without difficulty to obtain an audience with the Prime Minister.

On the 31st of August Lvov, who was prepared suitably by Aladin and Dobrinsky, went to Petrograd, where he was received by the Prime Minister, but he limited himself to a conversation of a general character about the necessity for strengthening the Government's authority by the inclusion in it of new elements with "power" behind them. Kerensky did not attach any importance to this visit, as at that time many people came to him whose conversation was of this character. Lvov returned to Moscow and went immediately to Headquarters with a letter from Aladin to Zavoiko. The meaning of this sending of Lvov to Kerensky, as well as of Aladin's attempt to interview the Prime Minister, was that the conspirators wished to secure for themselves means of contact with the Prime Minister independent of the ordinary channels of communication between Headquarters and the Government.

At the same time at Headquarters Kornilov and his friends were working out the final plan of "military" pressure on the Provisional Government. It is difficult to determine exactly when Kornilov became a conscious participant in the conspiracy and the head of the movement directed against the Government. In the first information about the conspiracies his name was not mentioned, but already on the 3rd of August, in the conversation with Kerensky, Kornilov spoke about a military dictatorship as about a possibility which might become a necessity. At the Moscow Conference the behaviour of Kornilov towards the Provisional Government was very

provocative. On the 23rd of August, at Headquarters, Kornilov spoke harshly to Savinkov about the Provisional Government; he found the continuation of Kerensky's power to be obnoxious and unnecessary and so on. But on the following day, on the 24th of August (6th of September, N.S.), before Savinkov's departure to Petrograd, Kornilov told him that he was going loyally to support the Provisional Government; he asked him to inform Kerensky of this, and Savinkov went away reassured. Now on this day the work of the conspirators was already in full swing.

The presence at Headquarters of the Deputy-Minister of War, Savinkov, from the 22nd to the 24th of August was called for, amongst other reasons, by the necessity for clearing up the conditions for the transference of the army of the Petrograd Military District to the Commander-in-Chief, also the conditions for sending a military detachment from the front at the disposal of the Provisional Government in connection with the proclamation of martial law in Petrograd. The proclamation of martial law in Petrograd was necessitated by the military situation created after the fall of Riga, which had brought the battle front nearer to the capital, by the necessity for transferring the Government institutions to Moscow, by the increase in numbers of refugees from the Baltic provinces and in the licence of the Petrograd garrison, by the proposed transfer of the other troops of the Petrograd Military District to the command of General Kornilov, and by the possibility of riots and various attempts from the Left and from the Right.

All these considerations compelled the Government to demand for its own use a well disciplined army force. Savinkov, in transmitting this order of the Provisional

Government to the Commander-in-Chief, pointed out that the strict conditions for sending troops for the use of the Provisional Government were that the detachment to be dispatched should not include the Caucasian "Savage Division," which was not reliable from the Government's standpoint, and that General Krimov should not be appointed to command it. General Kornilov definitely *promised* Savinkov on the 21st of August to fulfil exactly the proposal of the Provisional Government and not to send to Petrograd either Krimov or the "Savage Division"; but on the following day the 3rd Cavalry Corps was already moving towards Petrograd, with the "Savage Division" at its head, and the whole under the command of General Krimov, who had received definite instructions from Kornilov. It was proved later that General Krimov, who had been nominated as commander of one of the armies of the South-western front in order to divert attention from him, had been already, as a matter of fact, for some time at Headquarters working out a plan of military pressure upon the Government. Owing to the events of the 26th of August (September 8th, N.S.), which will be mentioned later, the Provisional Government had time to take measures; Krimov's army did not reach Petrograd (where he was expected by the local conspirative organizations), and he committed suicide. But the rôle of this unit was so important in carrying out the conspiracy that it was only after Kornilov had learned the fate of this detachment that he took actual measures to put an end to the adventure.

While General Krimov's detachment was approaching the capital, the conspirators attempted to get hold of the power "legally" by terrorizing the Government. On the 26th of August (8th of September, N.S.) Lvov, who had

arrived in Petrograd from Headquarters, presented an ultimatum to the Prime Minister in the name of Kornilov. The Provisional Government must give up its power the same evening, transferring it to General Kornilov, who would form a new Government. Kerensky and Savinkov must immediately, during the night of the 26th-27th of August, depart for Headquarters, as Kornilov proposed to offer them posts as ministers in his Cabinet and would not take the responsibility for their lives if they remained in Petrograd. At the request of Kerensky, Lvov on the spot put in writing Kornilov's demands; then Kerensky asked Kornilov to come to the direct telegraphic wire, and Kornilov himself repeated to him the proposal to come immediately, confirmed Lvov's authority, and indirectly confirmed all that had been said by the latter. To gain time Kerensky promised Kornilov to come to Headquarters, and at the same time took immediately all steps to cope with the rebellion at its very commencement. In the meanwhile, after the above "favourable conversation" by the direct wire, the most prominent political men in opposition to the Government were invited to Headquarters; the ultimate form of the dictatorship was being finally settled and the composition of the Government agreed upon. But on the following day, the 27th of August, a wire was received from the Prime Minister ordering Kornilov to surrender his office immediately and to come to Petrograd. Kornilov did not obey this order, but confirmed to Savinkov by the direct wire his refusal to submit to the Government. On the same day appeared Kerensky's appeal to the population about the Kornilov rebellion and Kornilov's appeal saying that he was "provoked" to make the rebellion and that he was acting against the Government, which was submitting to the "Bolshevik majority of the

Soviets" and "working in agreement with the plans of the German General Staff."

Thus the armed revolt against the Government began. For two days, while this attempt was being crushed, different "conciliators" besieged the Prime Minister, attempting to persuade him to compromise "as the real force is on the side of Kornilov." But already on the 29th of August it became evident that the whole of the real force of the country was against Kornilov, and, as had been predicted to him by Kerensky himself some time before, Kornilov found himself in splendid isolation. On the ~~13th~~<sup>31st</sup> of August the rebellion was definitely and bloodlessly suppressed. It was easy to deal with it. Kornilov was not backed by a single important political organization, nor could he rely upon the force of any class. Owing to their political inexperience, Kornilov and those of the officers who were with him mistook for a real force the grumbling of the "man in the street," irritated by the Revolution, but passive by nature, together with the instigation of various adventurers and the promises of support from isolated politicians. The financial help of a certain group of banking-houses artificially exaggerated the dimensions of the movement.

But Kornilov's adventure, though predestined to fail, played a fatal part in Russia's destiny, as it shook profoundly and painfully the consciousness of the popular masses. This shock was the more serious as it was unexpected. An adventure of a small group was transformed in the inflamed imagination of the masses to a conspiracy of the whole of the bourgeoisie and of all the upper classes against democracy and the working masses. The Bolsheviks, who up to the ~~13th~~<sup>31st</sup> of August were impotent, became masters in the Petrograd Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates on the 7th of September, gain-

ing a majority there for the first time during the whole period of the Revolution. The same happened everywhere with lightning rapidity. Massacres of officers again began; again the commanding officers lost all their authority. Throughout the whole country, as in the first days of the March Revolution, there appeared spontaneous organizations which seized the functions of governmental power under the pretext of fighting the counter-revolution. In the soldiers' and workmen's masses the authority of the leaders, who were fighting against the cry of "All authority to the Soviets" and who were defending the idea of a national power basing its authority on the will of the whole people, was annihilated. The wave of anarchy broke the Russian front and overflowed the State. Nobody will ever succeed in breaking the fatal link between the 27th of August (September 9th, N.S.) and the 25th of October (November 7th, N.S.) 1917.





# THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM

## MINUTES OF THE EXAMINATION OF A. F. KERENSKY BY THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE KORNILOV AFFAIR

*(All the dates in this section of the book — when not otherwise stated — are Old Style, which is thirteen days behind the chronology of Great Britain, etc.).*

### CHAPTER I

#### § I

<sup>1</sup> [THE Investigation Commission specially appointed by the Provisional Government for the Kornilov affair planned its work upon a very broad basis, embracing the whole period preceding the revolt and beginning from the 8th of July, when General Kornilov was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the South-western front.

Although strictly speaking, none of the events preceding the August days had direct connection with General Kornilov's movement of the 26th–30th of August, as subject to prosecution, yet this widening of the scope of judicial investigation to include the terrible days of the 3rd–5th of July had a profound inner meaning.

The scope of action of the Investigation Commission could not be narrowed, because the events of those July days (3rd–6th), days of the first Bolshevik riot, days of the

<sup>1</sup> The square brackets denote the explanations and supplements added by A. F. Kerensky to the stenographic report of the examination. All English words in italics are underlined by A. F. K.

Tarnopol disgrace, promoted General Kornilov to the highest post in the army, and created throughout Russia that novel atmosphere of wounded patriotism which originated the subsequent events of the 26th-30th of August.

I will not dwell in detail upon the events which preceded the appointment of General Kornilov as Commander-in-Chief of the South-western front. I think no Russian can have forgotten those two dates (the 18th of June and the 6th of July, 1917), the great impulse of self-sacrifice of the troops of the 18th of June, and the sombre orgy of the devastators of Tarnopol and Kalusch.

Who does not recollect the time when the hopes of salvation and honourable peace reborn in Russia were smashed by the double blow dealt to the Russian army by the German Government, alarmed for its future? Having tolerated the fall of the Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg and a liberal tendency in Vienna after the 18th of June, the rulers of the Central Powers decided to employ extreme measures in their attempt to prevent the regeneration of the Russian army and to blow up the Russian front.

One example is sufficient to give an idea of *how* this work was organized by the German General Staff.

I was at the western front near Molodetchno at the time of the Bolshevik "revolt" of the 3rd-5th of July. Our troops were preparing to launch an offensive. Here, while visiting the front trenches, where as yet nothing was known of the Petrograd events, one of my aides-de-camp took from a group of soldiers a fresh copy of the Bolshevik paper *The Comrade*, published in Vilna by the German General Staff for the benefit of the Russian soldiers. This copy contained an article upon "Russia and the Offensive," dated "Petrograd, July 3rd" (June 20th, old style), which with strange *foresight* made the following statement:

"According to news received from Russia, the Russian offensive in Galicia has excited great indignation among the Russian people. Tremendous crowds assemble in all the large towns to protest against this mass slaughter of Russia's sons. Indignation against England, whom all consider to be the originator and cause of the prolongation of this terrible war, increases daily. Kerensky is openly denounced as a traitor to the people. A huge manifestation has taken place in Moscow, whither Cossacks have been sent to quell the disturbance. The present situation cannot last. *Russkoe Slovo* states that martial law has been lately enforced again in Petrograd. A great many Left Socialists have been arrested during the past week. The paper adds that many of the extreme Left leaders were obliged to leave Petrograd for the interior of Russia."

Naturally, the ground was well prepared for the reception of the Russian accounts of the real disorders of July 3rd-5th, which reached the front trenches a few days later; and were described by the well-known and widely circulated "Russian" newspapers of the front as a revolt of the proletariat against the government of "the traitor Kerensky," who had sold himself to the capitalists of England and France.

The same kind of attack from the front and the rear was launched against the Russian soldier mass all along the front from the Carpathians to Riga.

The break-through of the Germans at Tarnopol completely unbalanced our higher command, and yet it was necessary to do the utmost to re-establish the front as speedily as possible. General Kornilov, Commander of the 8th Army, was at that time appointed Commander-in-Chief of the South-western front.

The narrative of my deposition begins from that mo-

ment; the beginning of it, as being of no importance, is omitted.

General Gutor, whose name is mentioned at the beginning of the deposition, had in May been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the South-western front. The commanders of the other fronts were: Northern front, General Klembovsky; Western, General Denikin; Rumanian, General Stcherbatchov; General A. Brussilov was Generalissimo, with General Lukomsky as Chief of General Staff.]

*Kerensky.*—General Kornilov was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the South-western front under the following circumstances. General Gutor lost his head, and Kornilov seemed to me the only man at the front capable of immediately replacing him. It seemed, then, that the dangerous tendency of his character—a too great impetuosity in case of success—would present no danger during a retreat. For the time when that tendency could become dangerous was still far distant. The retreat would bring into play all his positive qualities: decision, organizing talent, his initiative and independence. That is the reason for his appointment to the South-western front. There was no one else. Personally, I considered these reasons as all-sufficient.

[The decision to exercise actively the extensive rights of a military commander, the daring to act without fear of responsibility, without hiding behind another's back—these were the qualities most needed at the time. Unfortunately, these qualities were seldom to be found among our higher army command. It must be remembered that the active struggle against the disruption of the army, against the “soft-skins” and the “bag-men,”<sup>1</sup> the defeat-

<sup>1</sup> Cowardly soldiers and soldiers travelling about buying and speculating.

ists and pro-Germans, a struggle which often necessitated the use of armed force, was almost entirely carried on by the War Minister's commissaries and army committees.

Nearly the whole staff of the higher command were, so to speak, "not there" for all practical purposes during the period (May-June) of the most strenuous efforts for the re-establishment of military efficiency on all the fronts. And yet a true regeneration of the army could not be achieved without authoritative leaders, recognized as such by the whole mass of the army. Therefore, I think it obvious why every conspicuous personality, every man of initiative and action, met with the entire support of the Minister of War and received promotion. Therefore it is also obvious why I promptly and decidedly promoted General Kornilov, in spite of the original "ultimative" methods of his activity.

If we recall the whole military-political situation at the beginning of July, 1917, it becomes obvious that the *substance* of General Kornilov's "demands," was by no means an America discovered by him, but a somewhat peculiar formula applied by him to the measures partly passed, partly planned by the Provisional Government and fully corresponding to the frame of mind of all responsible democratic and liberal circles.

Russia was shaken and stunned by this combined blow — by the bolshevik attempt to "break up the inner front" at Petrograd and the actual piercing of the front of the 11th Army at Tarnopol. The bolshevik attempt was almost immediately suppressed. The task of stemming the German invasion was a hundredfold more difficult. Prompt and heroic measures were necessary, and their adoption became all the more easy, as all Russia was extraordinarily

unanimous in her estimate of the current events and of the measures to be taken against the double enemy.

"The meeting of the committees of the N corps" (according to a telegram received by me) "considers promoters of discontent, traitors and men who incite others to breaches of discipline and disobedience to battle-orders to be inadmissible in our ranks. We demand of all regimental committees the immediate arrest of all such individuals and the bringing of them up for trial to the army committees. We demand that all comrades of our corps should detain every individual appearing in the trenches or quarters of a unit to which he does not belong; all such individuals should be brought to the regimental committees for identification."

The executive committee of the South-western front and the army committee of the 11th Army, reporting to me on the situation created after the 6th of July, in a joint telegram dated July 8th, declared that the members of the frontal army committee and the commissaries "unanimously admit that the situation demands the adoption of *the most extreme measures*, as it is urgent to stop at nothing to save the Revolution from peril. Today, *with the consent of the commissaries and the committees*, the Commander-in-Chief of the South-western front and the Commander of the 11th Army have issued the order to shoot deserters. Let the whole country learn the whole truth. Let her shudder and form the resolve to punish the faint-hearted, who betray and destroy Russia and the Revolution."

On July 11th the Central Executive Committee of the Social Revolutionists and Social Democrats and the Executive Committee of the Soviet issued a proclamation "to all the people," peasants, workmen and workwomen, to all councils and committees, to the army. In this proclamation the C.E.C. made the following statement: "We

acknowledge the Provisional Government as the government for the saving of the Revolution. We acknowledge it to be a government invested with full and *unlimited* powers. Let its orders be law to everybody. Any one disobeying any battle-order of the Provisional Government is a traitor. *For cowards and traitors there is no mercy.* Remember that only a hard struggle will bring peace to Russia and to all peoples. By retreating you will lose both land and freedom, you will lose peace. Victorious German Imperialists will force you to fight again and again for their interests. Let there be no traitors nor cowards among you. Only one way is open to you — forward.”

On July 13th the “Isvestia of the Council of S. & W. D.”<sup>1</sup> published the following, in an article entitled: “Faced by an Imminent Peril.” “The work of irresponsible demagogues has already borne its bloody fruit upon the battle-field. Dissension and confusion have penetrated the ranks of the army. . . . And the army’s force and efficiency have vanished like a phantom. . . . The army is dissolved and broken-up, dismembered units are in flight before the enemy. . . . Our armies are retreating; worse still — they are running away, maddened by war. We tremble for the fate of Russia and the Revolution, and we are filled with shame. The troops, which fought bravely beneath the rod of Tsarism, have become a mob of miserable cowards now that the banner of liberty is hoisted above them: it is a disgrace.”

As if answering the feeling of inspired alarm which had taken possession of all the democratic centres, the army commissaries of the South-western front, with B. V. Savinkov at their head, sent the following telegram: “We feel bound by our conscience to declare what measures are to

<sup>1</sup> Soldiers and Workmen’s Deputies.

be taken. There is no choice: death-penalty for those who refuse to risk their lives for their country, for land and liberty." By this time my answer to the above-quoted telegram of the Executive Committee of the South-western front had been already received at the front. "I fully approve the truly revolutionary and highly proper decision adopted by the Executive Committee of the South-western front at this crucial moment."

Upon the background of this great tide of patriotism, which swept over the whole country, the contents of the telegram sent by the Commander of the 11th Army (General Baluev) were but the natural expression of the general feeling. "Having become acquainted with the spirit of the army, I am horror-struck at the peril and disgrace that threaten Russia. Time presses. All the high command and officers' staff are powerless to do anything except sacrifice their lives. Paragraph 14 of the Declaration (i.e. the right of shooting on the spot) cannot be executed, because the chief is single-handed against hundreds and thousands of armed men, bent upon flight. . . . As a faithful son of Russia, having devoted my life to the service of my country, I consider it my duty to declare to the Government that Russian democracy and the Revolution are perishing." (The general further proposes a series of measures concluding with the death-penalty, and adds:) "I hold that the suppression of the death-penalty in the army was a mistake: if the Government sends men to die from enemy bullets, why does it grant cowards and traitors the possibility of escape?"

The solidarity of opinion is clearly emphasized by the following extract from General B.'s telegram: "All literature circulated at the front must be approved by the Council of S. & W. D. and the army committees."



No wonder General Kornilov, suffering the same great anxiety as other patriots, expressed the general opinion; but with characteristic eccentricity he concluded his famous telegram of the 11th of July concerning the death-penalty with the following announcement: "Enough! I declare that if the Government does not confirm the measures proposed by me, and thereby deprives me of the only means of saving the army and using it for the fulfilment of its true object, the defence of the country and of liberty, I, General Kornilov, will arbitrarily resign my post of Commander-in-Chief."

Such was the will of the country for its salvation. It could not be otherwise. The Provisional Government had not underrated the certainty of obtaining universal support when it demanded decisive action at the most critical moment.

The front of the 11th Army was pierced upon the 6th of July; the law committing for high treason all persons guilty of inciting officers and soldiers to disobedience of military orders in wartime was published on the same day. General Kornilov was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the South-western front in the night of the 7th-8th of July. On the morning of the 8th of July I issued the following order, No. 28: "After reading the reports presented to me dealing with events at the South-western front, and particularly the grievous events which took place in the 11th Army, I consider it my duty once again to call attention to the unflinchingly gallant conduct of the commanding and officers' *personnel*, proving their devotion to liberty and the Revolution, and their unalterable love of their country. I command discipline to be re-established in the army with the full use of revolutionary authority, including armed force, to save the army. The

disruption of the army cannot be tolerated. All criminal elements, engaged in written or oral propaganda inciting to disobedience and refusal to carry out battle-orders, must be immediately eliminated from the army."

On the 12th of July the Provisional Government (from V. N. Lvov<sup>1</sup> to V. M. Tchernov) passed a *unanimous* vote, temporarily re-establishing the death-penalty at the front and setting up revolutionary martial tribunals. On the 13th of July the Ministers of War and of Home Affairs obtained the right to suppress papers and periodicals "inciting to disobedience to military chiefs, to revolt and civil war." I also received the right to close meetings, dissolve congresses, etc. A whole series of laws and measures was adopted by the Government in less than a fortnight.

Of course (I must again repeat it) all this was rendered possible by the extraordinary unanimity of all classes of Russian society and by the proof given by all governmental and social, especially democratic, circles of a thorough understanding of the existing situation. It was the beginning of a remarkable sobering of the populace, a rapid growth of a consciousness of responsibility towards the State, a period of an unheard-of decline of anarchic-bolshevik influence upon the masses. It became the Government's task to accentuate these tendencies, to strengthen the unity of the all-national front. At the same time the Government was obliged to keep a close watch, lest the reaction against Left Maximalism should lead to a Maximalism from the Right.]

I recollect that A. A. Brussilov (who, by the way, like all the commanding officers and military authorities, greatly

<sup>1</sup> High Procurator of the Holy Synod; not to be confounded with Prince Procurator Lvov, the former Premier.

distrusted Kornilov's somewhat naïve impetuosity) at first disapproved of Kornilov's appointment to Gutor's post, and I was obliged to use a certain amount of pressure to overcome his (Brussilov's) hesitation. I adduced the same reasons in favour of Kornilov to Brussilov which I have given you.

*Chairman.*<sup>1</sup> — Concerning the conference of July 16th at the *Stavka* (Headquarters). What were the views expressed at that conference, and did it not become the cause which subsequently brought about Kornilov's succession to Brussilov?

*Kerensky.*— The conference of July 16th certainly played a part in Kornilov's appointment. I must say, this conference produced upon me and upon all my colleagues (Terestchenko, Baranovsky and others) a disheartening impression, *absolutely* disheartening. I called this conference upon my own initiative and asked Brussilov to invite all the military authorities he could bring together. . . . You know the names. There is no need to repeat them.

*Chairman.*— No.

[The members present at the conference of July 16th at the *Stavka* were: Kerensky, Premier and Minister of War and Marine; Terestchenko, the Minister of Foreign Affairs; General Alexeiev, attached to the Provisional Government; Generalissimo Brussilov; his Chief-of-Staff, General Lukomsky; General Klembovsky, Commander-in-Chief of the Northern front; General Denikin, Commander-in-Chief of the Western front; his Chief-of-Staff, General

<sup>1</sup> The Commission which examined me consisted of the following members: Chairman; chief military and naval prosecutor, Shablovsky; appointed members: Kolokolnikov, Ukraintsev, Raupakh; elected members: members of the Central Executive Committee of the Council of Soldiers and Workmen's Deputies, Krokhnal and Liber. The examination took place in my study at the Winter Palace.

Markov; General Ruzsky, former Commander-in-Chief of the Northern front; Chief Engineer General Velitchko; Savinkov, Commissary of the South-western front; officials of the War Minister's cabinet and of the Generalissimo's staff.

The conference was called for purely strategical military purposes. It was of the greatest importance for the Provisional Government, and particularly for the War Minister, to form a circumstantial and impartial view of the real situation at the front and of the strategical consequences of the break through; to sketch out a plan of future military policy, etc. This last item was particularly important to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who therefore accompanied me to the conference. We desired to hear the opinion of men with a three years' war experience, men who had passed through the hard school of the *débâcle* of 1915 and the adversities of 1916. The observations I had made concerning the preparation and the carrying-out of the offensive of 1917 filled me with the gravest fears and misgivings. And I desired that the immediate problems of defence should be defined, however generally, by a conference of the most experienced former, present and, maybe, future chiefs. Naturally, these fears engendered certain doubts as to the expediency of General Brusilov's remaining at the post of Generalissimo.

Alas! No leaders were to be found at this conference, not even ordinary military specialists attaining the modern war-standard. There were none, not from lack of capacity in those present, but, I am firmly convinced, from lack of wish to reveal it. The possibility of settling old scores obscured everything else. All the misfortunes, the catastrophes, the disgrace, the horror of the first three years of war no longer existed for them. Everything had gone

well in the past. The reason of all reasons, the source of the July *débâcle*, lay solely and exclusively in the Revolution and its influence upon the Russian soldier. Soldau, Warsaw, Kovno, Peremyshl, San, Kovel, Mitava, etc., etc. — all these had not been, had never been. . . . The wine of hate for all things new had gone to those old wise heads. Russia and the Provisional Government obtained no counsel, no aid from the military chiefs. On the other hand, here for the first time General Denikin outlined the program of the "*revanche*," that "music of the future" of military reaction, which inspired many and many a partisan of Kornilov's movement. Some points of Denikin's program had already been presented to the Provisional Government in the form of demands. Thus at the very beginning of the Tarnopol break through the Main Committee of the Army and Navy Officers' League, in a highly significant telegram addressed to the Provisional Government, spoke as follows: "We insist upon the re-establishment of full power, authority and disciplinarian rights to commanders of all ranks."]

*Kerensky.*—Kornilov was not present at this conference. He received a telegram from the Stavka which seemed to imply that his presence was not desired. I cannot recall the exact text, but the tenor of it was to that effect: "In view of the critical situation at the South-western front you will be unable to come."

[General Kornilov, speaking of this telegram in his statement, says: "I received the telegram No. 5067 from the Generalissimo to the effect that, owing to the situation at the South-western front, my arrival at the Stavka is considered to be impossible, and that I am invited to present my considerations."]

In the midst of all the disheartening opinions and pro-

posals expressed by all the generals present, the telegram from Kornilov seemed to shed a faint ray of light. It was deeply oppressive, but still it contained a more impartial attitude towards the soldier mass and the commanding staff. I must say, that all the generals, particularly Alexeiev, Ruzsky and Denikin, evinced a complete lack of strategical and political insight. According to them the state of mind of the private soldiers lay at the root of all the evil. For instance, one of them considered that the only reform necessary to prevent soldiers from deserting was the immediate re-establishment of the salute.

[The general alluded to in the last sentence was not Denikin.]

Such were the judgments expressed. And upon such a background General Kornilov's opinion, that the present calamities were not solely due to the soldiers' demoralization, but also to the original and long-standing deficiency of the commanding staff; that therefore, simultaneously, with punitive measures immediate steps should be taken for the purifying of the commanding body — such a view tended to produce the impression that here was a man with a deeper and wider outlook upon the situation than that of his compeers. Lately it became obvious to me, by the style of the telegram, that it had *not* been drafted by *him*. Strange to say, all General Kornilov's appointments after he became Generalissimo were based upon an *inverted* principle. He immediately began to promote and reinstate men belonging to the oldest traditions. Take, for instance, the wholesale dismissal of the commanding staff of the South-western front, which occurred as soon as General Kornilov transferred thither Generals Denikin and Markov. They started a general removal of all commanders sympathizing with the new army organizations.

I was obliged to come into serious conflict with Kornilov, who was bent upon promoting to a high post General Lechitsky, an officer utterly unacceptable under the existing novel conditions. In fine, Kornilov's policy was in such absolute contradiction to the contents of his own telegram produced at the conference of July 16th, that I believe this telegram to have been written either by Savinkov or by Filonenko; I cannot be certain which of the two, but that one of them wrote it.

[General Kornilov's constant tendency to appoint to posts of high command partisans of the pre-revolutionary methods of army administration and his passive attitude towards the absolutely inadmissible conduct of some commanders in their treatment of the soldiers, his indifference, to say the least of it, towards the campaign set up by some of the commanders and staffs against the army organizations, drove me to despair. I was completely bewildered, until I realized that General Kornilov had *two* programs — one for presenting to the Provisional Government and another for daily practice. For instance, one of his reports upon army organizations presented to the Provisional Government, ran thus: "It is surely matter for wonder that the young elected bodies have scarcely ever swerved from the right path, and have so often proved themselves quite equal to the situation, even to making the supreme sacrifice in blood in their valorous military activity. The committees symbolizing in the eyes of the masses the existence of the Revolution guarantee the calm acceptance of all measures at the front and in the rear indispensable for the salvation of the army and the country." In practice, however, the battle-front which was the most highly organized (namely the South-western front) became speedily disintegrated owing to the course adopted by Generals Deni-

kin and Markov, ardently supported by the "driller," General Selivachov, and the recent "democrat," General Erdely. And yet the services rendered by the Executive Committees and the commissaries of the South-western front in the raising of the army efficiency and the struggle against anarchy at the time of the break through were absolutely *invaluable*. I regret being obliged to endorse the following estimate of General Denikin's policy stated in a resolution of the South-western front Executive Committee: "From the moment of General Denikin's appointment to the post of Commander-in-Chief of the South-western front, the staff began directly to oppose all elected army organizations. . . . Great partiality was practised in relation to the commanding body. Officers violating the rights acquired by the Revolution are encouraged, while those working in touch with the elected organizations are persecuted." The staff not only longed to violate these rights, but actually attempted to restore corporal punishment and resort to blows. By the way, General Alexeiev, in his well-known letter to P. N. Miliukov, gives the following explanation of the hostile attitude of the Executive Committee of the South-western front towards Denikin and Markov. "The committee had accounts to settle with Denikin and Markov, who put a stop to the committee's grabbing of public money." I consider it my duty to refute this entirely false accusation. The Executive Committee of the South-western front was one of the most serious, self-denying, patriotic army organizations which, after the 6th of July, raised a protest against the "soft-skins"<sup>1</sup> and authoritatively supported the Government in its struggle against the Bolshevik soldier rabble.]

<sup>1</sup> Cowardly soldiers.



*Chairman.*— By the way, *à propos* of this conference, Denikin took part in it.

*Kerensky.*— Yes.

*Chairman.*— He stated that his views upon the immediate reforms needed in the army received your approval.

*Kerensky.*— No. Denikin is a good and brave man. You see, when I arrived at the conference (remember, that it assembled at the moment of defeat, not success), I saw at once that all the generals' pent-up resentment against me and the new *régime* was ready to burst out. But Alexeiev, Brussilov and Ruzsky, men better versed in diplomacy, restrained themselves, although boiling with indignation, while Denikin behaved like a simple, straightforward soldier. His speech was such as not one of them, under any other Government, would have ever dared address to the Head of the Government. Such a speech would not even have been listened to under the old *régime*. It contained personal attacks on me. . . . So, after Denikin's speech, in order to emphasize that I took a different view of such plain-speaking from that of the old *régime*, and valued liberty of opinion, as well as to avert a scandal (the other generals were nonplussed), I rose, held out my hand to him, and said: "Thank you, General, for the courage of frankly stating your opinion." I meant to show my appreciation of his behaviour, not of his speech. Later, I opposed Denikin's point of view and defended my own. However, Denikin only sharply expressed the opinion *silently* shared by all the others. The immediate dissolution of all elected bodies, the abolition of all rights proclaimed in the Declaration, the resumption of full authority and disciplinary rights by the commanding officers, including the re-establishment of the salute — such was General Denikin's

program. [In a word, it meant the immediate return to the old order in the army.] However, even his adherents there present admitted that such wholesale reaction was impossible at such short notice.

General Denikin himself, in his telegram of August 27th, No. 145, addressed to the Provisional Government upon Kornilov's dismissal, refers to his speech at the Stavka Conference on July 6th in the following terms: "On July 6th, at the Conference with members of the Provisional Government, I declared that by a series of acts it had destroyed and corrupted the army and trampled our battle-standards in the mud." He was so firmly persuaded that no Government would have tolerated such open criticism and attacks from its subordinate, that he "considered his being allowed to remain Commander-in-Chief as a sign of the Government's confession of its heavy sin." . . . He never understood that a Government, acting upon the principle of right and truth, can and must listen calmly to every honest and independent opinion.

[What irony of Fate! General Denikin, arrested as Kornilov's accomplice at the South-western front, was saved from the fury of the maddened soldiers by the members of the Executive Committee of the South-western front and by the Commissaries of the Provisional Government. I remember with what emotion the never-to-be-forgotten N. N. Dukhonin and I read the account of how a handful of brave men escorted the arrested Generals Markov, Denikin and others across the town, through a crowd of thousands of soldiers thirsting for their blood; how they boarded a train and, having cleared the rails by force, drove them safely out of Berditchev. How very unfair is General Alexeiev's statement in his letter to Miliukov, that "the passions and hatred of the rude mob and soldiery of Ber-

ditchev were artificially fostered by the unclean wretched personality of Mr. N. and the corrupt *personnel* of the committee revealing demagogic tendencies," and that "if the base agents at Berditchev, gambling with the rude passions of the rabble, fail to play their game — court-martial and execution at Berditchev — they have other means at their command, namely lynching by an insulted democracy." N. N. Dukhonin's own fate has given a striking example that, with leaders *actually* playing with the passions of the mob, the victims are doomed to perish.]

*Chairman.*— Did not this conference provide a basis for the subsequent replacing of General Brussilov by Kornilov?

*Kerensky.*— Yes — in a way. We had generally a very limited choice. To my mind, General Brussilov could not remain. Besides, he seemed quite *at a loss what to do* next, and was obviously utterly unable to continue the policy of leaning more upon the common soldiery than upon the commanding body. Meanwhile the situation was such that events might have developed with catastrophic suddenness, if there had been no firm hand to control *the entire front*. We expected a further development of the German offensive. On the other hand, I was obliged to consider the fact that the appointment of an adherent of Denikin's policy would provoke a simultaneous revolt among all the troops. These reasons settled the question.

*Chairman.*— And were there no hints or, perhaps, political considerations of a certain kind pointing to General Brussilov's reactionary tendencies, or even counter-revolutionary aspirations? Or were there no such data, nothing but hesitation and indecision?

*Kerensky.*— I had observed even before the *débâcle* that strictly speaking, *the Stavka had no plan*; there was no stability; they never seemed to anticipate events, but to

follow in their train. For instance, I remember Brussilov's consternation when the offensive did not develop as rapidly as was expected. I saw he was quite incapable of disentangling the situation on all the fronts taken as a whole. But there were no *data* whatever as to Brussilov's being a counter-revolutionary. Simply I deemed it impossible for him to remain at the head of the army, owing to his lack of a definite orientation. At this conference he opposed no opinion of his own to all the arguments expressed by the commanders [passively submitting to the general tendency].

All this created such a situation that, if Brussilov had remained, we should have faced coming events in total ignorance of our next move. We could not tell what course we should adopt on the morrow, what would happen to the army, whether we should advance simultaneously in all directions, etc.

[The scheme of the offensive of July, 1917, consisted of a series of attacks to be delivered against the enemy on all the fronts in succession, thereby preventing the concentration of his forces on the point of attack. The success of this general offensive depended upon its rapid development, but in reality all calculations were upset from the start, the connection between the operations at various fronts severed, with the consequence that the entire aim of the operation was frustrated. As soon as this state of things became evident I advised General Brussilov before the 6th of July to stop the general offensive. But I met with no approval. Separate offensives were continued at different fronts, but all spirit and sense had forsaken them. Nothing remained but the inertia of movement, which only tended to augment the ruin and dissolution of the army. I remember that Kornilov's telegram of the 11th of July, pointing

to the necessity of "immediately stopping the offensive on all fronts," played an important part in his appointment to the post of Generalissimo.]

## § 2

*Chairman.*—Has not a certain conversation taken place with Savinkov and Filonenko in a railway car, concerning the conference, which explains our previous question?

*Kerensky.*—I do not know which conversation you refer to. There were several conversations.

*Chairman.*—About replacing Brussilov by Kornilov.

*Kerensky.*—I should like to say that Savinkov ought to be distinguished from Filonenko. As far as I can remember, Savinkov accompanied me to the conference. . . . Oh, no—he arrived from the South-western front [though at my summons]. He was commissary at that time. At first I did not even know that Filonenko was at the Stavka. I was acquainted with Savinkov's work at the South-western front; I had spoken to him, whereas Filonenko was personally very little known to me. I met him almost for the first time at the Stavka. After the conference of July 16th conversations did take place in the railway-car. I do not remember whether Filonenko was present or not, but I do not think he could speak in the *same way* as Savinkov would.

*Chairman.*—Perhaps in connection with this conference conversations had taken place concerning changes in the Government. Who were the Cabinet Ministers proposed, or what were the changes anticipated?

*Kerensky.*—I do not at all remember what happened on the train. I was then already Prime Minister. . . . I do not remember whether the crisis was over then or not. It

seems as if all this happened before the Cabinet had been reformed. I cannot say. I do not remember. If the Cabinet was incomplete, then the conversation did take place. That crisis lasted a long time, a whole month, I believe, and ended in my resigning. It was the only way to force public opinion to come to any decision. Generally, I must say, concerning your references to different conversations in which I took part, that conversations are freely going on around me. I never forbid any one, not even a sub-lieutenant (let alone a commissary), to express his opinion, give advice, etc. But such talk seldom influences subsequent events.

[During the examination proper these questions concerning conversations in the railway-carriage seemed to me rather unnecessary and irrelevant. But now, having become acquainted "at leisure" with the different statements upon the Kornilov affair, I see the use that was attempted to be made of such conversations and find it necessary to discuss the matter more fully.

Now I understand that the Commission of Inquiry was trying to clear up the question of the "irresponsible influences" upon the Prime Minister. Here are those of the statements touching upon this question and made in connection with the Kornilov affair with which I became acquainted. General Kornilov says that he "openly" declared to Savinkov that he considered "Kerensky a man of weak character, easily influenced by others." Savinkov relates: "On the way, I learnt in the train from A. F. Kerensky that he had summoned me from the Southwestern front in view of formation of a new Cabinet based upon the principle of a strong revolutionary power. . . . However, after our arrival at Petrograd, Kerensky's combination did

not come into existence. The problem of a strong revolutionary power remained unsolved, but General Kornilov was appointed Generalissimo, Filonenko Commissary-in-Chief, and I Deputy Minister of War." "On the way," says Filonenko, "*we* drew the Prime Minister's attention to the urgent necessity of creating a strong authority, and were energetically supported by M. I. Terestchenko. The question of forming an inner 'War Cabinet' of Government members was particularly discussed. . . . This idea, which received A. F. Kerensky's full approval, was warmly supported by Terestchenko. . . ." Lastly, in Savinkov's supplementary statement there was a special clause 4: "On irresponsible advisers," which ran as follows: "I became convinced that both N. V. Nekrassov and M. I. Terestchenko with Kerensky's knowledge *interfere* in the affairs of the Military Department." But both Nekrassov and Terestchenko were fully constituted members of the Provisional Government and as such had full right to "interfere," even without my "knowledge," in the affairs of any department. They not only possessed that right, but it was their duty to do so, as members of the Provisional Government jointly responsible for each other. Besides, V. N. Nekrassov was then my Deputy, and M. I. Terestchenko Minister for Foreign Affairs. Military problems touched them both very closely. I consulted them upon questions of military policy more frequently than any other ministers. Only a man very unversed in statesmanship could in this case speak of "irresponsible influences." "Besides which," continues Savinko, "I became convinced that A. F. Kerensky is advised upon affairs of state by persons not belonging to the Provisional Government. Thus Colonel Baranovsky and Flag-Captain Muraviev, and also, to the best of my belief, Gotz and Sen-

sinov offered advice about the formation of a new Cabinet, while Messrs. Balavinsky and Virubov discussed V. N. Lvov's 'ultimatum.' "

Balavinsky and Virubov, as will be seen later, rendered me very important services upon the evening of the 26th of August — and that is all. I will also dilate further on the circumstances in which Colonel Baranovsky and Flag-Captain Muraviev have expressed their views. Concerning the hints as to the influence of Gotz and Sensinov, I could greatly enlarge the list of "irresponsible advisers" by adding to it the representatives of other political parties (C.-D., S.-R., S.-D., etc.),<sup>1</sup> whom I *invariably consulted every time* the Government was reformed. I do not think it possible to form a serious Cabinet without learning the wishes and tendencies of the political parties called upon to support the Government.

When, however, the question was not of a political agreement for the formation of a coalitionary Government, but one of a measure of administration — then the most influential "irresponsible advisers" remained powerless, even "Gotz and Sensinov." For instance, both of them decidedly protested in the name of the S.-I. party against B. V. Savinkov's appointment as Deputy Minister of War, and yet he was appointed in spite of them.

"Moreover," continues Savinkov in his disclosures, "Colonel Baranovsky often expressed his views concerning the appointments and dismissals of persons belonging to the high command." But Colonel Baranovsky was chief of my Military Cabinet, whose duty it was to give me correct information and conclusions upon all military questions which came before me. Moreover, the only effect of his opinion

<sup>1</sup> C.-D. = Constitutional Democrats; S.-R. = Socialist Revolutionists; S.-D. = Social Democrats.



about the staff of the military department was in helping me to examine each case more fully. Savinkov even added my eighteen-year-old aides-de-camp to the list of my "irresponsible advisers." Well, here he beats me, and I am powerless to refute *this* accusation.

I have purposely dwelt upon these details to give an example of how history is written and legends created. The events of the 3rd-5th of July in Petrograd, the break-up of the front, the Government crisis, complications with different nationalities, economic difficulties, the food crisis — offered problems which the Government, diminished numerically (the cadets having only just left it) had to cope with all at once. ✓

On me devolved primarily the task of dealing with these matters: for almost twenty-four hours at a stretch I had to divide my time between supreme State Government, Home policy, reports of the Ministries of War and Marine, and continuous trips to the front or the Stavka. At such a time, the railway-car meant rest — a respite, when one could cease to be Prime Minister and just sit quietly and listen, and when one could also allow one's companions to indulge in unconventional talk upon all subjects; for my closest collaborators also worked like convicts when not on the train. And now such a railway-respite assumes historical significance, the chance companions of a casual talk upon the burning topics of the day transform it into a political event of which they were the centre. And when later the Provisional Government does not act upon "our report," naturally all the blame is laid upon other advisers, who had played upon the "weakness" of the Premier. Men who wish to govern must possess the art of listening silently and letting others speak out their thoughts, for this brings one into closer touch with the yet unconscious hopes and aspirations of different social

circles. We were, of course, not exempt from work even on the train. So on this occasion I listened attentively to all Savinkov's conclusions upon military questions and to his character-sketch of General Kornilov, as both of them were destined to occupy more responsible posts in the future.]

### § 3

*Chairman.*—What was your attitude, sir, and that of the Provisional Government, towards General Kornilov's proposals regarding the enforcement of army discipline and the restoration of order at the front and in the rear?—also as regards his program and demands after he was appointed Generalissimo?

*Kerensky.*—Well, you see, here you must take both sides of the question: the substance of his desires and the outward forms he wished them to assume. In substance his scheme was already partly being worked out by the Provisional Government and was expected to be put into practice according to the plan: co-ordination of relations between the committees, the commissaries and the commanding staff; definition of rights and duties; army discipline, such as the re-establishing and enforcing of the officers' authority, etc. All this was *already* being worked out. The only novelty that presented itself was this: proposals became *demands*, presented to the Provisional Government by General Kornilov. This was strongly emphasized. Moreover, he specially insisted on reprisals, such as death-penalty, revolutionary tribunals in the rear, etc. Part of the Provisional Government advocated the full acceptance of General Kornilov's "demands." Myself and the majority of the Government were of opinion that Kornilov's demands, like all the proposals of other commanders, however highly placed,

could only serve as material for free discussion by the Provisional Government, as we could not on principle deviate from our adopted course of action, which consisted in gradually introducing necessary measures without creating undue shocks in the army and the country. As to the form of Kornilov's demands, here the Provisional Government as a body was obliged to protest emphatically against Kornilov's ultimative manner of addressing the Government, in order to safeguard the rights and the prestige of the Provisional Government as the Supreme Authority of the State.

General Kornilov's first ultimatum was presented *immediately* after his appointment as Generalissimo and before he had even left Bendery. I sent him the customary telegram of congratulation, expressing the hope that under his command, etc. . . . in short, all that is usually said upon such occasions. It seemed to me that the man honestly desired to and would work. In reply to my telegram I at once received the first ultimatum. You know, the Tcheremissov affair. I told the Provisional Government that we must dismiss Kornilov at once; that if we wanted to restore discipline in the army, we must begin by giving an example in high quarters. My proposal was not accepted, and Kornilov interpreted our indulgence as a sign of *impotence*.

[As a matter of fact, General Kornilov during the first twenty-four hours of his Generalissimoship managed to send me two ultimative telegrams, but I did not deal with them in the same way. I simply made a note of the first telegram. I did not report it to the Provisional Government, although it contained neither more nor less than the "terms" upon which General Kornilov *consented* to remain Generalissimo. Here is the text of this ultimatum: "As a soldier bound to give an example of military discipline I obey the order of the Provisional Government appointing me to the post of

Generalissimo; but *now as* Generalissimo and a citizen of free Russia I declare that I shall remain at this post only so long as I am conscious of being useful to my country and to the established *régime*. According to the above statement I declare that I accept this appointment upon the following terms: (1) *responsibility only before my conscience and before the whole people*; (2) *absolute non-interference* with my imperative orders, including *appointments* to the high command; (3) extension of all measures lately adopted at the front to all districts in the rear where there are army reserves; (4) acceptance of my proposals stated in my telegram to the Generalissimo at the Conference of July 16th, at the Stavka. . . ."

Today, upon the background of the events which succeeded them, these "terms," drawn up by Zavoiko, produce a far less naïve impression than they did on the 20th of July, 1917. Then, if treated seriously, an official discussion of the ultimatum of General Kornilov, acting "*now as* Generalissimo," would have resulted in one inevitable consequence (see Clauses 1 and 2 of the terms)—General Kornilov's immediate dismissal from his post, with committal for trial according to military statute. And yet the entire document gave proof of such absence of even an elementary knowledge of statesmanship that it seemed impossible to reprove this gallant soldier, who clearly had signed a document foisted upon him by "chance persons." At that time I could have entirely shared Prince G. N. Trubetzkoy's later expressed opinion of General Kornilov.

"My general opinion of Kornilov," wrote Prince Trubetzkoy, "is, that he is above all a soldier unable to grasp complicated political matters, and as such he offers a particularly remarkable sample of our commanding staff." I recollect that, after reading the Generalissimo's terms, I handed over

the telegram to Savinkov and Baranovsky. They both said it was unworthy of notice, and Savinkov added that this action showed that the General had been again influenced by the unscrupulous adventurers who surrounded him, and that, after receiving corresponding explanations, Kornilov would acknowledge his mistake.

If you bear in mind that those were times when "all and sundry" addressed nothing but "demands" to the Provisional Government, that the relation of a person demanding something to somebody of whom he demands it was the only accepted form of relation to the authorities; if you understand an attitude entirely comprehensible in the case of a people intoxicated with liberty after long years of slavery, whose imperious mode of address was adopted by a street meeting and the State Duma Conference, by the spokesman of the "revolutionary democracy" and the Central Committee of the Officers' League — if you bear all this in mind, you will understand why I considered General Kornilov's terms as mere *literature*. Added to that was the extraordinary critical position at the front, which had to be dealt with with the utmost circumspection, and clamoured not for "politics" but for military art; and I think that every impartial critic will understand why I could not deal with Kornilov's telegram otherwise than by locking it up in my desk.

General Tcheremissov's affair was quite another matter. This time I had to deal not with mere literature but with a very decisive act, which called for instant repudiation by the Supreme Authority. In his statement to the Commission of Inquiry General Kornilov himself gives the following narrative of his Tcheremissov "conflict" with the Provisional Government:

"On the 19th of July I was appointed Generalissimo by

order of the Provisional Government. I telegraphed a reply, stating upon what terms I considered it possible to accept that post. One of the terms was the absolute non-interference of the Provisional Government in all appointments to the high command. . . . In reply I received a telegram from the Minister of War, recognizing my right to appoint my own collaborators, and the next day I learnt from the Press news that General Tcheremissov had, without my knowledge, been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Southwestern front. I was obliged to telegraph to the Minister of War, asking him to cancel this appointment and warning him that otherwise I should find it impossible to accept the Supreme Command. On the 20th of July I wired to Savinkov telling him that before receiving a decisive answer to my telegrams I would *not* start for the Stavka."

In the first place, the simultaneous appointments of Generals Kornilov and Tcheremissov by order of the Senate were made on *the 18th of July*, i.e. *before* Kornilov presented his terms, and therefore my answer to General Kornilov's telegrams of July 19th could have no connection with the events of July 18th. Then my answer contained no assent to the terms of "non-interference"; I only recognized General Kornilov's right as Generalissimo to make such appointments to the commanding staff as are within the jurisdiction of a Generalissimo, but this right had never been disputed. The fact is that the Statute concerning the rights of the Generalissimo, which had been drawn up for the Grand Duke Nicholai Nicholaevitch, gave the Generalissimo the right of appointment to commanding posts, subject to the presentation of the candidates for confirmation by the Supreme Authority. This Statute remained in force after the Revolution, the power of the Sovereign being transferred to the Provisional Government. In practice, both

before and after the Revolution the mutual relations between the Supreme Authority and the Stavka concerning appointments to the High Command consisted in each case in a preliminary agreement. I cannot recall a single instance of the Provisional Government appointing any one to the army without previously consulting the Stavka, or of refusing the confirmation of an appointment made by the latter. On the other hand, I must bear witness that neither General Alexeiev nor General Brussilov ever exercised their rights in cases of importance without first privately consulting the Premier or the Minister of War. Naturally, General Kornilov's attempt to give such a wide interpretation of the Generalissimo's rights as to make him completely independent of the Government was doomed to failure. In Kornilov's time the Provisional Government made as much use as ever of its right of control and final confirmation of all appointments, decidedly interfering, when necessary, with the Stavka's activity. Thirdly, and that is the most important point, General Kornilov, in spite of my telegram, continued to insist upon General Tcheremissov's dismissal, and threatened to abandon his post in the middle of the enemy offensive. Having accepted the post of Generalissimo on the 19th of July, Kornilov arbitrarily delayed entering upon his duties for five days until the 24th of July. This was no longer literature, but a serious breach of military duty, which threatened the country with grave consequences.

I plead guilty for not having finally insisted upon Kornilov's immediate dismissal, but . . . but those were such awful times, there was such sore need of a strong personality at the front. Besides, General Tcheremissov's remaining under the existing circumstances at the post of Commander-in-Chief of the South-western front could only

bring harm. When judging this "conflict" one must bear in mind that General Tcheremissov, commanding one of the 8th Army corps, had delivered a successful attack at Galitch and had added fresh laurels to General Kornilov's fame. At the time of my visit to the 8th Army, just before the Galitch offensive, General Kornilov spoke very highly of Tcheremissov, and my personal impression of Tcheremissov was that of a man capable of commanding troops in the novel post-revolutionary conditions. In the opinion of every unprejudiced person General Tcheremissov appeared as General Kornilov's most natural successor at the South-western front. And when, under pressure of the moment, I appointed them both on the 18th of July, I had no idea of creating a "conflict."

Since then I received weekly ultimatums from General Kornilov. I here again repeat that I *struggled most decidedly* against these ultimatums and against this matter of treating the Provisional Government. I *struggled from first to last*.

This struggle was all the more difficult because I could and would not use the favourite method of both the Right and Left parties — *demagogy*. You have but to open the papers of that period to see the organized demagogic campaign led by the Stavka by means of special correspondents, interviews and declaration telegrams, which appeared in the Press before reaching the Premier's study — all of which produced an echo from the demagogues of the Left. Observing the play of these passions, the Government tried by all means to calm the social atmosphere, to support the authority of the Stavka as the supreme military centre in the eyes of democracy, to keep General Kornilov within bounds *in such a way* as not to increase the differences in the army. During those long weeks of struggle there was



not a single instance of a hostile act done by any member of the Government against the Stavka. On the contrary, when General Kornilov arrived at Petrograd on the 3rd of August, I took the opportunity of fêting him at a meeting of the Provisional Government and of having the fact printed in all the papers. Just before and during the Moscow Conference, as will be seen later, the Government took steps to prevent Kornilov from compromising himself. The Government's conflict with Kornilov assumed the shape of a passive resistance, the main point of it being the prevention of him and his adherents from taking one step beyond the limits drawn by the Provisional Government, so that all his attempts to use the Provisional Government as a *means* for the attainment of his own ends proved a failure. The Provisional Government executed the will of the whole people as expressed in the agreement between all the political parties which had delegated their representatives to the Provisional Government, and the only way of forcing it to deviate from such an all-national program in the interests of one separate party was to overthrow it—an attempt which failed on the 27th of August and succeeded on the 25th of October.]

#### § 4

*Chairman.*—Did Kornilov always address his demands for reform in the army and the rear to you personally, or through Savinkov, and were you always acquainted with them?

*Kerensky.*—No; and I must say that the most critical period was at the time of the possible prevention of the Moscow Conference (10th–11th of August), on the very eve of its meeting, when without my knowledge Kornilov

was summoned to Petrograd. Although he refused to come [owing to the grave situation at Riga], the Ministry of War, that is Savinkov and Filonenko, insisted upon his arrival. When I heard of this insistence (about midnight on the eve of the Generalissimo's arrival at Petrograd) I sent the following telegram to Kornilov: "The Provisional Government has not summoned you, does not insist upon arrival, and will not be responsible for it in view of the strategic situation." In spite of that Kornilov arrived and presented me with a memorandum [to be brought that evening before a meeting of the Provisional Government], supposed to have been jointly drawn up by the Minister of War and the Generalissimo. But *I had never seen it before* it was shown to me by the Generalissimo. Neither had Kornilov seen it before his arrival at Petrograd, but he supposed I was acquainted with it. Here he had sat on that little chair and I in this arm-chair, and it seemed to me that I had succeeded in persuading him that, whatever opinion one might have of the memorandum itself, it was impossible to issue a document in the name of the Minister of War of whose contents I, then Minister of War, knew nothing [and that therefore, before I became thoroughly acquainted with it, it could not be discussed by the Provisional Government].

Kornilov agreed to this, took this document, and departed. He returned, however, in the evening in a totally changed frame of mind and declared that he was fully in accord with Savinko and Filonenko and had already signed the memorandum.

*Chairman.*—Therefore this memorandum did not proceed from him, but was apparently written by Savinkov?

*Kerensky.*—It seems to have been drawn up by Filonenko.

[As will ultimately be seen, my deposition at this point

refers to the so-called second report of General Kornilov. This document ought to have been brought before the Provisional Government instead of the first report of the Supreme Command which he proposed to lay before the Government on August 3rd, but the reading of which was postponed until its contents were approved by the Minister of War. Thus the very origin of this second report proves that, even if I did not entirely agree with all it contained, my knowledge of its essential contents was an indispensable preliminary condition of its being laid before the Provisional Government. From General Kornilov's deposition it is evident that his decision to sign the report of Savinkov and Filonenko, at 6 P. M. on August 10th, was brought about by Savinkov's declaring that although "the memorandum had not actually been laid before A. F. Kerensky for his final revision," he had reported to him (Kerensky) "bit by bit in the course of its preparation, and that in any case the contents of the report were known to the Prime Minister." In reality I was only informed of the first clause relating to "the introduction of military courts-martial at the rear." However, Savinkov in his deposition changes the definite word "contents" into the vague term "substance of." "This memorandum," says Savinkov, "apart from the projects of bills of Committees and Commissaries, contains within itself other projected measures: (1) The establishment of revolutionary courts-martial at the rear; (2) the restoration of disciplinary powers to commanding officers; (3) the militarization of the railways; (4) the militarization of such enterprises as were working for the defence. A. F. Kerensky was kept informed by me to some extent of the preparation of such a report by the War Office, since on several occasions I laid before him the substance of it, emphasizing more especially the bill of the military-revolu-

tionary courts-martial by which it acquired a decisive importance. Kerensky did not express his views as to the measures proposed by me until August 8th, when at the Ministry of War he declared to me categorically that in no case, and under no conceivable circumstances, would he sign such a document. After this declaration of his, I said that in that case the report to the Provisional Government would be presented by General Kornilov and I sent in my resignation."

This deposition depicts in sufficiently high colours the relations between the Deputy-Minister of War and the War Minister; but an indispensable commentary on Savinkov's cautious words will be found in the conversation by telegram between Filonenko and the Commissary of the South-western front, Gobetchia, on August 27th. "You know our rule," said Filonenko, "to act always with the cognizance not only of our allies, but of our real, or presumed, enemies as well. Therefore we have informed the Prime Minister betimes of the fact that I am writing a report, that Boris Victorovitch<sup>1</sup> is in constant touch with me, and that General Kornilov fully shares our views on the state of things. . . . The Premier did not find it possible to lay such a report before the Provisional Government for consideration. We then warned him that it would be presented to the Provisional Government all the same by one who had the right to do so, that is to say, by the Commander-in-Chief. Unfortunately the Premier did not value our sincerity, nor the frank line of action we adopted. . . . I, bidding good-bye (Filonenko had to proceed to Headquarters on the evening of August 10th), assured

<sup>1</sup> Familiar appellation of Savinkov, according to the Russian custom of calling a person by his prenomens plus his father's prenomens.

Savinkov that in this *extraordinary political conflict* he had, of course, a right to the support of his adherents."

Thus, on account of a political quarrel, it was considered possible to command the presence of General Kornilov in spite of the fact that "the changes in the strategic situation demanded his presence at Headquarters," as, according to Savinkov, Kornilov had declared to him in person, on August 9th, by telegram. (These were the critical days of Riga.)

Savinkov, fully realizing how serious was his action, assured General Kornilov, according to the statement of the latter, that "the summons to Petrograd was made with the knowledge of the Provisional Government." In his own deposition Savinkov speaks as follows: "I summoned General Kornilov to Petrograd in the full conviction that I was acting entirely in agreement with Kerensky, for: (1) on August 3rd, General Kornilov notified me that he was coming to Petrograd for the discussion of the memorandum, and his declaration had met with no objection on Kerensky's part; (2) on August 7th, General Kornilov telegraphed to Kerensky and received no objection; (3) on August 8th, I referred the matter to Kerensky and encountered no opposition. The fact of Kerensky's having sent a telegram to Kornilov on the 9th, intimating that his journey to Petrograd was unnecessary, which did not find the General at Headquarters, was not known to me." While so precisely demonstrating that on August 3rd, 7th and 8th he had good grounds for his conviction that he was acting in complete agreement with me, Savinkov has forgotten that he himself was only informed on August 9th of General Kornilov's refusal to come to Petrograd; while as to Savinkov's being ignorant of my telegram sent to catch General Kornilov, the

matter is easily explained: it was sent late in the evening, after I had accidentally learnt of the unauthorized and repeated invitation to Kornilov, which, it is to be regretted, I did not learn from Savinkov personally.]

*Raupakh.*— This was on August 10th?

*Kercensky.*— All this took place on August 10th, and early on August 11th Kokoshkin came to me with the intimation that he would resign at once if General Kornilov's program was not accepted that day. The tension was great, but I succeeded in smoothing things over.

[It is only necessary to remember the exceptional tension of political passion under pressure of which the Moscow Conference met and was inaugurated, in order to realize what a sense of bewilderment came over me on Kokoshkin's appearance with his resignation — for I was in the very centre of this area of tension. This matutinal interview with Kokoshkin was one of the stormiest of my political encounters. But today I rejoice to remember the passionate flame of love for his country which he felt in the depths of his soul; a love which so soon consumed him on the martyr's pyre; a love which then made it possible for us, in fine, to speak independently of party, and above all party feeling, the fraternal language of the sons of one mother — Russia.

✓ The departure of one group of ministers from the Provisional Government on account of Kokoshkin would probably have been followed by the resignation of the remaining ministers on the eve of the opening of the Conference for the same reason as in the case of Kokoshkin — the "demands" of Kornilov. This would have made any further preservation of national equilibrium an impossibility. The Government, however, was only too well aware of the state of the country to risk a disastrous attempt at government

by a "homogeneous" Cabinet, and was compelled to put aside any subject of which the "Bolsheviks from the Right"<sup>1</sup> might take advantage for an attempt (which was being prepared for the Moscow Conference) to create a so-called "strong authority" and in any case to deviate the course of the Government towards the Right. Of course, such an attempt could only have brought to cruel shame those who took part in it. Its danger might only have lain in the fact that it would have thrown towards the Left the leaders of democratic circles which at this juncture were following sincerely and honourably in the steps of the Government. I think the Moscow Conference proved that the hypothesis that the masses of the nation might at that time have been detached from the Provisional Government in order to follow a course more to the Right was a harmful Utopianism, because such dreams, impotent to bring forth results, were only effective in producing irritation in the masses and increasing their distrust of the classes. At that time, at the Moscow Conference, the Utopians of the Right were shown their proper place without serious trouble, but no lessons of facts and realities could disillusion them, and they continued to clamour just enough to become a convenient weapon in the hands of the demagogues of the Left to rouse the wild beast in the masses, who in the end has broken his cage and run amuck. ✓

Later, after the Moscow Conference, I laid matters before Savinkov and persuaded him not to resign. When it seemed that at Moscow everybody realized clearer that it is impossible to attack the Provisional Government on *this* ground, I decided that it was not worth while to follow up any further all the consequences of this episode of the memorandum and summons to Kornilov.

<sup>1</sup> The Absolutists.

Of course this decision may appear to have been wrong, but I did not perceive in Savinkov's doings any evil design, and only saw in them an extreme manifestation of his militant temperament. But in any case his resignation would not have averted Kornilov's proceedings, because I am convinced that the events of August 27th-29th had been prepared behind Savinkov's back. I think it will be evident to the reader later that this deduction was correct.]

## § 5

*Chairman.*— Were reports made to you by Filonenko concerning the conspiracy at Headquarters, and on what were they based? Especially as regards Lukomsky and Tikhmeniev?

*Kerensky.*— I read in the newspapers that certain witnesses attach some great importance to the alleged "fact" that I was informed of a plot almost under the direction of Lukomsky, and nevertheless paid no attention to it. . . . As a matter of fact, the affair was quite otherwise. There was some talk of Lukomsky, but under the following circumstances. A day or two after Filonenko was elected Commissary to the Supreme Command, Savinkov told me that Filonenko had "discovered" something, and that he insisted on the immediate dismissal of Lukomsky. I replied by asking how he had learnt it, seeing he had only just arrived from Headquarters. Then Filonenko came here and said to me: "I do not trust General Lukomsky and I insist on his immediate dismissal." I answered that I could not do this because it was quite impossible to dismiss the Chief of the Staff of the Generalissimo without any grounds or information; that my position would be ridiculous, and it would be said that this was autocracy in its



most inadmissible form—to dismiss one man for who-knows-what one day, and another one the next. So far, General Lukomsky had carried out his duties conscientiously, and there was nothing against him. “If you bring me positive information, that will be another matter,” I said.

*Shablovsky.*—And he produced no facts?

*Kerensky.*—He produced none; he only said: “I declare that I utterly distrust Lukomsky and insist on his immediate dismissal.” M. I. Terestchenko, who was at Headquarters at that time, came and told me that the feeling there was extremely serious because Filonenko led a most persistent campaign against Lukomsky. After this I received no further communications regarding Lukomsky except that information reached me that the people there managed to get on together better than before.

*Shablovsky.*—In connection with this indication by Filonenko of the lack of any data which would confirm his desire to see Lukomsky dismissed, did you not explain to Filonenko that as Commissary to the Supreme Command he ought to maintain good relations with the Chief of the Staff?

*Kerensky.*—I spoke thus: I consider, generally speaking, that such behaviour was undesirable, and that without sufficient grounds such assertions should never be made to me. Also I insisted that the relations between himself, as the Commissary attached to the Commander-in-Chief, and the Chief of the Staff should be correct.

*Chairman.*—And did you say that in the meantime you did not suspect Lukomsky of being a counter-revolutionary?

*Kerensky.*—Yes. Because there was no sort of evidence to that effect. [General Lukomsky's appointment to the post of Chief of the Staff was made at the same time as

that of General Brussilov (who became Commander-in-Chief). Comparatively young, energetic, very intelligent, an accomplished specialist, with great experience in administrative and military matters, General Lukomsky carried out his duties as Chief of the Staff during an extremely difficult phase of the war in an exemplary way, understanding how to limit tactfully the circle of his duties and never mixing himself up in politics. Therefore what afterwards happened — the union between Lukomsky and General Kornilov — was incomprehensible to me. Now that I am acquainted in detail with all that took place at Headquarters previous to August 27th, and that the rôle played there by Filonenko himself became clear to me, I understand why Lukomsky at the last moment proved to be at one with Kornilov. But then, at the close of July, the campaign against Lukomsky could be explained as being (as it seems in fact to have been) merely an effort to rid Headquarters of a man who was distrusted. Here is a characteristic passage from a statement of Prince Trubetzky which confirms my conjectures: "I must say that as early as August 24th, having called on Lukomsky after a discussion with General Kornilov, I pointed out to the former the people who surrounded Kornilov, enlarging upon the possible harm to him from their influence. Lukomsky, agreeing with me entirely on this point, remarked that he had been kept altogether out of the recent political discussions . . . and that he had raised *the question as to whether he possessed Kornilov's confidence* or no, after which he was informed in a general way of the political movements." Elsewhere, Trubetzky relates how, on August 27th, Lukomsky, in his presence, asked Kornilov "to make it possible for them to converse in private, if only for a few minutes."

I do not think that the effort to get rid of Lukomsky in

July was made without Kornilov being aware of it, because his wish to change the Chief of the Staff was known to me, and it was only at the Moscow Conference that Kornilov told me that he had come to an agreement with Lukomsky.]

*Chairman.*— More particularly, sir, as regards Tikhmeniev, was not his dismissal demanded on similar grounds, namely that he was something like the head of the plot, and had not the prejudice against him some foundation?

*Kerensky.*— I must confess that the incident relating to Tikhmeniev passed before me as in a dream. I heard that a telegram had been sent to summon Tikhmeniev to the Ministry of War, that when on his way thither he was sent back again, and that all this was done on account of that telegram from Filonenko to Savinkov, a phrase of which was found later in a note-book in the possession of Kornilov when he was arrested — about “the pale horse.”<sup>1</sup> This story did not reach me officially. All this fuss was grounded on the fact that almost immediately after his arrival at Headquarters Filonenko sent Savinkov a code telegram to the effect that Tikhmeniev was leading troops (“the pale horse”) against Kornilov (“the Myrta”). Afterwards Filonenko explained this telegram by the fact that just at this time the Third Army Corps was moved from the South to Headquarters.

*Shablovsky.*— Did not Colonel Baranovsky then specially vouch for Tikhmeniev, saying that so far no kind of suspicion had been aroused by him, and did not that serve to rehabilitate Tikhmeniev?

*Kerensky.*— There was some conversation on Lukomsky's account, but the story about Tikhmeniev did not reach me. Some one just mentioned that a curious telegram was re-

<sup>1</sup> “The Pale Horse” is a well-known novel by B. V. Savinkov.

ceived which had very mysterious contents. Perhaps I am confusing matters, but it seems to me this was how it stood. [General Tikhmeniev was the Chief of the Military Transport at Headquarters, consequently orders for the transport of troops were sent out from there signed by this general. But Tikhmeniev could only give such directions after having received corresponding orders from the Staff. Consequently, the duties of Chief of the Military Transport were purely technical and administrative. The case of General Tikhmeniev is quite unimportant, almost farcical; it was touched upon by the Commission of Inquiry evidently in connection with that version of it which was so persistently expounded by Filonenko and a few others: there was a plot, but all the threads of it centred in the Staff, and Kerensky, being reassured by Baranovsky, closed his eyes to this. . . . In reality the misunderstanding with Tikhmeniev happened because, at the time of General Kornilov's arrival at Headquarters, the Third Army corps also went there, having been summoned after the events of July 3rd-5th to station itself in the region of Headquarters. The fact was that, having received false intelligence of the victory of the Bolsheviks in Petrograd, their comrades of the Soviet of Mohilev (where the Headquarters were) tried to achieve a similar result at Headquarters, and appeared before General Brussilov with a proposal to recognize them as Authority. In a discussion on this subject it came out that Headquarters were, in reality, completely without protection against such insolence. Now, to create, even temporarily, entanglements in the working at Headquarters would be a very attractive plan, and not only for Russian Bolsheviks. . . . Therefore we, with Brussilov, decided to strengthen the defences at Headquarters. This is all.]

## § 6

*Chairman.*— Then, what about Kornilov's arrival on August 3rd, its reason, aims, and all that took place there? Both Kornilov and Savinkov express themselves explicitly on this subject.

*Kerensky.*— On the 3rd of August, Kornilov arrived in order to . . .

*Raupakh.*— To report on the strategical situation . . .

*Kerensky.*— Yes, yes. . . .

*Chairman.*— They refer to a memorandum which Savinkov wrote to Kornilov and transmitted through the Minister Terestchenko. In this connection Kornilov makes an extended deposition; he says in it that then a complete change came about in his ideas . . .

*Kerensky.*— In his deposition he states what I said. Please do not repeat it all here.

*Shablowsky.*— Yes, and Savinkov gave him a note. . . . Was Kornilov summoned by the Government, or did he come, as on August 10th, on the invitation of Savinkov?

*Kerensky.*— I cannot say on whose initiative it was— whether the Government summoned him, or whether he expressed a desire to present a report. We usually observed the following procedure: the Commander-in-Chief used to come in order personally to review generally the military situation and to confer with the Provisional Government upon the essential questions relating to the front. In any case Kornilov's coming on August 3rd was quite straightforward. On whose initiative he came is of no importance. He arrived, and on the same day a special sitting of the Provisional Government was called, at which Kornilov produced a report. That report had the following antecedents.

Kornilov brought with him a memorandum (which was certainly not written by him personally, but by somebody at Headquarters) of such a nature that I considered it impossible to read it out before the Provisional Government. It set forth a whole series of measures, the greater part of which were quite acceptable, but formulated in such a way and supported by such arguments that the announcement of them would have led to quite opposite results. At any rate, there would have been an outburst, and after making the memorandum public it would have been impossible to retain Kornilov as Commander-in-Chief. I then requested the Deputy Minister for War so to arrange matters that this report should not be read before the Provisional Government. It was resolved that the memorandum should be revised in conjunction with the Minister for War (i.e. myself), to make it acceptable to Headquarters, to public opinion, and to me; and that on that particular day General Kornilov should only report upon the strategic situation of the army and upon possible military events. By the way, I do not know whether you are aware that in the second memorandum presented on August 10th there appeared two entirely new clauses relating to factories and ways of communication.

*Shablowsky*.—Which did not figure in the report of August 3rd?

*Kerensky*.—No. Both these clauses were very like a production by a Stchedrin official.<sup>1</sup> They were not, as it appears, known to Kornilov before he came to Petrograd on August 10th. On that day, we — that is to say, Nekrasov, Terestchenko and myself — insistently asked Kornilov at any rate not to touch upon these clauses at the Moscow Conference. At the same time we said that if he made

<sup>1</sup> Stchedrin, a famous Russian satirist.

these clauses public, there would simply be a great scandal. As a matter of fact, if any one had desired the downfall of Kornilov at the Moscow Conference, it would only have been necessary to let him read his report in public, and especially the two clauses dealing with factories and ways of communication. Then all would have been at an end. ✓

I well remember how Nekrassov and Terestchenko, with the greatest tenderness for the General's feelings, tried their utmost to bring things home to him; and, pointing to their own experiences in the Duma, in the War Industries Committee, and other public organizations, endeavoured to make it clear to him that all his proposed measures for the regeneration of the rear — the militarization of the railways and factories — had already been brought forward by the Ministers of the old *régime*, and were even then rejected, not only by public opinion, but even by official experts; that it was impossible, for instance, to condemn an engineer to death for some technical error, or to attach the workers to their factories under the threat of repressive measures, and so on; how for General Kornilov to come forward with such projects borrowed from the archives of bureaucracy would hardly increase his authority, and so on. But all in vain. The general, much too simple in matters of state-administration and economics, who, without bothering about thinking it out, had signed this school-boyish composition in the style of Ugrium-Burcheev,<sup>1</sup> would not believe a word of what the two ministers said, and was convinced that the Provisional Government, on some pretext or other, did not wish all Russia to know of his new program for the country's salvation. Moreover, General Kornilov was so persuaded of the unique importance of this report, that in his speech at the Moscow Conference he even attributed the authorship ✓

<sup>1</sup> A character in "History of a Town," by Stchedrin.

of it to himself ("My report was presented to the Provisional Government, and this document was signed without any hesitation by the Deputy Minister for War, Savinkov, and the Commissary attached to the Supreme Command, Filonenko").

On August 3rd all was carried out as decided. At the sitting of the Provisional Government General Kornilov made a report on the strategical situation, stating that he will report on the proposed measures for the regeneration of the army during his next visit. As regards the deposition of Kornilov concerning a note received by him from Savinkov during the sitting of August 3rd, I do not know what Savinkov wrote to General Kornilov. I do not wish at present to decide whether Kornilov interpreted sincerely or not my words in regard to this document, but the conversation we had with him was on a quite different subject. He reported, at great length, on the question of the proposed offensive operations on the South-Western front, and on a whole series of other measures, and afterwards he began to talk of various technical matters in detail. Then I turned to him and said, "General, these details are not at all necessary here." That is all.

*Shablovsky.*— . . . Thus, the general strategical situation was sketched out?

*Kerensky.*— More than that; he even spoke, as I have said already, about the preparations made for an offensive on the South-Western front. Only after I perceived that all that was essential had been reported, I said to the General that these details were unnecessary here. It should be stated — and members of the Provisional Government can confirm this — that I always endeavoured to keep the sittings of the Provisional Government as brief as possible, and used to cut short even Ministers ruthlessly when once I



saw that the essence of the matter had been laid before us. . . .

*Krokhmal.*— There was not in it a thought of the necessity of secrecy?

*Kerensky.*— I had no such thought. Simply, if it had happened to be a member of the Provisional Government or an intimate friend, I should have said: "Ivan Ivanovitch, enough. The matter is now clear." I did not wish to . . .

*Krokhmal.*— Offend him?

*Kerensky.*— To place him in an awkward position, and I said: "General, these details are quite unnecessary here."

*Shablovsky.*— But what was in Savinkov's note?

*Kerensky.*— I do not know. It was addressed to Kornilov.

*Shablovsky.*— Yes, the note came to Kornilov from Savinkov, and in his deposition he now insists upon this note.

*Kerensky.*— I think it likely that this happened afterwards, and that it was not a note, but a conversation. I sat beside Kornilov and should have noticed if a document had been handed over to him. Even if this had been done behind my back I should have seen Kornilov stretch out his hand.

*Shablovsky.*— This episode is not within your recollection?

*Kerensky.*— I do not remember it.

[In order to form a clear judgment as to *which* note it was that the Commission of Inquiry was so anxious to be enlightened upon, and why, I will quote the depositions on that subject of Kornilov and Savinkov which are known to me. Speaking of the sitting of the Provisional Government on August 3rd, General Kornilov added: "I con-

sider it my duty to observe that when I touched upon the question, which is the front where it might be possible to carry out an attack under certain conditions, the Prime Minister, who was sitting beside me, turned round and warned me in a whisper that this question must be handled circumspectly. Shortly afterwards Savinkov's note was handed in to me with a similar warning. I was filled with consternation and indignation; that in the Council of the Ministers of Russia the Commander-in-Chief could not, without risk, touch upon questions about which he deemed it necessary, in the interests of the defence of the country, to keep the Government informed! But at the close of the sitting it became evident to me, from a few words spoken by Savinkov, that the warning concerned the Minister ——”

About this same episode Savinkov says: “During the sitting of the Provisional Government I sent Kerensky a note containing approximately the following: ‘Does the Prime Minister feel sure that the communication by General Kornilov of the secrets of our Government and its Allies will not become known through “comrades” to our enemies?’ Moreover, at the close of the sitting I said to General Kornilov that unfortunately I was not certain that all which was said in the sittings of the Provisional Government was kept secret. Of course, I had no intention of casting suspicion on any of the Ministers as having relations with the enemy, but I knew that some members of the Government were in frequent and friendly communication with members of the Soviet, among whom, according to information from the Intelligence Department, were persons suspected of intercourse with the enemy. Besides which I knew that an officer of the Austrian army (Otto Bauer) had been invited to attend a meeting of the Soviet.” From these two deposi:-

tions it would appear that Kornilov did not receive a note from Savinkov, and that I did receive such a note from the latter, which note I immediately tore up (I remember so much). Savinkov was very cautious, being as he was in close touch with the Military Intelligence Department and studying all the reports of the Secret Service. Thus, in another part of his deposition he says: "Zavoiko was suspected of taking part in the plot, and, at the same time, my attention was drawn to him by the Intelligence Department, on account of his excellent relations with a Mr. Kurtz, who had been exiled to Ribinsk on suspicion of being a German spy."

Such is the history of the note at the sitting of August 3rd. The reason why the Commission of Inquiry became interested in this story and why I am now telling it in detail, is that it furnished General Kornilov with grounds which he deemed sufficient for an infamous statement — that "the Provisional Government is acting in complete agreement with the plans of the German General Staff." This accusation appears in his famous first manifesto "to the Russian people," which, by the way, was the work of the friend of Mr. Kurtz — Mr. Zavoiko.] ✓

## § 7

*Chairman.*— Did not the General, then Colonel, Baranovsky visit Headquarters on August 3rd-4th? For what reason was this journey undertaken? We wish to receive evidence as to when more definite reports began to come in regarding the possible plot at Headquarters.

*Kerensky.*— This is an old story. Long before Baranovsky's journey.

*Shablovsky.*— Earlier than August 3rd-4th?

*Kerensky.*— You know that at the Moscow Conference an attempt was made . . .

*Shablovsky.*— This was later . . . but on August 3rd-4th?

*Kerensky.*— Why did Baranovsky visit Headquarters? Perhaps at that time arose the question of proclaiming the establishment of martial law in connection with the Riga events.

*Krokhmal.*— No; Riga was taken after the Moscow Conference.

*Raupakh.*— Baranovsky went on August 23rd?

*Kerensky.*— Yes; he went there when it was necessary to decide the question of separating . . .

*Liber.*— This is a different visit; it was no doubt in connection with the separation of the territory of Petrograd. . . .

*Shablovsky.*— This was when he went with Savinkov, on August 23rd-24th; but on the 3rd-4th he went there on account of the peculiar relations which had already existed between Headquarters and the Provisional Government. The question of superseding the Commander-in-Chief had not yet arisen?

*Krokhmal.*— Why, Kornilov was here on August 3rd. I must remind you that Baranovsky's journey was after this.

*Ukrainzev.*— Colonel Baranovsky was to have gone to Kiev to see his sick mother (or was it his father?), and stopped at Headquarters on the way.

*Kerensky.*— Yes. He went to Kiev to his father, who was ill. I wish to be accurate, and I am afraid of stating positively whether I asked him to go to Headquarters, or whether he went of his own accord. Let us assume that it

was I who asked Baranovsky to go there. The question of the moment might have been to make clear what was *the position of the League of Officers*. I must say that from July 3rd-5th the League of Officers had taken up a somewhat aggressive attitude towards the Provisional Government and was addressing to the latter telegrams in the spirit of the "Bolshevism from the Right": "We ask this," "we demand that," "we protest," etc. When I came to Headquarters, Novosiltsev always met me with a good deal of opposition. There may often be something in the attitude of people — especially in political and social matters — which one feels clearly, although one may not be able to produce any documentary justification for the conclusions one draws from it. The tension in the atmosphere at Headquarters, especially among the Central Committee of the League of Officers, had long been felt; and a month, or perhaps more, before all these events — about the end of July — I received precise information of a plot which was being prepared among the officers and had its centres in Petrograd and at Headquarters.

*Shablovsky.*— At the end of July?

*Kerensky.*— Yes, perhaps even earlier; it can be verified in this way: when was the law passed giving the right to arrest officers when not on duty and to send them into exile?

*Liber.*— I believe, on July 9th.

*Kerensky.*— No, later. A week or two before this law was promulgated, I was thinking out the way to organize the struggle against the plotters. Ultimately, the legal measure which, as early as the month of April, I, as Minister of Justice, had brought in for formal purposes, now became necessary in practice. Of course I kept the Provisional Government informed of this new phenomenon, the

“plots wave.” At this time occurred the arrests of the Grand Dukes, but it appeared that we were purposely put on the wrong track. Baranovsky went to Headquarters in order to investigate the state of mind of the people there, and to throw some light upon what they were doing there at the League of Officers. Another time, after going there with Savinkov, he said to me among other things on his return: “The atmosphere at Headquarters is desperate just now; they absolutely can not stand you.”

[I consider it necessary to emphasize sharply the fact that Colonel Baranovsky's journey to Headquarters was not and could not have been in any way connected with questions of political investigation. The plotting at the League of Officers was a sort of smugglers' business, and the investigation of that matter was being done separately. From the midst of the Central Committee of the League of Officers were recruited the active conspirators; its members in various places were also the agents of the conspiracy on the spot: on the other hand, they also determined the character of the legal declarations or actions of the League. Now, Colonel Baranovsky was interested in the League of Officers precisely as in a legitimate social organization — an organization of which the object was exceedingly useful and necessary — although in the activities of this Central Committee features were appearing which became more and more disquieting to me both as Prime Minister and Minister of War. In its conception and rules, the League of Officers was a professional, non-party organization. “The League of Officers of the Army and Navy” (it is stated on the first page of its statutes) “is a professional League. . . . It has no political platform, and pursues no political aims. Every member of the League has a full right freely to form his political views. Members bind

themselves not to carry political intolerance into their professional relations and the everyday life of the Army and Navy." This is an entirely correct definition of the character of every professional Union. Of course, it would be absurd to expect a completely non-political attitude from any professional association in Russia during the summer of 1917, but a professional Union, and still more its administrators, never should or could behave like a militant and "intolerant" political body. Now, the Central Committee of the League of Officers violated this ABC of a professional organization, and also its own rules, in a radical manner. It is true that on July 25th of the previous year the "Messenger of the Central Committee of the League of Officers of the Army and Navy" concluded its leading article as follows: "In this article we reply to past and future accusations against the League attributing to it political activities, in order that we may point out to those who wish to implicate us in politics that the League refuses to go that way. Its mission is far wider, its activities more useful, for it aims at making it possible for every officer of the Russian revolutionary army and navy to fulfil his duties under the most favourable conditions, in the firm belief that the League will afford him full and organized support in his efforts to promote the interests and greatness of his native land." But, in its conception of "the most favourable conditions" under which officers can "fulfil their duty" the Central Committee introduced an entire political program, and, in the name of the *whole* body of officers, made very definite and sharp demands, and put forward trenchant political declarations. In order to be convinced how peculiarly the Central Committee understood its own "professionalism," it is sufficient to glance at a few numbers of its *Messenger*, and to bear in mind that the Central Com-

mittee, far from assuming a neutral attitude, would often adopt a rather "intolerant" one towards even the Provisional Government itself.

Better than any one else, I, as Minister of War, together with my close collaborators, knew and understood all the horror, moral, professional and political, of the officers' situation; better than any others we realized that the officers of the Russian army, who, after the Revolution, were becoming the "scape-goats" for the sins of others, could not keep outside politics. Less than anybody else could we be surprised by, let alone indignant at, the opposition, however sharp, on the part of the officers, who, not knowing all the complexity of the new political conditions in the life of the country, might justifiably, and quite naturally, not only complain of, but be indignant at, the Government. They did not know that strange, powerful pressure of elements let loose by revolution in the mass of the people, and particularly in the masses of soldiers—a pressure which strained to the utmost the whole organism of the State. They did not grasp the reasons for the apparent slowness with which Government exercised a cooling influence on these elements, nor realize that any imprudent measure might only enable these elements to break out afresh and sweep everybody before them, and first of all the officers and, with them, the entire Russian army.

In the fiery atmosphere of revolution, as in the torrid desert, many saw mirages before them, and in their efforts to reach them, they unhappily brought disaster—not only on themselves. That the Central Committee of the League of Officers should run after a mirage was dangerous, because the Committee spoke in the name of the whole personnel of the officers, calling itself "the representative" of "the corps of officers," pretending that its own political



creed was the cult of all the officers, and setting its seal upon the entire corporation. This was too risky a game. It was like playing with fire on the edge of the powder magazine. And if we take into consideration that the Central Committee of the League was located at Headquarters; relied in its work on the co-operation of officials upon the staff at the fronts and in the various armies; nominated its own confidential representatives; kept a black list of officers who differed from its political views; set up its own commissions of inquiry; expressed its approbation or disapproval, etc.; if, as I say, we take all these facts into consideration, it will, on the one hand, be evident why the proceedings of the Central Committee of the League assumed a "highly officious" character, and, on the other hand, why the responsibility for the actions not even of the whole League, but only of its Central Committee, was attached to all the Russian officers jointly and individually.

I will cite a clear example of the embarrassing relations between the military powers and the Central Committee which prevailed last summer and required the intervention of the Ministry of War. Savinkov then telegraphed to Kornilov as follows: "Your instructions obliging the staffs to provide the Central Committee of the League with lists of Bolshevik officers may lead to most undesirable misunderstandings, because these orders will result in setting up a certain control by the Central Committee over the party organizations and activities of the officers, which control certainly is not a function of the Central Committee; and the right of such a control can only belong to the Commissaries and to competent tribunals. In view of the above considerations, I would suggest the desirability of cancelling your instructions." Again, the staffs used to circulate certain militant resolutions of the Committee, which cir-

cumstance was understood as an official approval of the course steered by the Committee and served to increase the tension already existing in the relations between the officers of the army and the rank and file, etc.

I considered this position quite abnormal, unpermissible, pregnant with serious consequences. By way of example I will point to the alarm aroused by the activity of the League among the naval officers, on whom the least fluctuation in the political temperature of the men reacted painfully. "In view of the strong agitation in both fleets against the officers, due to the activities of the League, I beg you to bring to the knowledge of the fleets that there is information to the effect that the officers of the Baltic Fleet never had representatives in the Central Committee of the League at Headquarters, and that the Black Sea Fleet recalled theirs." Thus the Chief of the Naval Staff of the Commander-in-Chief telegraphed to me at the beginning of August.

Considering, however, that the root-idea of the League was healthy and useful, I and my collaborators, especially General Baranovsky, desired to clear up the general position, by an exchange of views, by pointing out the possible results of such a course, and thereby to restrain the Central Committee from tendencies which were psychologically intelligible, *but dangerous for the personnel of the officers as a whole*, and, what was even more important, *fatal to the whole army*. I remember having issued instructions that Colonel Pronin, a representative of the Central Committee, should be requested to come to me personally for a discussion of the matter, but, unhappily, for some reason the discussion never took place.

At the end of July, information began to come in pointing to the participation of an influential section of the Cen-

tral committee (especially of the staff officers) in an organized conspiracy, and the question of the ultimate fate of the Committee became still more acute. It was urgently necessary to find some issue before it was too late. Unfortunately, the leaders of the Committee, and among them a former member of the Fourth Imperial Duma — Colonel Novosiltsev (Constitutional Democrat)—persisted in their dangerous game, and after the Moscow Conference I resolved to have the Central Committee removed from Headquarters. . . . The nightmare through which we are living today has fully confirmed our fears, having shown how cruelly the whole body of officers suffered for the proceedings of a separate and unimportant group of fantastic and insane gamblers. And yet, as I said in my manifesto of August 22nd, “the flower of the army — the personnel of its officers — had gone through a great bloodless revolution in brotherly unity with their men, strengthening the work of those who had struck off the shameful fetters of slavery. The officers had shown that they were of one flesh with the people. The first days of joy passed; a hard task was keeping every man at his post, and preventing him from throwing down his arms, so that the foe should not snatch away his newly found freedom. The officers remained at their posts, the better part of them, in spite of all calumnies, having faith in the common sense of the people, displaying the loftiest heroism; in some units the casualties included almost all the officers. The officers, as a body, gave their blood on the battlefield, and proved their faith in their country and the Revolution. . . . History will do honour to these heroes.”]

*Shablowsky.*—What was the particular information regarding the extent of this plot, the individuals — or perhaps the organizations — which might be implicated in it?

Perhaps there was merely general information that something was being hatched?

*Kerensky.*—There was not merely information that something was being hatched, but concrete data. You are aware of our position at present. Without actual means of investigation, we are like blind puppies. We may be tricked on all sides and yet notice nothing. Generally speaking, a whole pile of information was amassed, and even before the Moscow Conference I expected that some developments were inevitable. This information came in at the end of July and the very beginning of August.

*Shablovsky.*—Was it a military conspiracy?

*Kerensky.*—The position was, that the people about whom we received information were all in the army, but they had relations with some civil elements; they had abundant resources. Quite a series of newspapers appeared—some of them are flourishing to this day—which started to attack the Provisional Government, and myself personally. They were all organs of the partisans of “a strong rule”: the *Jivoe Slovo*, *Narodnaya Gazetta*, *Novaya Russ*, *Vechernee Vremya*, etc. I cannot, naturally, furnish at this moment proofs satisfactory for inquiry purposes, but to me the whole plan is clear.

*Shablovsky.*—The creating of a suitable public opinion in certain circles, by means of a propaganda in the Press?

*Kerensky.*—Yes.

*Shablovsky.*—But were there any indications as to the immediate object in view?

*Kerensky.*—To seize the power and arrest the Provisional Government. A typical counter-revolution was being prepared; not a mass movement, but a *coup d'état*.

*Shablovsky.*—On what could “they” rely?

*Kerensky.*—“They” had links with Headquarters. At

that time no special indications pointed to Kornilov, but there was some talk of the part played by the staff officers. The first source of information was perfectly trustworthy. It was not received through agents, not being denunciatory information, so to speak; but it came from people of the highest reliability, who were honestly and seriously anxious that I should look betimes into possible occurrences. Later on, information was received through less trustworthy sources, but it completely coincided with the first intimations. Then we began to take our own observations as far as lay within our means. Naturally this was very difficult to do, for the general feeling at Headquarters was so strained that every person who came there from the Centre awakened irritation and suspicion.

[As regards the plot, it is necessary to make a few general remarks. Where did the wave of conspiracy originate? There can be but one reply: it originated at Tarnopol, and on July 3rd-4th in Petrograd. The *débâcle* at the front had created a feeling of wounded national pride which lent itself easily to methods of conspiracy, and the Bolshevik insurrection had revealed to the unenlightened how far-reaching was the inner dissolution of the democracy, the impotence of the Revolution against anarchy, and the power of the minority if competently organized and acting unexpectedly. The fact that only a handful of Cossacks and a few soldiers who had not yet lost discipline had saved the Taurida Palace (that is to say, the Soviet itself) from being wrecked was duly noted by those who were interested in such things. A further series of mistakes, and more particularly, an absurd terror, amounting almost to panic, of a coming counter-revolution, which after the 3rd-5th of July positively became the fashionable disease of the democracy, gave the circles from which the future adven-

turers originated the impression that the democracy was afraid because it felt its weakness.

Now began a tragic misunderstanding: one side lost faith in its strength, which was real, while the other, hearing its power talked about, believed in this myth. The former, panic-stricken on account of a coming counter-revolution, grew demoralized and thereby contributed towards re-establishing in the masses the anarchical-Bolshevik influences; the other side became bolder and bolder in its attacks on the "revolutionary democracy," and so irritated the people, to the great joy of the unruly elements. Besides, among circles adhering to the "Right" it was supposed that popular discontent was to their advantage, consequently they considered it a good thing to inflame the passions of the masses. See, for example, how Souvorin's *Narodnaya Gazetta* sang to the tune of Messrs. Bronstein-Trotsky and Co.: "In the very first days when in the streets of Petrograd appeared the solemn placard, 'Long live the Democratic Republic!' we said that this kind of political emasculation will not succeed in Russia; for here only a great People's Republic can be established on a new social order—a great Social Republic." And here is an echo of the Bolshevik war-cry, this time from an authentic organ of the Black Hundred—the *Groza* ("The Storm"): "On June 18th [when a number of demonstrations took place] the workers of the capital and the soldiers had a review of forces, which marched against the capitalists with a view to shortening the war and exchanging ministers taken from among the merchants and landowners for ministers from their own ranks. Against them marched the Jews, supported by the capitalists who are for the continuation of the war. The workers and soldiers threw them-

selves upon the Jews, soundly beat them, and tore up their banners."

On this "July" soil, "non-party organizations" sprang up like mushrooms, and soon began to form themselves into various circles and groups, which proceeded to take practical steps towards preparing a counter-revolution. From among various similar beginnings finally emerged a serious nucleus, the work of which was planned on a large scale. A special Press made its appearance, a propaganda was started and members enrolled, while in some places agents were appointed and gathering-points established. Valuable information received by me at this time made it possible for us to see something of what was going on, and at least to note certain individuals and partially to reveal their object and task. One thing stood out clearly: the aim of the counter-revolution was not the re-establishment of the fallen dynasty; consequently some successor of the Provisional Government was being prepared somewhere, and in any case this question must have been very seriously discussed. Later it became the special aim of certain groups to "remove" me by some means, however drastic. I was warned of an occasion when the lot had been already drawn to decide who should carry out the sentence, and only an accident prevented the performance of the act itself. . . . Upon considering every aspect of this seditious movement, I decided that the extra-judicial arrest and exile of the prominent conspirators would be an entirely suitable measure of precaution in this case (although in the case of a mass movement such procedure is useless and even harmful). However, our means of investigation were technically so imperfect that we did not succeed in suppressing the leading centres in time.

The whole time between July 3rd and August 27th may be divided into three periods: first comes that of work by primitive methods in small separate Leagues, and the process of merging the more important of them into one body; in the second, the forces were organized and means devised for an attempt to take advantage of the Moscow Conference; and in the third and last period occurred the decisive effort to seize the governing power by violence under the pretence of a conflict with the Bolsheviks. *The aim of the movement was a military dictatorship.*]

## § 8

*Shablovsky.*—When Kornilov was here on August 3rd, did you not have a conversation with him—did you not simply deliberate on the subject of how he would regard your personal departure from power? Was there no such conversation, discussion or talk?

*Kerensky.*—I read about this, and marvelled. Somewhere in his printed depositions he says that “Kerensky discussed with me or inquired whether it was not time for him to retire”—or something to that effect.

*Shablovsky.*—He put it rather differently.

*Kerensky.*—In reality (it was in this study of mine) I assured him as positively as I could that the existing coalitional Government was the only possible combination of forces, and that any other course would be *fatal*. I said to him: “Well, suppose I retire, what would be the outcome?” That was what I said. . . .

*Shablovsky.*—So there was a discussion?

*Kerensky.*—There was no deliberation of any kind. All that Kornilov and others said to the effect that the Provisional Government attached a political value to him is quite



absurd. I and other members of the Government did all we could to restrain Kornilov from politics, which were not within the range of his intellect; he did not in the least understand politics nor political developments.

*Chairman.*—Therefore this conversation, if it took place, had the character of a discussion, but not, in fact, of a consultation?

*Kerensky.*—I said: "What are you aiming at? You will simply find yourself choked in an airless space: the railways will stop, the telegraph will not work." The conversation was in that kind of spirit.

[I remember how, following my question about the Dictatorship, Kornilov answered thoughtfully: "Well, maybe we shall have to make up our minds even to that," . . . "Well," I remarked, "and that will lead inevitably to a fresh massacre of the officers." "I foresee that possibility, but at least those who are left alive will have the soldiers in hand," Kornilov replied with decision.]

Really, all my relations with Kornilov and my attitude to his enterprises are very well known to the Provisional Government, and ought to be known everywhere. I was obliged to carry on a stiff fight all the time for *the maintenance of a single fount of authority* and to prevent political adventures. I believe this was the sole method I made use of—to watch and be ready. I am sure that this was my only way, because I could not act (that is to say, bring forward accusations officially in court) on the strength of secret evidence and on the mere friendly information which I possessed. I would then have appeared in the opinion of the public like a man suffering from persecution-mania. Nothing would have come of this. But all the while I was on my guard and followed the smallest fluctuations which took place in these circles.

*Chairman.*— Then, as to this incident of the summoning of Kornilov. You stated in your deposition that the Provisional Government did not summon Kornilov, that you found yourself faced with the fact of his intention to come, and that, having learnt it, you tried to prevent him by sending him a telegram which crossed him on the way, and that afterwards he arrived here and on his arrival presented himself. . . .

*Kerensky.*— He arrived, and his attitude towards me was so “ friendly ” that he came to me with machine guns.

*Ukrainzev.*— With machine guns? What do you mean?

*Kerensky.*— A motor-car with machine guns went in front, and another motor with machine guns came in the rear. The Asiatic soldiers of Kornilov brought in two bags with the machine guns and laid them in the vestibule.

*Chairman.*— Really, they brought in machine guns?

*Kerensky.*— Yes!

*Chairman.*— And left them there?

*Kerensky.*— No. Afterwards they took them away, when they themselves were departing. Again one motor-car with machine guns led the way and another followed behind. This was their manner of leaving.

[On his previous visit to Petrograd on August 3rd, Kornilov came in without machine guns. The following quotation from the *Russkoe Slovo* gives some idea of the sultry atmosphere which prevailed at Headquarters before the Moscow Conference and the visit to Petrograd on August 10th: “ The feeling at Headquarters in connection with General Kornilov’s departure was very strained, and this nervousness increased, particularly on account of vague rumours which came from Petrograd of a plot against the Commander-in-Chief which was said to be in preparation. . . . This explains why, during General Kornilov’s

journey, measures of precaution were taken. . . . Nearer to Petrograd the feeling of apprehension of the guard increased, although there was no ostensible reason for it.”]

Oh yes, I forgot that I was informed of the existence of a certain political “salon,” where an organized campaign was going on in favour of Kornilov, and where all kinds of agitation took place and attempts were made to form public opinion. But as this was a lady’s salon I will not mention the names; this is of no importance.

*Chairman.*—Well, then, in your first deposition you state that on August 3rd Kornilov withdrew his memorandum, and that later he presented it again, personally or through Savinkov, in a revised form, in which new clauses appeared respecting the output of work in the factories.

*Kerensky.*—No; he brought it to me quite ready on August 10th. As far as I remember the matter stood thus: Savinkov and Filonenko met Kornilov at the station and handed him the report there. Personally, I believe it was so, although I do not insist upon it. I believe it happened as I said. Anyhow, Kornilov came straight to me with this memorandum. A space was left at the end of the document for his signature, and Savinkov signed just under this space, while quite at the bottom of the document Filonenko had put his signature.

*Chairman.*—Now, about these paragraphs regarding the railways and factories. When Kornilov came with his fresh report, was he alone or accompanied by Savinkov?

*Kerensky.*—He came quite alone. Previously, however, Savinkov insisted that Kornilov should, without fail, make a report to the Provisional Government.

*Chairman.*—On August 10th, when he was summoned by you?

*Kerensky.*—Previously. I said at a sitting of the Cab-

inet that, at a moment when we were wholly occupied in preparing for the Moscow Conference, the sittings of the Provisional Government did not provide either the right time or the right place for a report that required to be considered in detail. Then Savinkov and Filonenko summoned him notwithstanding; still, it all happened as I predicted: the report was not read before the Provisional Government on August 10th. It was read here, in this study, in the evening. I summoned Terestchenko and Nekrassov, and Kornilov laid the document before us here.

*Chairman.*— You have expressed your views during the day. Kornilov did not show you the report earlier?

*Kerensky.*— No; I had run through the report during the day and noticed the factories, workshops and railway clauses, which opened up entirely new questions; moreover, as I have already told you, it contained some preposterous things.

*Chairman.*— And then you expressed your objections to it?

*Kerensky.*— I said that from the formal point of view it was quite incorrect. After all, said I, who is the Deputy Minister of War? He is an official attached to myself, the Minister; he is my close collaborator and my representative.

The Deputy Minister of War had no right to go against his chief, the Minister, and still less to sign documents. Kornilov agreed that this could not be done. He agreed that, as I had not yet seen the memorandum, whereas he had brought it to me supposing that its contents were known to me, it was impossible to insist on its being read before the Provisional Government immediately. He also understood that Savinkov had behaved with a lack of

discipline. During the evening, while Kornilov was making his report, Savinkov called. I was informed that "the Deputy Minister of War is there." I did not receive him. Savinkov was not present while Kornilov read his report, because I considered that he had already retired from the Government. This was obvious to me.

[Savinkov's effort to be present during the reading of Kornilov's report on August 10th was evidently made counting on my "soft-heartedness," which would prevent me from refusing before strangers to receive him. The fact is that, according to Savinkov himself, after my categorical refusal on August 8th to sign the measures projected in the second report, he gave in his resignation, declaring that "in that case the report would be presented to the Provisional Government by General Kornilov. . . . My resignation (he continues) was not accepted. I carried on the current work as usual, but I did not report any more to Kerensky." (Which was, of course, quite unwarrantable, I may add.) In a conversation with Kornilov on August 10th, Savinkov acknowledged that his conduct had been an offence against discipline, but considered that it could not be regarded as positively harmful to the State, for during that time there were no urgent reports. "On the other hand, my offence against discipline was the only method at my disposal of rousing the Prime Minister to give his serious attention to the report, to which I attached exceptional importance."

Is not the whole character of Savinkov revealed in this incident?

It is true I did not cause official action to be taken in regard to Savinkov's letter of resignation dated August 8th, hoping that he would come back to his senses and would not carry his "threats" about General Kornilov

into execution. When General Kornilov actually arrived and began to carry out Savinkov's ideas, I recognized that it was not permissible that the latter should remain any longer in the service of the Government, and I signed my acceptance of his resignation. Thereupon, in order that I might not put Savinkov into an awkward situation on that day, I sent him word through Terestchenko, so that he should not call on me that day. . . . ("Terestchenko informed me," says Savinkov, touching on this subject, "that I was not invited to attend at the Palace that day.") How then, under such circumstances, could Savinkov have resolved to call on me that evening, and how could he count on being received?]

*Chairman.*—That is to say, it has been assumed then that Kornilov's lack of tact was due to Savinkov?

## § 9

*Raupakh.*—And Savinkov did not make any verbal report to you as to the contents of the document?

*Kerensky.*—It was in this way: He would begin to speak of the introduction of the death-penalty at the rear; to this I invariably objected, and there our conversation would usually come to an end. "If you disagree on this fundamental point," Savinkov was saying, "all the rest is unessential." Now, all the other measures, with the exception of the clauses relating to the railways and factories, had been projected even earlier by the Ministry of War. The complete error into which every newly appointed administrator fell, and which he would innocently propagate, was that nothing had been done before he came, as though he were the first to start upon any reforms: Savinkov was the first, Kornilov was the first, now Verk-

hovsky is the first — and so on. In reality, all the material for my collaborators had long been collected in full, and systematically elaborated into a series of measures which all tended to definite aims [to re-establish the organization and the fighting capacity of the army].

[From the very beginning, when I became Minister of War, it was evident, without expending much time in one's survey, in what an inextricable confusion Gutchkov, with his preposterous reforms, had thrown the Ministry. At a glance it was obvious what a vast work was required in order to amend this muddle and carry out well-planned and thorough reforms. Now, Kornilov wished to proceed by sweeping reforms, a method which could only have shaken the whole State.

In connection with this point, the history of reforms made by the Ministry of War, I recollect the words I spoke at the Moscow Conference: "Gentlemen, that which many now set down to the account of the Revolution was wrought by the force of elements, not by a conscious action and ill-will on the part of malign forces of revolution; this is evident from the fact that all which arouses the indignation of the present regenerators of the army, all that was done before me, without me, and by their own hands."

In fact, the statute which defined the nature of the committees and organizations elected by the soldiers was sanctioned by Gutchkov and appears in his famous order, No. 213. The much-discussed Commission of General Polivanov (formerly Minister of War) which worked out the declaration of the rights of the soldier, and generally has cost the army so dear, existed during Gutchkov's term of office, but was, as soon as my authority enabled me to do so, set aside by me. The Admiralty paid also dear for the

doings of the Commission of Savitch (member of the Octobrist "Right" in the Fourth Imperial Duma); while V. I. Lebedev<sup>1</sup> brought it back to some extent to sanity and activity. The Military Council even found means to reduce by May the maintenance of the officers. Then, that formation of detachments of homogenous nationality, introduced without the knowledge of the Provisional Government—how many difficulties I experienced later in struggling with the inevitable consequences of this innovation! Then, the shuffling of the commanders at the front—incomprehensible to any one! Etc., etc.!

I signed the "declaration of the rights of the soldiers," which I received fully prepared as a legacy from my predecessors. To refuse to sign it when its existence was already known in the remotest corners of the front and it was actually in practice, would have been to act upon an "ostrich-policy," to believe that the reality disappears because one shuts one's eyes to it. I took upon myself the formal responsibility for it; and at the same time I demanded categorically that it should include not an implicit assumption but a clear and open statement of the rights of commanding officers, under battle conditions, to act by force of arms against those who were disobedient. Such was the origin of the final text of the famous § 14, which furnished the grounds upon which the Bolsheviks raised a hue-and-cry about me in the army. Now is the right time to speak of it; let the powers that be reproach me with that crime against the people—they who so piously bow before the inviolability of human life!

Yes, when I was Minister of War it was my lot to be continually cutting down and curtailing various "liberties" introduced under Gutchkov, and my collaborators will cer-

<sup>1</sup> Socialist Revolutionary, and for a short time the Marine Minister.



tainly remember that I sometimes said to them: "How strange that a 'violent' revolutionist should have to oppose the initiatives of the Octobrist 'upholders of the State'!" They will remember, too, how, when signing some restriction or prohibition, I laughingly said: "Give me something to sign which would be pleasanter for 'comrades,' otherwise they will be down on me"! Ah, least of all do I wish in any way to do Gutchkov an injustice, and still less to justify myself! History will have its word to say and determine the place of each one of us. I only wish that more should be known and understood at this present moment. I want once again, as at the Moscow Conference, to make this statement: from the time of my coming to the Ministry of War, *not one measure* was passed which could have undermined the power of the army or the authority of the commanders. From the outset I carried on a systematic plan of work for the revision, codification, and definition of the limits of all the new institutions in the army. Above all, I considered it necessary to proclaim throughout the army, from top to bottom, that "the entire army, without regard to rank or position, ought to set an example of discipline, of obedience of every one to his chief and of all to the supreme command."

In less than a month the very Head of the Army had given an example of insubordination towards his superior — the supreme authority of the Government. Thus was confirmed the right of every one who carried arms to get *his own way*. Kornilov's action played *the same part* for the army that the counter-revolution of October 25th effected for all Russia — it started the army on the road to ultimate ruin.]

*Chairman.*— Who, besides yourself, took part in this Council of August 10th?

*Kerensky.*— Terestchenko, Nekrassov and Kornilov himself.

*Chairman.*— At this Council did you express your opinion of the report, or have you had no opportunity to do so?

*Kerensky.*— No; I believe only two people spoke, one of them being Nekrassov; I kept silent.

*Chairman.*— You had said what you thought of it during the day?

*Kerensky.*— All of us said the same thing: in the military section most of the projected clauses were just and acceptable, but the form was impossible.

*Chairman.*— Another question. In this report was there any mention of the suppression of the Soldiers' Soviets and Committees in the army?

*Kerensky.*— Not in the second report. The situation had, apparently, altered so much that when on another day, on the eve of the Moscow Conference, the military section of the Government's declaration there was being considered by the Provisional Government, it was found possible to put the question as to the measures in the army thus: That *the Provisional Government accepted the substance of Kornilov's first report, in my exposition of it.* At the Moscow Conference it fell to me to bring forward Kornilov's report as formulated by me.

[I remember this sitting of the Provisional Government on the eve of the Moscow Conference. It was marked by great nervous tension. Only that morning Kokoshkin had sent in his resignation, and the sitting was taking place literally just a few hours before the time of departure for Moscow. When it came to the question of what should be said about the army in the name of the whole Government, it was proposed that we should first of all hear the report of the Commander-in-Chief.

Following the reading of this report (the first one, which was more militant, but more acceptable in substance, being without the two nonsensical clauses), there was a very sharp discussion. Then I brought forward my version of the clauses of the program, which, in my opinion, might have met the requirements of the case, the real intentions of the Government, and would have been at the same time acceptable to Headquarters and the views of the general public. My formula secured the assent of the Ministers (with the exception of the clause referring to the death-penalty at the rear).

Here is the substance of the decisions accepted by the Provisional Government on August 11th respecting army reforms, as they were laid before the Moscow Conference: "The experience of these last months has shown that all that was done in a fortuitous, sometimes spasmodic way, sometimes without sufficient consideration, has now to be reconsidered. It is necessary to regulate both the rights and the duties of every man belonging to the army. . . . What was accomplished first was a hasty and fortuitous structure. This haste was unavoidable, otherwise all this vast mass of material would have gone to pieces after the fall of the despotic military power. This tendency to 'disaggregate' has been checked. Now the work of preparation for building gives place to real construction. All will be allotted their right places and each one will know his rights and obligations. . . . The Commissaries, Committees, and disciplinary tribunals will be maintained; but all will assume the forms which are now necessary to the army. And we who are, or have been, in the army know where it is possible to draw the line, and where the impossible and the hazardous begin. When it comes to the limit, the Provisional Government will say: 'Thus far

and no further.'” Then followed the passage already quoted about discipline.

In order that it may be understood *how* the declarations of the Provisional Government differed from the “demands” of General Kornilov, I will quote an extract from his speech, also made at the Moscow Conference, on the Committees and Commissaries: “I am not hostile to the Committees. I have worked with them as Commander of the Eighth Army and as Commander of the South-western front. But I ask that their activities should be confined to the economic interests and internal life of the army, within limits which should be strictly defined by the law, without in any way interfering in the sphere of military operations and the selection of commanding officers. I recognize the Commissaries as being a necessity at the actual moment, but this institution will only be effective if the personnel of the Commissaries combines democratic views with energy and fearlessness of responsibility.” If we take into consideration that, at the time of the Moscow Conference, the Committees had no legal right to interfere in the question of operations at the front, etc., and compare this passage of Kornilov’s with my short formulas about the Committees and Commissaries, it will be evident that the difference between us was only in tone, and in Kornilov’s putting the matter in a very personal way.

Here is what was published on the subject of the Moscow Conference in Savinkov’s name, on August 18th, in the *Izvestia*, the organ of the Central Soviet: “I may state that I remain at the head of the administration of the War Office . . . and according to the statement of A. F. Kerensky I may again work in complete unity with him to bring into being that program to which he refers in certain passages of his address before the Moscow Conference, and

in which I, as well as the Commander-in-Chief, Kornilov, fully concur. . . . It would be a mistake to think (and all information which appeared in the Press to this effect is *absolutely false*) that I proposed to do away with the soldiers' organizations. Neither I nor General Kornilov proposed to do anything of the kind. Both Kerensky and we stood for the preservation and strengthening of the soldiers' organizations, with the proviso, however, that they had no right to alter the battle-orders or interfere in the question of the appointments and transferences of the commanding officers."

How vital was the new organization of the army, systematically prepared by the Ministry of War and energetically brought into existence, will be evident by comparing the following facts. On July 28th Savinkov, in the name of the Ministry of War, formulated the new situation thus: "With the establishment of the institution of Commissaries, the Supreme Command is in charge of military operations, the army organizations (Committees, etc.) are entrusted with the army administration (economic affairs and conditions of life), while the Commissaries control the political life of the army." At the Moscow Conference a declaration of the Army Committees was read, in which it was stated among other things that: "The commanding body ought to be left quite free to direct military operations and activities, and to have the decisive voice in regard to military preparations and training. . . . The Commissaries should act as the vehicles of the revolutionary policy of the Provisional Government, the representatives of the will of the revolutionary majority in the country. . . . The soldiers' organizations, being the organs of the soldiers' self-administration, ought to have their rights and obligations fully fixed in and confirmed by the law." Finally, the

following regulation was published on March 30, 1918, and accepted by the supreme Military Council of the "People's Commissaries": "The soldiers' committees will *only* conserve their economic functions; they are deprived of the right to interfere in questions of service or of military operations. All political questions will be decided by specially nominated Commissaries, who will keep in touch with the Committees." It is evident that matters concerning operations at the front will again be within the jurisdiction of commanding officers, no longer appointed by elections!

Thus, through the nightmare-like experiment of Krilenko's folly the miserable remnants of the army returned to the "counter-revolutionary order of the Kornilovite Kerensky"!] ]

*Chairman.*—At the Moscow Conference you set forth in your version the whole of Kornilov's report except the question of the death-penalty at the rear?

*Kerensky.*—Yes, with that exception, because at the sitting of the Provisional Government on August 11th it was decided to recognize in principle the possibility of applying these or any other measures, including even the death-penalty at the rear, but to bring them into existence only after discussing in a legislative way each concrete measure separately [according to conditions of time and place].

["Let every one be aware," I said at the Moscow Conference, in reference to the death-penalty at the rear, "that this measure is a very trying one, and let no one venture to inconvenience us in that matter with any unconditional demands. We will not permit this. We only say: 'If the wholesale devastation and disaggregation, pusillanimity and cowardice, treacherous murder, attacks on peaceful inhabitants, arson, pillage — if all these continue in spite of

our warnings, the Government will combat them in the way now proposed.'” I spoke thus conditionally of the death-penalty at the Moscow Conference because on this question the Provisional Government was not only not unanimously “for” it, but had actually had a majority “against” this method of fighting destructiveness and decomposition. On the other hand, the whole Government unanimously acknowledged that the question of the death-penalty should not be the subject of a sharp political conflict, especially within the Government itself; the more so as, after the partial reintroduction of the death-penalty at the front, the quarrel was no longer one of principle but of opportuneness. Personally, I was decidedly opposed to the restoration of the death-penalty at the rear, because I considered it absolutely impossible to carry out the sentence of death, say in Moscow or Saratov, under the conditions of a free political life.

Homicide by sentence of a court of law, in accordance with all the rules and regulations of the official execution ritual, is a great “luxury” that only States with a smoothly working administrative and police apparatus can afford. Setting aside all humanitarian considerations, the practical *impossibility* of carrying out a judicial death sentence in Russia should have been a conclusive reason for every practical statesman. The short but sad experience of the revolutionary courts-martial even at the front has added very weighty evidence in support of this view of mine.

I feel that readers of these lines in the Russia of the present will be irritated by this goody-goody sentimentalism or “Manilovism,”<sup>1</sup> and will ask me indignantly: “What about the executions by order of the Commissaries, the

<sup>1</sup> After “Manilov,” a ridiculously sentimental hero in Gogol’s “Dead Souls.”

Bolshevik terrorism?" . . . Yes, exactly; there is terrorism: executions, mass executions; but without any previous sentence by competent judicial authority; assassinations by the police, but not death sentences imposed by courts of law; and that is the whole point. It is the Bolshevik reaction which has proved that in Russia it is not yet possible to *take human life by judicial sentence*. As far as I am able to judge by the information that has reached me, Mr. Bronstein (Trosky) did not dare, after all, to introduce his guillotine, in other words to reintroduce the death-penalty, to be executed with the solemnity of a sentence passed by a court of law. In Russia they now practise "shooting on the spot." That, however, is an institution beyond the pale of any State Constitution, or of any culture, however barbaric. To transform every coward who left the front into a privileged assassin the State has had first to be thoroughly destroyed. . . . But even irrespective of these considerations, Kornilov and Filonenko's idea of employing capital punishment as a specific against strikes, locks-out, disorganization of transport and similar occurrences is much too original to be applicable in any State which is at all civilized.]

## § 10

*Chairman.*—Did not this sitting (of the Provisional Government on August 11th) deal with the question of Kornilov's taking part at and addressing the Moscow Conference?

*Kerensky.*—It did.

*Chairman.*—What attitude did the Provisional Government take up?

*Kerensky.*—We had a perfectly definite point of view.



Our task at the Moscow Conference was clear and definite. Our policy, which we applied everywhere and at all times, and which, however, is often by misunderstanding considered a sign of weakness in the Government, consisted in abstaining from forcing events or provoking any explosions. In this particular case one of our objects was to create such an atmosphere at the Moscow Conference that, in the event of Kornilov's addressing the Conference, he should not arouse a hostile attitude against himself among large masses of people, simply because it appeared to us that at that time Kornilov could not be replaced by anybody. Being guided, then, by that consideration, the Provisional Government adopted the following plan: the Commander-in-Chief will deliver an address or report of contents similar to that which he made to us on August 3rd, that is to say, he will deal with the position at the front, with the state of the armies, the strategic situation and so on. The Provisional Government adopted a decision specifically limiting General Kornilov's address in that sense, and in spite of that . . .

*Chairman.*— And in spite of that, in spite of the warning, he acted in his own way. Had he been warned already here at Petrograd?

*Kerensky.*— If I am not mistaken, he was warned here.

[I now recollect that the warning could not have been given at Petrograd, as General Kornilov left Petrograd on the eve of the meeting of the Provisional Government.]

After Kornilov's arrival at Moscow, the Minister of Ways of Communication called on him the day before he spoke. Then I spoke to him on the telephone and at the Theatre.<sup>1</sup> I again sent for him, and told him for the second time of the decision of the Provisional Government

<sup>1</sup> The Grand Theatre, where the Moscow Conference took place.

and insistently asked him again to act accordingly. When in reply he said to me that he would speak in his own way, I warned him that he must understand that he would thus be infringing discipline. "You should anyhow show an example to the rest, and you speak of breaking discipline," said I. At that time General Kornilov was in such a mood that he was *firmly convinced that the Government was absolutely powerless*; he looked upon the Government as, so to speak, a thing in the past, to which no heed need be paid: if we, i.e. the Provisional Government, said that a certain thing must be done or must not be done, our reason for it was solely our fear of him. This, I believe, was at the time Kornilov's state of mind and that of his friends.

*Liber.*—Allow me to ask you a question. Did you know that the address which Kornilov delivered at the Moscow Conference was written by Filonenko, or at least that Filonenko was part-author of it?

*Kerensky.*—I know nothing as to that.

[Later I read the following evidence of Filonenko, the truth of which is of course a matter for his own conscience: "On the evening of August 13th I asked General Kornilov whether he had prepared the speech which he intended making at the sitting of the 14th, and upon being told that it was not ready, I offered him my help in sketching out its contents. Apart from my desire to be of assistance to General Kornilov, I thought it to be my duty, in view of the responsibility which was incumbent upon me for all acts of a political nature by the Commander-in-Chief. Similar help was also offered to the General by Zavoiko, who met General Kornilov. Zavoiko's assistance consisted in his writing down at my dictation the text of the speech that I had previously discussed in a general way with General Kornilov. With a few additions, dealing purely with

some facts, the text as dictated by me was read by General Kornilov at the Conference." In drawing up the speech Kilonenko was apparently cognizant of the instructions issued by the Provisional Government to the Commander-in-Chief, for these instructions were substantially complied with in the speech, and all the sharper angles, such as the question of capital punishment elsewhere than at the front, were avoided.]

I forgot to mention that on the day, I think, before his arrival at Moscow, Kornilov, knowing already of Savinkov's resignation, sent me a telegram while on his journey insisting on Savinkov's retention in the service. Then I received a second telegram, in which Kornilov stated that Savinkov's and Filonenko's presence at the Moscow Conference was of the utmost importance for him (Kornilov), as they, S. and F., would support him either in his demands or in his speech—I forget the exact words. That was the kind of telegram I received. Let us assume the less offensive wording (since I am not sure of the exact words): "in his speech." The telegram further contained the following opinion of Savinkov: a well-known man wielding enormous influence with democracy. Something to that effect.

[In giving my evidence I was mistaken on that point: there was only one telegram mentioning Savinkov, as follows: "Information has reached me that . . . Savinkov has tendered his resignation. I deem it my duty to express the opinion that the withdrawal of so important a man as Boris Victorovitch (Savinkov) from the Government is bound to affect adversely the Government's prestige with the country, more particularly at this serious juncture. I consider Savinkov's presence and support of my views necessary on the occasion of my speech at the Moscow Con-

ference on August 14th, because those views will have more chance of unanimous adoption if they have the advantage of the prestige attaching to Boris Victorovitch's great revolutionary past and the authority he enjoys among the large democratic masses. . . ."

*Raupakh.*—Allow me to return to the question of the Memorandum. Was that draft of Kornilov's submitted to the Provisional Government on your behalf in your capacity as Minister of War, or was it submitted by the Commander-in-Chief on his own behalf?

*Kerensky.*—The Memorandum was submitted by Kornilov on his own behalf.

*Raupakh.*—The new draft which was discussed on August 10th?

*Kerensky.*—We (Nekrassov, Terestchenko and myself) asked Kornilov about it on the 10th of August in the evening, and he left the Memorandum for the Government in its first draft of August 3rd.

*Raupakh.*—He thought it necessary to bring . . .

*Chairman.*—The Prime Minister has explained to us that this draft was a new one, and was signed.

*Kerensky.*—The signature of the Deputy Minister of War was affixed to the second draft, but the latter had not been read before the Provisional Government.

*Chairman.*—That second draft had not been read?

*Kerensky.*—That second draft had not been brought out at the time. Later, it disappeared.

[I remember my surprise when, at the Moscow Conference, I heard Kornilov talking of his report presented to the Provisional Government, which had been signed without reservation by both Savinkov and Filonenko. I was surprised to hear the announcement that the draft, backed by three signatures, had been "presented" to the

Provisional Government, whereas what I had read, with General Kornilov's consent, at the meeting of the Provisional Government on the 11th of August, was his *first* memorandum. Now, only, having read the conversation on the Hughes tape-machine between Filonenko and Gorbetchia, the Assistant Commissary of the South-Western front, I learnt that "General Kornilov, after the discussion upon the general situation (on the 10th of August), drove away to the railway station carrying the report with him; but there B. V. Savinkov and myself, thinking that such important questions could not be decided by private conversations between persons however highly responsible, persuaded General Kornilov to send the report in an envelope to the Provisional Government, which he did." However, that "envelope" never reached me. This case provides an example of General Kornilov's lack of independence in political actions.]

To come back to the Moscow Conference, I must say that the only trespass beyond the limits assigned to him made by Kornilov in his speech was a somewhat general discussion of measures to be adopted in the rear, containing the remark that he did not, at present, enter into an examination of the measures necessary for the reorganization of railway traffic and industry.

*Raupakh.*— He evaded that question?

*Kercensky.*— We had stipulated that he should not mention the railways, whereas he did mention them.

## CHAPTER II

### § 11

*Chairman.*— Did information concerning the conspiracy begin to reach you just before the Moscow Conference, or even at an earlier date? Did not the evidence grow and strengthen?

*Kerensky.*— Yes, all the time.

*Chairman.*— Was not Kornilov's name mentioned in connection with the conspiracy?

*Kerensky.*— Kornilov's name cropped up later, not long before the events actually took place. An officer used to put in an appearance at the time, whom later I transferred to the Intelligence Department. He was a bit of a black-mailer, but he often attended the Cossack Council and was apparently well-informed. This officer would come to warn me just as Lvov did, that I was threatened with inevitable ruin in connection with coming events due in a few days, that is, the seizure of power by the conspirators.

*Raupakh.*— From the parties of the "Right" or . . .

*Kerensky.*— Yes, from the "Right." There is no doubt this officer was well-informed, but I never clearly could make out whether he came to me as a scout or simply to betray others and earn something for himself. Only one thing is perfectly obvious to me — he was quite *au courant*.

*Chairman.*— He did not name Kornilov or any one else at the time?

*Kerensky.*— He did not name Kornilov, but he named others closely associated with the latter — Zavoiko, and others whose names I forget, who were intimate with Kor-

nilov. Then, as you know, a Cossack regiment had been summoned to Moscow at the time of the Moscow Conference . . .

*Chairman.*—The 7th Orenburg Cossack regiment?

*Kerensky.*— . . . without knowledge of the Commander of the Moscow District. At this same time the corps of Prince Dolgoruky was advancing to Petrograd from Finland, but was stopped by the Commander of the troops there, General Vassilkovsky. Various rumours were spread in the officers' training school. For instance, we received a communication from the Moscow cadets to the effect that an officer had warned them that during the Moscow Conference a dictatorship would be proclaimed. I do not know what were the results of the investigation of that case. I do not know the reason of the Cossack regiment's move.

*Chairman.*—Kornilov did not know. It was probably done to support some kind of demand.

*Kerensky.*—Probably.

*Chairman.*—Is it not now definitely known who summoned the regiment?

*Kerensky.*—It has been certified that the regiment was hastily summoned without the knowledge either of the Commander of the Moscow military district, the Provisional Government or the Minister of War. We knew nothing; and only were in time to stop it at Mojaisk.

*Chairman.*—At the time of the Conference, did not Kornilov's refusal to yield to the Provisional Government's directions excite the Government's suspicions as to his loyalty; did not the Government suspect him in connection with the rumours of the conspiracy?

*Kerensky.*—You see, I must admit that part of the Provisional Government were completely hypnotized by Kornilov's personality. Of course, I do not mean that these

members of the Government were particularly in touch with him or approved of his bearing, but simply that some of the ministers believed that here was a man outside politics, an honest, daring soldier, who can and should organize the army [but who finds it difficult to strike the right note in complicated "civilian" affairs]. Therefore, they considered this move as a hopeless action of a helpless man: certainly (they said) the man is completely unversed in politics, unable to cope with them, but, then, like everybody, he has a citizen's feelings! But I and some of the other ministers *did take into account* Kornilov's behaviour. I remember telling my intimate friends and also the Provisional Government, on my return, that I was extremely satisfied with the Moscow Conference, as I had been able to learn and understand all I wanted, and know *the "how, why and where"* of everything. Later, when the Kornilov rebellion took place, one of the Constitutional Democrats said to me: "Only now we understand your attitude at the Moscow Conference, your tone; then your threats addressed to the Right wing seemed unintelligible to us."

[Here are the corresponding parts of my speech at the Moscow Conference: ". . . Let those who deem the time has come to overthrow the revolutionary power by bayonets beware still more. (Loud applause from the Left.) . . . Others at their meetings dare to utter against the Supreme Authority of the Russian State words for which, in the days of the old *régime*, they would soon have found themselves removed very far, as insulters of Majesty. . . . I will now, with the aid of the entire Provisional Government, employ the same energy (as was exerted upon the 3rd, 4th and 5th of July) to set a limit to all aspirations tending to use Russia's great misfortune . . . for injuring the common national interests; . . . and whoever dares present



me with an ultimatum, in whatever form, will be subjected by me to the will of the Supreme Authority. Once more, I repeat: every attempt of the 'inside-out Bolsheviks' <sup>1</sup> will find a barrier in me."

In general, the Moscow Conference presents a very important stage in the development of the movement for the establishment of a military dictatorship in Russia. It is but a *prologue* to the 27th of August. Here the *Russian republican* reaction becomes definitely conscious of itself. Here this peculiar Russian "Boulangisme" definitely selects its leader, here forces are reckoned up, here is the rallying-point of the social circles which support the movement both ideally and materially. The circle of active conspirators is here greatly widened; here, for the first time, Russia makes acquaintance with her future dictator — Kornilov. The circles sympathizing with the idea of a military dictatorship were so thoroughly prepared and organized, that even on the 30th of August Kornilov could still seriously think of getting a "support," when he declared to the Government that only on condition that the latter agreed to certain terms would he immediately take steps to tranquillize those who "followed him"; the organization was so real that, after his arrest, General Kornilov complained bitterly of being forsaken by every one at the crucial moment, while General Alexeiev, in his letter of the 12th of September to Miliukov, warned him "that General Kornilov would be obliged to describe in detail before the court all the preparations, all the negotiations with various *persons and groups*, their *participation* in the affair, to show the Russian people who were his adherents, and why he, abandoned by all in time of need, alone with a few officers," etc.

<sup>1</sup> Expression used (as well as "Bolshevik of the Right") to denote people employing Bolshevik methods for conservative purposes.

Without even peeping "behind the scenes" of all these "preparations" and negotiations, the mobilization and concentration of forces could be observed upon the open stage itself just before the Moscow Conference. A considerable number of meetings took place of various organizations looked upon as influential by some sections, and one after another, as if obeying a word of command, they adopted resolutions *against the removal* of Kornilov. On the 6th of August, the Council of the Cossack Troops' League decided to "inform the Provisional Government and the Minister of War, and to publish in all the daily papers, that: (1) . . . (2) General Kornilov *cannot be removed*, being a true leader of the people and in the eyes of the majority of the population the only general capable of regenerating the army's fighting force and of extricating the country from an extremely serious situation; (3) the Council of the Cossack Troops' League, as representative of all Russian Cossackdom, declare that the *removal* of General Kornilov will *inevitably* suggest to the Cossacks the fatal idea of the futility of all further Cossack sacrifices, in view of the Government's not desiring to adopt effective means for the salvation of the Motherland; (4) the Council of the Cossacks' Union think it their moral duty to state to the Provisional Government and to the people that they do not hold themselves responsible, as they were until now, FOR THE BEHAVIOUR OF THE COSSACKS' ARMY AT THE FRONT AND IN THE REAR in case of General Kornilov's discharge; (5) the Council of the Cossacks' Union LOUDLY AND FIRMLY declare their complete and absolute devotion to their heroic chief, General Lavr Georgievitch Kornilov."

On the 7th of August, the Central Committee of the League of Army and Navy Officers telegraphed to the Minister of War, to the Commanders of groups of armies of

different fronts and to the Commanders of armies, their decision about General Kornilov, which was very diplomatically drawn up and concluded thus: "We summon all honest people and all Russian officers to declare their full confidence in him without delay. We do not admit the possibility of interference by any institutions or persons whatever in his acts sanctioned by the Government, and are ready to *assist in the fulfilment* of all his lawful *demands* TO THE LAST DROP OF OUR BLOOD."

Late at night, on the same day and at the same place, the Union of Knights of St. George carried the following resolution: —

"(1) The Conference of the Union of Knights of St. George, having deliberated on the Cossacks' Council's resolution at their special meeting on the 7th of August, has unanimously decided to support this resolution and **FIRMLY** announce to the Provisional Government that, if they should allow calumny to triumph and General Kornilov to be discharged, the Union of the Knights of St. George would immediately call to arms all the Knights of St. George for joint action with the Cossacks." Similar resolutions were carried by the Military League and other organizations.

This movement to maintain General Kornilov in his position has culminated in the significant decision of the "Conference of public workers," held on the 6th to the 10th of August before the All-Russian Conference, and at which were gathered all the best men of the Progressive Coalition of the Fourth Duma. The following was telegraphed to Kornilov by Rodzianko: "The Conference of Public Workers, welcoming you, the Chief Leader of the Russian Army, declare that they consider all attempts to prejudice your authority in the army and in *Russia* to be criminal and join their voice to the voice of officers, Knights

of St. George and Cossacks. In the terrible hour of heavy trial, all thoughtful Russia looks to you with hope and faith." All this campaign was said to be provoked by the rumours of General Kornilov's "possible discharge" under the pressure of the Central Soviet. In fact, this campaign was the call to arms which united all the different political parties gravitating towards a "firm government." The Conference of Public Workers, under the leadership of Rodzianko, was the centre which has reviewed the troops, defined the ideal aims of the growing movement and made the final preparations for the assault on the Provisional Government at the All-Russian Conference at Moscow. The leaders of the movement had such confidence in their success that some most practical politicians determined to take part in the drafting of resolutions on behalf of Kornilov, though only three days later they winced at being reminded of the fact.

At the same time, many journeys of representatives of different organizations and of private individuals to General Headquarters were taking place, as well as conferences at some houses in Moscow, etc. In short, something substantial was being prepared for the justification at the All-Russian Conference of the confidence in the success of the movement for a "firm government." Should the circumstances prove favourable, preparation was made to bring matters to an end at the Conference itself. Hence the attempt to have at hand some real help, to create the necessary atmosphere amongst the cadets of the Officers' Training Schools. Just before General Kornilov's arrival in Moscow, a special pamphlet was largely circulated, under the title "Kornilov, the hero of the people" (or "Kornilov, the leader of the people"), written, in a suitable style, by a prominent member of one of the military associations.

Finally, General Kornilov's solemnly ceremonious entry into Moscow took place in conformity with a previously settled plan (including the call at the Iverskaya Chapel). During the whole time of his stay different persons, having nothing to do with the army, were being received in his saloon carriage. The great financial experts W. and P. "reported" (as stated in Moscow papers) on Russia's financial situation. Aladin "presented a report" on the general international situation. Purishkevitch was "presented," Miliukov "received"; of course Kaledin called, etc.

However, the Moscow Conference did not in the least justify their hopes. Not only was it necessary to abandon the hope of the support of the Conference in proclaiming a Dictatorship, but the very clenched fists of the Preliminary Conference of Public Workers became hands extended for a friendly shake. From the start, the schemes of both the extreme parties of Right and Left were washed away by the general feeling of provincial representatives attending at the All-Russian Conference, and the general strike proclaimed by the Bolsheviks had no more success than the call at Iverskaya.

The overrating of his forces by one party and the under-rating by the other party of his — a circumstance already mentioned by me — became strikingly apparent at the Moscow Conference. Before the Moscow days, a great number of people, even among the democratic masses, were infected by a sickly fear of a counter-revolution and looked forward to the Moscow Conference with apprehension, fearing that the voice of the country would join that of the "Progressive Coalition" (regenerated in those days at Moscow) and suspecting me of flirtation with the reactionists. (I was not at that time acknowledged to be counter-revolutionary.) On the other hand, the leaders of the coalition of "all

thoughtful elements in Russia" (to quote Rodzianko), which prepared themselves for an assault on the Government, were, under the pressure of their provincial constituencies, also obliged to alter their intended resolutions. Summing up the results of the Moscow Conference, the *Izvestia* of the Soviet stated with some astonishment in their issue of the 16th of August that "all men of the 3rd of June,<sup>1</sup> who were ready to kick the dying lion, experienced, in the days of the Moscow Conference, a profound sense of disappointment." Noting the unanimity displayed at the Conference by the representatives of workmen and peasants, the masses of the army and navy, by the Zemstvos, the towns, the co-operative organizations, by railwaymen, teachers, etc., the *Izvestia* rightly remarked that "the democracy has been strengthened by the Moscow Conference." Notwithstanding this, though the results of the Moscow Conference seem to have destroyed all hopes of a *coup d'état* from the Right, the active adherents of a Dictatorship were not persuaded to keep quiet, but were incited to pursue their aims by other more peremptory means. An open political struggle with the Provisional Government being found to be not within their power, they decided to storm it unawares by a "sharp stroke."]

*Chairman.*—Did a plan arise after the Moscow Conference for some changes in the composition of the Government, and have certain names been mentioned in this connection?

*Kerensky.*—No, there was only talk about the necessity of making use of the change of mood arising from the Bublikov-Tseretelli incident<sup>2</sup> and of starting *pourparlers*

<sup>1</sup> Supporters of the *coup d'état* of the 3rd of June, 1907, when Stolipin disfranchised the great majority of the people.

<sup>2</sup> After Bublikov's speech at the Moscow Conference urging the

with the industrial circles with regard to their being represented in the Provisional Government. The question was then simply that of recalling to the administration of the State representatives of the propertied classes — not Cadets (Constitutional Democrats), but Konovalov and other genuine representatives of these classes.

## § 12

*Chairman.*— What intelligence have you had about the Bolsheviks' actions, whence did you get it, and was it not of a designedly provocative character?

*Kerensky.*— We used to receive information of Bolshevik actions nearly every week or fortnight. For instance, *not long before* the 27th of August, at a Government meeting, one of the Ministers asked me whether I, or the Minister of the Interior, was aware of the rumours about an impending Bolshevik rising, and whether these rumours had serious grounds. Then I answered (and so, I believe, did Skobelev) that these rumours were of no importance.

*Chairman.*— What measures did the Government undertake in case the expected Bolshevik rising in Petrograd and Kronstadt took place?

*Kerensky.*— In Kronstadt, nothing was proposed to be done. I must state that a Bolshevik action then had no importance at all. In my deposition at the preliminary examination, I mentioned my talk with Mr. V. Lvov. It is stated there that Lvov was assuring me that a Bolshevik rising was inevitable, and I replied that, as far as we know, no Bolshevik action was expected to take place. I even told him:

necessity of the loyal co-operation of the bourgeoisie with the democratic elements, Tseretelli demonstratively shook hands with him.

"You speak with as much certainty as if you were going yourself to take part in this rising."

[Now, after the Bolshevik counter-revolution, or (to use a better term) after the All-Russian new "Pugatchevstchina," which has destroyed the Russian State, and taking into account our remarkable ability to forget altogether yesterday's events, very many of my readers will think at this part of my statement that, whilst firing at sparrows (the Kornilovites), the Provisional Government ignored the real game, and many others will say that Kornilov had foreseen the possibility of a Bolshevik rising, whereas the Provisional Government was fatally blind, or at least had their *left* eye blindfolded. These criticisms are thoroughly wrong, because (1) before and at the time of Kornilov's rebellion, *there was no* real danger or even any symptom of a Bolshevik rising, and (2) before Kornilov's rebellion, the Bolshevik menace was confronted by the whole enormous force of democracy organized in the new local self-government—the Soviets and army organizations, the force which was defending the country and Government from the chaos of the extreme Left.

Kornilov's movement was being prepared, just at the time of the most intensive struggle of the statesmanlike and patriotically minded democracy with her anarchist and Bolshevik elements. On the 8th of July a resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet insisted on "the sharp change in the minds of the masses, which was created by the adventurous political attempt (of July 3rd–5th) at an armed rising against the Provisional Government," prepared by anarchist-Bolshevik elements and by some dark forces acting under their colours.

On the 18th of July, the same Central Soviet *unanimously* stated that "the restoration of the fighting capacity of the



army is the most serious problem of the moment." I have already quoted many other proclamations and resolutions of the Central Executive Committee full of the same healthy feelings. It is enough to run over the leaves of the *Izvestia* of the Central Executive Committee for July-August, to be convinced of the intensity of this struggle between the statesmanlike and the anarchist parties, to see how the class feelings were more and more subdued in the minds of the democracy to the needs of the State, how the longing for work and order was reviving, and how the consciousness of the necessity of sacrifices for the country's sake was penetrating deeper and deeper into the minds of the people. One should remember how unselfishly the army organizations and commissaries struggled on the front with the Bolshevik propaganda of "my precious life first," how many of them redeemed their unwitting errors of the first days of Revolution, and sanctified their struggle with cowards and traitors by their blood. One has only to look through the many hundreds of resolutions drafted by battalions, regiments and divisions at that time, to be convinced that a process of purification was rapidly going on in the minds of the soldiers themselves, and that the position of the commanding officers was steadily getting better. At the same time, the activity of newly formed local government bodies was developing in the country *at the expense* of the Soviets and various self-appointed Committees. The leading Soviets' papers acknowledged this fact and thought it to be a symptom of the healthy development of revolutionary statesmanship. But, first and foremost, we must not forget that everywhere the Bolsheviks were then a small minority and were playing the part of an irresponsible opposition. Their piteous attempt at organizing a general strike at the time of the Moscow Conference, their forfeiture of their

right of independent action at its meetings, decreed by the Bureau of the Central Soviet, and, on the other hand, the boldness of the democracy in extending a friendly hand to the bourgeoisie — all this is no dream, but the actual reality in which we lived before the 27th of August and which enabled me to answer, to the proposal to postpone the proclamation of martial law until the arrival of the 3rd Corps of Cavalry, that I did not need it for that purpose at all.

On the whole, a comparison of forces showed that all attempts to repeat the 3rd–5th of July were sure to be a COMPLETE FAILURE. Still less was there any real danger to the *régime* then existing to be anticipated from the attempts of the extreme Right. THE “BOLSHEVISM OF THE RIGHT” BY ITSELF WAS NEVER TO BE FEARED. It was not a powder store which on explosion destroys the foundation of everything, but a match that could fall in a store of explosives and then . . . The results of the 27th of August have shown WHAT would follow.

One of the most prominent leaders of the S.R. party, notorious for his irremediable propensity towards the Left extremists, speaking of Kornilov's rebellion at the last Congress of his party in November, 1917, said: “The sudden increase of energy in the struggle against the threatening military plot and counter-revolution for one moment succeeded in reuniting the forces of the revolutionary democracy against the only great party of Russian propertied classes which still held an ambiguous position, the ‘party of the People's Freedom’ (Constitutional-Democrats): the position of socialist democracy and the *rather shaken* influence of the Soviets was much *strengthened* by this rising of enthusiasm and energy. This had enabled the Soviets, who had, after the events of the 3rd–5th of July and the dislocation of the democratic front, become more moderate, again

to join the line and provoked a new MOVE TO THE LEFT. That is why it is no wonder, comrades, that many, and I amongst them, were welcoming Kornilov's action as a step which would bring this MODERATION of the country to its logical end, to absurdity, to a military plot, and would enable us to profit by the mistakes and folly of the Right in order to smooth over and rectify all the harm that was done by the mistakes and folly of the Left."

I was not among those many who were "welcoming" the possibility of bringing Soviets under the Bolshevik influence, but I must state that, in fact, it was only the 27th of August that made the 27th of October possible. And that is really the great crime, the unredeemable sin against our native country of those naïve dreamers, skilful politicians and bold adventurers who undertook to save Russia by means of a "White General."<sup>1</sup> In his proclamation "to the Russian people," General Kornilov, in spite of all evidence to the contrary, states that the Provisional Government acts under the pressure of the Bolshevik majority of the Soviets, etc. Whether Kornilov himself laboured under a delusion, or lied deliberately, is of no importance, but there was nothing, nothing whatever, of the kind at the time in the Soviets clearly leaning to the Right. But Kornilov himself proved a remarkable prophet. Almost immediately following his declaration, the Soviets were everywhere actually seized by the Bolsheviks.

On the 27th of August, the lighted match actually fell into a powder-store. On September 1st the Bolsheviks' resolution, containing the program of the *coup d'état* of the 25th of October, was introduced into the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet. Here are some of its most prominent points. "All wavering policy as to the organization of the

<sup>1</sup> General on a white horse.

authority must be decisively set aside; the policy of *compromise must be struck at the root*. . . . The extraordinary powers and irresponsibility of the Provisional Government can no longer be *tolerated*. The *only* remedy lies in the creation of an authority composed of representatives of the revolutionary proletariat and peasants, whose policy would be based upon the following principles: immediate abolition of all private land property, that of the landowners to be abolished without compensation, etc.; labour control of all production and distribution upon a scale embracing the entire State; nationalization of the most important branches of industry . . . ruthless taxation of large investments and property and confiscation of war-profits; annulment of all secret treaties and the immediate proposal of a democratic peace to all nations. The following immediate measures must be decreed: revocation of all repressions directed against the labour classes (read 'Bolsheviks') and their organizations; abolition of the death-penalty at the front and restoration of complete liberty of propaganda and of all democratic army organizations . . ." etc.

At this same meeting of the Central Executive Committee, even Dan protested already against the "irresponsibility" of the Provisional Government, and declared that "the authorities have no right to take any repressive measures (against workmen) without a previous discussion with our Commission for the struggle against the counter-revolution." The same meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet adopted a resolution of protest against the suppression of two Bolshevik papers which were carrying on an injurious campaign against the officers.

The Red Guard was created, and developed so rapidly that its statute was worked out in Moscow by the 5th of September. On the 6th of September the Menshevik and

Social-Revolutionary presidium of the Petrograd Soviet *gave up its powers*, and a few days later, in place of Gotz, Skobelev and Tseretelli, appeared Bronstein (Trotsky), Rosenfeldt (Kamenev) and Co. . . .

A regular mania for arbitrary arrests was exhibited everywhere: self-appointed "Committees for the suppression of the counter-revolution" sprang up in all quarters, openly refusing to obey my orders to stop their activity after the suppression of the Kornilov revolt. The so-called "Inter-regional Conference" at Petrograd on the 6th of September declared that, "having discussed Kerensky's order, we decide not to dissolve the revolutionary organizations for the suppression of the counter-revolution and to inform the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet of the above decision." The Central Executive Committee agreed to the Inter-regional Conference's point of view.

On September 7th the Moscow Soviet for the first time rejected a Menshevik resolution expressing confidence in and promising to support the Provisional Government on condition of the exclusion from its membership of Cadets (Constitutional Democratic Party), and adopted the Bolshevik resolution, which on the 1st of September was not passed in Petrograd.

Abominable massacres of officers occurred again in the army and navy on the 30th of August, and I was obliged to send the following telegram to the fleet: "I demand that all atrocious acts of violence shall cease immediately. Crews committing these crimes, under pretext of saving the country and the Revolution, when in reality ruining the fleet's military efficiency in the face of the enemy, have forgotten their duty, their moral sense, and are traitors to their country. These counter-revolutionary acts of murderers and brutes will forever brand all the Baltic crews with shame. Am

expecting immediate report that order is fully restored." The position of the officers became indeed desperate. Army organizations, under pressure of the soldiery maddened by agitators, arbitrarily assumed new powers; much of what had been re-established with such enormous difficulty had to be thrown overboard for the sake of saving, at least, some remnants.

Handled by clever demagogues scenting booty, the absurd adventure of a group of persons becomes a "counter-revolutionary Government plot against the labouring masses." The worse than imprudent behaviour of a few prominent members of the Cadet Party in having been in touch with Kornilov's movement, offered the opportunity for proclaiming the most influential Liberal Party a criminal and counter-revolutionary organization, and that opportunity was seized by the very men who, in July, were indignant at the attempt of the Right to lay the blame for the rising of the 3rd-5th of July upon the entire Bolshevik Party. A death-blow was being *consciously* dealt to the idea of an all-national authority at a moment when *nothing* but anarchy could replace it.

At the same time, maddened by their failure, the avowed and secret Kornilov faction started a shameless slandering campaign against me, creating the legend of a "great provocation," which, cleverly managed by the writers of the *Pravda* (the leading Bolshevik organ), became the fairy-tale of my complicity, of my being a Kornilovite. It was the beginning of a chaos. September and October witnessed the torturing agony of the Revolution, which was destined to become the agony of Russia. . . . We are quickly apt to forget what happened but yesterday. I say to those who have genuinely forgotten: curse not democracy alone for the

Motherland's ruin; remember that *the 25th of October could not have been without the 27th of August.*]

## § 13

*Chairman.*— Was the intended proclamation of martial law in Petrograd called for by strategical considerations, without any connection with the Bolshevik movement and with the question of the organization of a strong authority?

*Kerensky.*— Had I sufficient time at my disposal, I would, according to my habit in dealing with big legal investigations into political cases, have reconstructed the whole story properly. There certainly existed a certain group of persons at the Stavka (Headquarters) who always endeavoured, whatever events took place in the country, to make use of them according to their own definite tendency. For instance, immediately after the break through at Riga, I began to receive demands for the establishment of martial law, for the transference of all the troops of the Petrograd district to the command of the Generalissimo.

*Krokhmal.*— Demands from whom?

*Kerensky.*— From the Stavka, from Kornilov. My task then was rather hard, because again part of the Provisional Government were ready to accept ANYTHING coming from the Stavka. As for myself, taking into consideration the political situation on the one hand, and on the other considering that the front was drawing near to Petrograd and that all the region close to Petrograd might gradually become the army's rear line; that before Protopopov introduced the separate command for Petrograd (which took place on the 10th of February, 1917, i.e., only a few days before the Revolution), the Petrograd district was under

orders of the Generalissimo; that therefore this state of things had been changed only seven months ago and that I had no reason for adhering to such a separation of the Petrograd district — considering all that, I decided to pursue but *one aim* — to safeguard the independence of the Government. I explained this to the Provisional Government by pointing out that, owing to the critical political situation, it was impossible for the Government to be entirely dependent upon the Stavka for military command. I proposed the following: that at any rate Petrograd and its nearest neighbourhood should be detached and constitute a separate district military subordinated to the Government. I firmly insisted upon this. Thus the Provisional Government would give over to the Stavka all that was needed for strategic purposes, while Petrograd, as the political centre and the residence of the Provisional Government, must remain extra-territorial, i.e. militarily *independent* of the Stavka. This plan cost me a week's struggle, but at last I succeeded in bringing the members of the Provisional Government to unanimity and in receiving General Kornilov's formal assent. It became known later that Kornilov thought there would only be a delay of from four to five days, the condition "While the Provisional Government remains in Petrograd" having been interpreted by him as meaning that the Provisional Government would leave Petrograd almost on the day immediately following the declaration of the new military order; although there was, of course, not the slightest intention of doing so, as practically no measures have yet been undertaken to prepare a possible evacuation. Later, General Krimov told me, before committing suicide, that he came to Petrograd in the capacity of an Army Commander with the order to proclaim a state of siege and divide Petrograd into military sections. So that *we should have been*



*bagged at any moment.* Therefore, in view of the Stavka's state of mind and of possible complications arising from the sending of troops to the front (which was not proceeding quite smoothly), in view also of possible excesses during the transfer of the Government Offices to Moscow, we intended to keep a certain number of armed troops *at the special disposal* of the Provisional Government, but in no way subordinated to the Generalissimo (i.e. neither to the Commander-in-Chief of the Northern front nor to the Generalissimo).

*Chairman.*—Therefore, martial law was not to be established in consequence of Petrograd's being formed into a separate unit?

*Kerensky.*—No. Martial law was to be established, but on a special principle, under direct control not of the Generalissimo but of the Provisional Government.

*Shablovsky.*—Was there any intention of dismantling Kronstadt, and what were the reasons for doing so? Were they strategical reasons?

*Kerensky.*—That was not mentioned in connection with the establishing of martial law in Petrograd. That is an old business — as old as last summer.

*Liber.*—The official document was signed on August 8th, therefore there was some connection.

*Kerensky.*—No, that is an old story. There are very good guns at Kronstadt which we needed for other positions, but the Kronstadt garrison would not give them up. I think that this was due not merely to revolutionary zeal, but to *deliberate German propaganda*, because Kronstadt is full of German agents. From the very beginning of the Revolution, especially during the summer, the Stavka had given repeated orders for the guns to be delivered to the command of the Northern front for some new positions, but

these orders always met with a decided opposition from the Kronstadt garrison, on the alleged plea of the Stavka's treacherous intention of disarming Kronstadt.

*Krokhmal.*— For political reasons?

*Kerensky.*— Not only for political, but for treasonable purposes. The result of the Kronstadt people's behaviour is that the before-mentioned positions are insufficiently fortified even now, and they cannot be fortified in the near future. It was decided to dismantle the Kronstadt fortress in June, or July at latest, and to transform Kronstadt into a base for supplies, stores, etc.

*Shablovsky.*— Was not the fortress considered of no value for military purposes, and was not the coast considered to be of more importance?

*Kerensky.*— Yes, this is why all that was suggested — the removal of the guns and the dismantling of the fortress. All this was intended for purely military and strategical reasons.

*Liber.*— And the removal of the Kronstadt garrison?

*Kerensky.*— This was but the natural consequence of the dismantling of the Kronstadt fortress. Had the fortress been needed and had it possessed any importance as a point of defence, then, whatever the spirit of its garrison, the Government would never have ordered its disarmament and abolition for political reasons — to suppose so is absurd; but had the heavy artillery been removed there would be sense in such a dismantling. In general, Kronstadt has no military or strategical importance whatever.

[The Kronstadt question had apparently been raised owing to the following statement by General Kornilov. Referring to the two tasks to be accomplished by General Krimov upon arriving with his troops at Petrograd, General Kornilov writes that, "after accomplishing his first

task, General Krimov would have to send a brigade with artillery to Oranienbaum and, once there, order the Kronstadt garrison to dismantle the fortress and cross over to the continent. The consent of the Prime Minister for the dismantling of the fortress had been obtained on the 8th of August." It was not I who "gave consent" for the disarmament of the fortress, but I as the Minister of Marine had raised that question and obtained the consent of the Provisional Government, and I never consented to the method of disposing of the fortress proposed by General Kornilov; besides which, he could allot no *tasks* to a detachment sent to be at the disposal of the Provisional Government. . . . I must say that the fall of Riga had slightly sobered the Kronstadt garrison, and, when Kornilov was entrusting Krimov with his "task," they were already "surrendering" the guns. By a terrible irony of fate, in February last, the Kronstadt garrison's suspicion of treason in the Stavka's order for the removal of heavy artillery was based upon the Stavka's order being signed by the German name of Captain Altvater, who is now, apparently, playing an important part with Messrs. "The People's Commissaries" and has been delegated by them as an "expert" to Brest. The legend of treason at the Stavka was so deeply rooted in Kronstadt, that every attempt to remove the artillery drove the crowd to absolute fury, intensified by clever agitators.

I must point out, however strange it may seem, judging by the terrible results of the six months' activity of the revolutionary masses, that they were ready to credit the most absurd stories and rumours of treason, and searched for it with exceptional ardour. For instance, in the Baltic provinces, the sailors in their ardent search for traitors among the local German Barons surpassed all examples

of the kind recorded from the practice of the agents of the old *régime*.]

*Liber*.— Had the fortification works in Finland been reduced with Kornilov's knowledge and had this been decided upon at the Moscow Conference?

*Kerensky*.— No, it had been decided upon much earlier.

*Liber*.— But with Kornilov's knowledge? Was he acquainted with it?

*Kerensky*.— No. It had been decided before Kornilov's appointment to the post of Generalissimo. It can be verified by the agenda of the Provisional Government's meetings. It was decided to limit measures for the fortification of Finland because they proved to be utterly useless and absurd. They were no good. Why do you attach any significance to the matter?

*Liber*.— Because, in his statement, Kornilov declares that the cessation of work in Finland was a *deliberate act* of the Government which has now resulted in disastrous consequences.

*Kerensky*.— Nonsense!

["A deliberate act"—the member of the Commission of Inquiry has greatly softened General Kornilov's meaning. "The limitation of fortification work in Finland" is considered by General Kornilov as a proof of the Provisional Government's acting in full accord with the plans of the German General Staff. The story of the "note" transmitted at the meeting of the 3rd of August was, so to speak, a preparation for attack. The Finland story is a bombardment from a 48-inch gun. I am not revolted, nor indignant: a year of revolution has too deeply revealed the secret nature of men. I only want to tell all past, present and future slanderers that he who wishes to calumniate successfully must know well of what he is speaking.

So far as I can remember, the limitation of work in Finland took place in early spring, and in any case the question arose in A. T. Gutchkov's time. The fact is that, besides important military defensive constructions, a great amount of work went on in Finland under cover of needs of defence, and this work, very advantageous for those who directed it, was unnecessary for the country's defence, ruinous for the exchequer, and extremely harmful politically, since rapine, plunder and violence towards the population acted more potently than any pro-German propaganda. Dozens of square kilometres of timber were cut down around Helsingfors and other places. Priceless forests were destroyed aimlessly and needlessly, and national wealth ruthlessly plundered. It was the Government's duty to arrest this carnival of mischief and put a stop to the activity of such marauders of the rear. Needless to say, all the really defensive works never ceased in Finland for a moment.

Speaking generally, it is possible to point to a whole series of enterprises and works run under the old *régime* as defence-work, often for no other reason than to escape the necessity of asking the State Duma for a vote of credit. This limitation of work in Finland formed but a small part of the milliards saved from "military expenses" by the Provisional Government in an urgent way, mainly owing to the insistence of all four Ministers of Finance (Terestchenko, Shingarev, Nekrassov and Bernadsky), without distinction of party. Yet, what do demagogues from Right or Left care for dull reality, when so many simpletons are always ready to believe any kind of nonsense?]

*Chairman.*—In view of the coming establishment of martial law, was any opposition to this measure expected from the Soviet, and did the Government enter into negotia-

tions or confer with the Central Executive Committee concerning the prevention of a possible conflict?

*Kerensky.*— No, there were no negotiations. Probably, Liber also knows that I had no negotiations concerning the establishment of martial law, nor did any one else negotiate in my name. We had plenty of Soviet representatives: Avksentiev, Tchernov, Skobelev. There was no opposition from any quarter. The Provisional Government only wished to guarantee the capital and country from surprises and experiments.

*Shablowsky.*— Then the 3rd Corps, which was marching here, was to represent a military force placed at the disposal, not of the Generalissimo, but of the Provisional Government in case of emergency?

*Kerensky.*— Yes.

*Shablowsky.*— Was there any intention of using these troops for the suppression of possible disorders, or was not the question discussed by the Provisional Government?

*Kerensky.*— It had never been definitely laid down for what purpose these troops might be needed. Generally, in case of any emergency. Because the Government needed support. It was not even known against which side they would have to be used. I did not even think there would arise a necessity for using them. In any case, they *were not* to have any relation whatever either with the Commander of the front or with the Generalissimo.

*Shablowsky.*— Were not these troops intended to form a nucleus for the formation of a new army on the coast in connection with the break-through at the Riga front?

*Kerensky.*— Hardly that. There existed an old dispute about the formation of an army for the coast. That is a special military question. It had been raised in Gutchkov's

time, between the Stavka on one side and Gutchkov and Kornilov on the other. There were many plans as to the organization of the Petrograd troops in case they found themselves obliged to defend not only the "Revolution," but the approaches to Petrograd. It is an old question.

## § 14

*Krokhmal.*— Did the intention of summoning the 3rd Corps originate only after Riga fell?

*Kerensky.*— Yes.

*Krokhmal.*— Was not there some kind of talk between you and Savinkov to the effect that this corps was meant for a possible suppression of a Bolshevik revolt; and is anything known as to how Savinkov put it in his conversation with Kornilov about the summoning of this corps?

*Kerensky.*— I do not know the wording of Savinkov's conversation with Kornilov, because I learn from the papers that much has been said at the Stavka *which has never been mentioned here*; for instance, I read that discussions took place there concerning possible changes in the Provisional Government; absolutely fantastic names were proposed, while we here had no idea of what was going on. But here, the question of calling up troops against the Bolsheviks had never been so concretely formulated by the Provisional Government. No such great importance was attached here to the Bolsheviks as was at the Stavka; they were a mere incident. At that time, there were generally no particular discussions. For instance, when we thought at one time of moving to Moscow, it was intended to call up a railway battalion to raise the efficiency of the Nicholas railway (from Petrograd to Moscow). All these episodes are of no consequence. I recollect that only after Savinkov's return from

the Stavka, presumably on the 25th of August, I received the first information that a corps was on the march, and that it was actually the 3rd Corps. I mention all this because at the beginning of the episode I was questioned by many persons who were more intimate with me, whether I could remember how it all originated — why the 3rd Corps had been sent; and we could not recollect how it all happened, why and what — everything had been so little recorded here.

[In his statement of the 13th of September, Savinkov gives the following explanation of the causes which led to the summons of the 3rd Cavalry Corps: "By order of the Prime Minister I asked the Generalissimo to dispatch a cavalry corps for the purpose of establishing, in reality, martial law at Petrograd. The establishment of martial law at Petrograd originated from the necessity of subordinating the Petrograd military district to the Generalissimo, in consequence of recent events at the front. The draft of the declaration of martial law at Petrograd was approved, to the best of my belief, by the Provisional Government, of which Tchernov was also a member. It goes without saying that this cavalry corps, being at the disposal of the Provisional Government, was obliged to defend it from all antagonistic attempts independently of their origin, just as the joint detachment defended the Government against the Bolsheviks at the beginning of July" (*Volia Naroda*, September 12th). This formula is perfectly correct. It is highly probably that Savinkov, when asking Kornilov in my name to send troops to the Provisional Government, founded this demand upon a possible danger from the Left. . . . What else could he tell Kornilov? . . . As to Savinkov himself being perfectly alive to the danger from the Right, this is plain from his following statement: "I



was satisfied (on August 24th) by Kornilov's statement of his readiness fully to support A. F. Kerensky. However, the general state of mind at the Stavka appeared to me as being highly strained, and I was not at all surprised when, on my return journey in the train, the Commissary of the 8th Army spoke to me of possible attempts at a conspiracy of the Stavka Staff, and offered to put at once the entire 8th Army (of which he was sure) at the disposal of the Provisional Government; an offer which I gratefully accepted, promising to send him a telegram in case of necessity. I did send that telegram on the 27th of August, having previously reported my conversation to A. F. Kerensky." On his return from the Stavka on the 25th of August, Savinkov told me that, during the first day of his stay, Kornilov's attitude had been quite "irreconcilable," but by the end of the second day he, Savinkov, succeeded in making him change his mind. I must say that Savinkov himself always suspected the Stavka Staff of plotting, but exempted Kornilov himself.]

*Kerensky.*—Concerning the 3rd Corps, I recollect Savinkov telling me, after his return from the Stavka, that he had succeeded in dissuading Kornilov from sending here the "Savage Division" and appointing Krimov. I do not know whether you are aware that I had, just at that time, signed the order appointing Krimov to the command of the 11th Army. This was done for greater reassurance.

*Krokhmal.*—For whose reassurance?

*Kerensky.*—For mine. Once General Krimov was in command of the 11th Army, there was nothing more to be said. But, it seems, he remained all the while at the Stavka, working out the disposition of the troops "in case of a Bolshevik revolt," and then suddenly made his appearance here. I was extremely surprised to hear of his arrival.

I asked him: "Who are you?" "I am the Commander of the Special Army." "Which?" "The one appointed to Petrograd."

*Krokhmal.*—And yet there had been no order appointing him to the command of this very army?

*Kerensky.*—No. My assistant, General Iakubovitch, was present at our interview. I asked him: "Do you know anything about it?" "No, I know nothing; neither does the Ministry of War."

*Chairman.*—We have a lacuna concerning General Krimov, as we had not examined him; therefore, the Commission begs you to state whether you have had any explanations with him.

*Kerensky.*—I have a vivid recollection of the whole scene, and I can describe it to you.

*Chairman.*—What information had you as to the movements of his corps before he put in an appearance?

*Kerensky.*—You see, we dispatched an officer, who had formerly served with him, to meet him at Luga and explain the situation. We did this after our telegrams ordering him to stay his march remained unacknowledged. This mission succeeded. General Krimov arrived here accompanied by this officer (General Samarin). When General Krimov was announced, I went to meet him, invited him to my study, and then we had a talk. As far as I can remember, General Iakubovitch, Assistant Minister of War, was also present. General Krimov began by saying that they had no special aims in marching here; that they had been sent at the disposal of the Provisional Government; that they had received orders to aid the Provisional Government; that no one ever dreamed of acting against the Government; that, as soon as the misunderstanding had been cleared, he had given orders to halt. Then he added that he was in

possession of a written order to that effect. At first he would not produce the order, and I had no reason to doubt that he had been deceived by it. He apparently hesitated to deliver it, but did so at last. The order was absolutely clear and precise.

*Chairman.*— You were good enough to give it me.

*Kerensky.*— You know it. . . . It is very cleverly written. I read the order. I knew Krimov and always greatly respected him, as a man of decidedly very moderate views, but highly honest and decent. I rose and slowly approached him. He also rose. He saw that I was greatly impressed by the order. He approached this table; I came up quite close to him and said, in a low voice: "Yes, General, I see. You are undoubtedly a *very* clever man. Thank you." Krimov saw that the part he played was perfectly clear to me.

(To the Chairman) I sent for you at once and passed it to you.

*Chairman.*— You gave me the order.

*Kerensky.*— After this, General Krimov told me that he had been at the Stavka, where they had drafted the disposition and the statute for proclaiming a *state of siege* at Petrograd; he added that, according to this plan, Petrograd was to be divided into military sections. I am sure he found the situation unbearable, because he, Krimov, had swerved from the truth; first of all, he did not openly confess his own part in the affair, and secondly, clause 4 of the order begins with the words: "From communications of the Stavka and information received by me, I learn that riots are taking place in Petrograd . . ." etc. I asked him what were his grounds for making this declaration in his own name about riots. He was driven to refer to some "officer," travelling he did not know whence or whither. In short,

he could not explain it. Then we parted, i.e. I dismissed him, refusing to shake hands with him.

[It appears that in about an hour or two after Krimov left my study he committed suicide. It should not be thought that I ceased to respect him when I refused to shake hands with him. Not at all. The whole of Krimov's behaviour during his interview with me, his calm resolve — after momentary hesitation — to hand over to me immediately the convicting document (the order to his corps), his noble silence as regards General Kornilov's telegrams of August 27th–29th, his manly confession of his belief in a dictatorship, all give him an undeniable right to the highest esteem of his political enemies. All these facts clearly illustrate the honest, courageous, vigorous nature of the man. But I, as the most official person in the most official surroundings, as Premier and War Minister — I could not and had no right to treat this general guilty of a crime against the State in any other way.

By the way, General Krimov was one of those higher officers of the Russian army who, in the winter preceding the Revolution of February 27th, together with a part of the "propertied classes," planned, and were preparing, the deposition of Nicholas II.

The story of the 3rd Corps' march on Petrograd, led by General Krimov, throws important light on the question whether General Kornilov's rebellion was a "misunderstanding" caused by my "provocation," as it is termed in Kornilov's address to the "Russian People," or whether it was a premeditated crime. I shall record a few facts which will solve this question, without as yet drawing any conclusions therefrom.

On August 21st Savinkov, the Deputy War Minister, arrived at Headquarters, and reported to the Generalissimo

the Premier's suggestion to place a detachment of troops at the disposal of the Provisional Government, under the *strict condition* that Krimov should not be at the head of the detachment, and that the native Caucasian division should not be sent with it.

On August 24th Savinkov left Headquarters, having secured (according to his statement) General Kornilov's consent "to send a cavalry corps, *not* to appoint General Krimov as its commander, and to *replace* the native division by a regular cavalry division."

But, first, General Krimov, just appointed Commander of the 11th Army by the Provisional Government in the usual way, i.e. on the recommendation of the Generalissimo, *turns out to be at Headquarters* as "selected" to command the Petrograd army, and precisely at that time is completing the study of the plans not only "of the defence" of Petrograd against the Germans, but also of its occupation. Secondly, not only does the cavalry corps remain under General Krimov, but, as far as I remember, precisely on August 24th, by *special* orders from the Generalissimo, Krimov was also placed in command of the native division. Thirdly, not only does the native division remain unreplaced by regular cavalry, but it *heads* the advance on Petrograd. Fourthly and finally, the detachment, far from being sent to be at the disposal of the Provisional Government, is advancing for the accomplishment of "two tasks" expressly entrusted to General Krimov by General Kornilov.

On August 25th Savinkov returned to Petrograd and informed me of General Kornilov's "consent" to accept my conditions; and at the same time troops were already approaching Petrograd, but they were not those troops which would have had the right to do so. On August 26th Kornilov signed an order for the formation of the Petrograd

army, an order which — under the pretence of its being premature — was not transmitted to the troops, nor was the Government informed of it. Why was it just on August 26th? There certainly must be some reason for the fact that on the very day of his departure to join his troops General Krimov was entrusted with the following task: "On hearing from me (General Kornilov) or from local sources of the commencement of a Bolshevik rising, advance on Petrograd immediately, *occupy the city*, disarm those divisions of the Petrograd garrison which join the rising, disarm the population, and *disperse the Soviets*." All this happened before the evening of August 26th, i.e. before my conversation with V. N. Lvov and with General Kornilov on the direct wire, when the "great provocation" is alleged to have taken place. On August 27th at 2:40 A. M. General Kornilov, as yet ignorant of his dismissal, sent a telegram to the Deputy War Minister beginning with the following words: "The concentration of the corps in the environs of Petrograd will be completed by the evening of August 27." . . . He thus made the Government believe that it was the detachment which was to be placed at the disposal of the Government *without* Krimov or the native division. At the same time I and Savinkov were eagerly "awaited at Headquarters" on August 28th, certainly not later. It was not in vain that V. N. Lvov implored me not to go there. And what would have been the position of the Provisional Government if it had, following on the same telegram, proclaimed martial law in Petrograd on August 29th and had then to face Krimov's troops, who had a task *of their own* to perform? Would not the Government itself be *then* declared to be acting under the influence of the "*Bolshevik majority of the Soviets*," as it soon happened (August 27th)? This being so, did a change occur in the conduct of

Headquarters after the evening of August 26th, after my conversation with Kornilov over the direct wire? — *No change whatsoever.*

“That General Krimov did not carry out the task entrusted to him,” Kornilov explained by the fact that “communications with him were severed, and he could not receive my (Kornilov’s) instructions. No special measures to maintain my connection with him were taken, because the corps was advancing on Petrograd at the demand of the Provisional Government, and I could not foresee that the Government itself would order connections to be severed between the corps and Headquarters.” In other words, General Kornilov assumed that, in face of the demands put forward through V. N. Lvov, and after our “conversation” on the direct wire, I would still feel happily confident that there was no connection between Headquarters’ “offers” and the advance of the 3rd Corps.

On August 29th General Kornilov gave orders to General Krimov to continue the movement on Petrograd, and “in case of communications being severed again, to act according to the circumstances and *to my original instructions.*”

But this was not the first order since August 27th. On the morning of August 29th General Krimov already issued his own order No. 128, which he afterwards handed over to me personally. These are its most characteristic points: —

“1. I received the following telegrams from the Prime Minister and the Generalissimo: —

(Here he quotes the text of my announcement of the dismissal of General Kornilov and the reasons thereof, as well as the text of General Kornilov’s declaration of his open move against the Provisional Government.)

“3. . . . Having received M. Kerensky’s telegram, I sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Front for

orders. General K——sky stated in reply . . . that in these hard times all Commanders-in-Chief recognized General Kornilov to be the sole Generalissimo, whose every order was valid. Moreover, the Cossacks (it should be remembered that the 3rd Army Corps was a Cossack one) long ago decided that General Kornilov could *not be removed*, which I hereby proclaim for *general guidance*.

“4. Tonight I heard from Generalissimo’s Headquarters and from Petrograd that *riots* have broken out in that city. Famine is increased by the insane actions of the people, who, panic-stricken at the sight of their own troops marching on Petrograd, destroyed the railway and thus stopped the supply of food to the metropolis. And who were those troops they were so afraid of? They were those who had sworn on oath to be loyal to the new *régime*, those who at the Moscow State Conference had declared their belief in the republican order as the best suited for Russia,” etc.

This order scarcely requires explanation. I think every one will now understand why General Krimov did not hand over to me his order at once. And does not this order remind one of Kaledin’s conduct at the Moscow State Conference and the noisy campaign in favour of Kornilov’s “irremovability,” which I have already mentioned above, as well as many other things?

To what extent General Krimov’s march on Petrograd was anticipated and how serious were the hopes centred in it can be seen from the fact that Headquarters could not to the very end reconcile themselves with what had actually happened. On September 1st General Lukomsky spoke over the Hughes tape machine to General Alexeiev, who was then at Vitebsk, already on his way to Mohilev:—

“For me to receive a definite reply from General Kor-



nilov, it is highly desirable that you should explain what is happening to Krimov."

Even Kornilov himself admits that only at the moment "when I learned from a conversation over the direct wire of General Krimov's death did I take measures to settle my conflict with the Prime Minister Kerensky in a bloodless and painless way as far as the country and the army were concerned."

These are the facts. There is one which I wish to emphasize. As Prime Minister I suggested that a detachment of troops should be sent and placed at the disposal of the Provisional Government on certain terms. This suggestion was *not carried out* by the Generalissimo, so that the march of Krimov's detachment cannot be explained as being the result of an "agreement" with the Government.

And then arises the pertinent question, why these troops were marching on Petrograd even *before the evening of August 26th.*]

## § 15

*Krokhmal.*—Was the question of bringing up additional troops considered by the Provisional Government, or at a private conference of some of its members?

*Kerensky.*—I think the matter was settled by conversations. Usually, at meetings of the Provisional Government questions are put to me by individual ministers, e.g., about the general situation, or whether the Provisional Government has at its disposal sufficient forces on which it can rely, or what are the relations between, and the state of, this and that body of troops, etc.

*Krokhmal.*—Not at official meetings?

*Kerensky.*—We hold various kinds of meetings—business, political and private. I always try to report to the

Provisional Government about the general political situation, so as to keep it always well informed. At that time the question arose of the necessity of securing a sufficient force at the command of the Government to maintain order under such difficult circumstances. I remember that in addition we also had to deal with the grave question of the influx of refugees from the Baltic provinces. I remember, M. Shablovsky, your report on this question in connection with the state of affairs on the Baltic railway lines, which I then submitted to the Provisional Government. An active propaganda was being carried on among the troops on the lines of retreat towards Petrograd. On the whole there was much tension in the atmosphere. Add to this the inevitable conflict between myself and Headquarters which sooner or later was sure to arise, and I believe you will admit there was sufficient cause for alarm concerning the position of Petrograd.

*Krokhmal.*—Do you remember when the question of bringing up troops was considered by the Provisional Government, and which of its members were present?

*Kerensky.*—No, I don't. I even think I can state with certainty that we did not discuss at all which corps to bring up, the 3rd, 5th, or 12th. It was merely asked, "Are you sufficiently secure?" and the Minister of War (or the Minister of the Interior) answered, "The necessary steps are taken," or "everything will be arranged."

*Krokhmal.*—Do you remember whether the question of the necessity of bringing up troops in connection with the then possible or expected Bolshevik rising was put before the Provisional Government?

*Kerensky.*—No, I don't.

*Krokhmal.*—Did not Savinkov speak to you about it?

*Kerensky.*—Possibly. The subject was discussed.

*Krokhmal.*— But it was not definitely referred to when it was decided to bring up troops?

*Kerensky.*— It would be wrong to assume that our attention was mainly directed that way, that we were expecting a Bolshevik *coup*. Our attention — my personal attention — was directed elsewhere. You remember, just at that time some of the Grand Dukes were arrested, and various searches were made. After the Moscow State Conference it became quite clear to me that the next blow would come from the Right, not from the Left.

*Chairman.*— Did Savinkov go to Headquarters with the knowledge and according to the instructions of the Government, or on his own initiative?

*Kerensky.*— Both. You see, he arranged a conference of all Commissaries at Headquarters for August 24th (which I either did not know or had forgotten), to discuss various proposals of reforms; at the same time it was necessary to arrive at a decision on many urgent questions, e.g. about the Officers' Union, about sending troops, etc. And as the question of proclaiming martial law, with the exclusion of the Petrograd area, was also to be considered, I asked Baranovsky to go with Savinkov in order that the military business should receive better attention. [I remember that in this very room I met Savinkov, two of my colleagues (Iakubovitch and Tumanov) and Baranovsky. We were busy in defining the area which was to be excluded from the jurisdiction of the Generalissimo after the Petrograd district had been transferred to that of Headquarters. Then it was decided that Baranovsky should also go to Headquarters.]

*Chairman.*— Was it reported to you and did you know that Savinkov was taking Mironov with him, and what was the object of it?

*Kerensky.*—No, I don't know about Mironov. I remember that the day after their departure I wanted Mironov to arrange that the movements of a certain person should be watched. I sent for Mironov. I was told that he had gone to Headquarters with Savinkov.

[At that time N. D. Mironov was the Head of the Counter-Intelligence Department at the General Staff of the Petrograd Military District. His arrival at Headquarters with Savinkov caused considerable alarm and enormous irritation.

"I know," said Kornilov to Savinkov excitedly, "Kerensky wants to arrest a valuable officer. . . . He sent Mironov, this Professor of Sanskrit, with you. I know that Mironov is engaged in political espionage. He has come here to watch us. . . ."

"Mironov has come with my permission," retorted Savinkov. "Kerensky did not even know that he was going with me. . . ."

"All the same, I warn you, if Mironov dares to arrest any one here, I'll have him *shot* by my Tekintzy (Asiatic soldiers)."

"He cannot arrest any one without my orders," remarked Savinkov.

This is a picturesque fragment from Savinkov's conversation with Kornilov on August 24th. The alarm caused at Headquarters by Mironov's arrival will be perhaps better understood in the light of the fact that it was Savinkov's intention to take serious measures against the Main Committee of the Officers' League and the Headquarters' Political Department in connection with information received concerning the plot.]

*Chairman.*—What report did Savinkov give of his visit to Headquarters?

*Kerensky.*—Not a very detailed one. He told me besides that on the first day (August 23rd) Kornilov adopted an extremely *excited* and *irreconcilable* attitude towards me. Only after long negotiations did Savinkov succeed in alleviating this animosity, and at his departure Kornilov himself, or a representative of his—I don't remember who—called on Savinkov in order to ask him to tell me that Kornilov desired to co-operate with me and was devoted to me.

At the same time Baranovsky, who also returned, told me, as I have already mentioned, that the whole atmosphere at Headquarters was unbearable, that "it is even impossible to mention your name there," that "*practically no work is being done*," because at all desks one heard nothing but political discussions.

[I must here mention that one of the most unexpected aspects of Kornilov's policy was that from the moment of his appointment as Generalissimo all questions, *military, strategic, or concerning the front*, completely ceased to interest Headquarters. What used to be the chief subject of my discussions with Alexeiev and Brussilov now fell into the background. I remember that on several occasions I expressed surprise at such a hypertrophy of politics where such questions should not have existed at all.]

*Chairman.*—Did Savinkov tell you about his proposal not to proclaim martial law in Petrograd until the 3rd Corps approached the city?

*Kerensky.*—Yes, he did. But I pointed out that *I did not attach any importance to the advance of the corps*, that I considered the delay quite superfluous, that the measure was necessary in view of altered circumstances, and that martial law could be proclaimed without waiting for new troops. So you see, I disagreed with Savinkov.

The Government did not discuss this particular question.

*Chairman.*— Did he report only to you personally?

*Kerensky.*— As far as I remember, no report was made to the Government on the subject, apart from a statement of the general results of his journey to Headquarters.

*Chairman.*— Was it not then intended to send Terestchenko on a mission to Headquarters, and for what reason?

*Kerensky.*— To which mission do you refer?

*Chairman.*— To the one immediately following on Savinkov's return. What was the reason of it?

*Kerensky.*— He visited Headquarters in July, and brought back the news that Filonenko was intriguing against Lukomsky.

*Libcr.*— And what about his visit before Lvov?

*Kerensky.*— Oh, yes. He went to Headquarters on his own business, and possibly might have wished to discuss the general situation personally. I believe at that time Maklakov had to go there, whose ambassadorial appointment to Paris was then under consideration.

*Chairman.*— So there was no connection between Terestchenko's visit and Savinkov's mission?

*Kerensky.*— That, I think, is very unimportant. It did not occupy my attention at the time. [But now I can say definitely that it had nothing to do with Savinkov's Mission.]

*Raupakh.*— May I ask whether Baranovsky had any object of his own in accompanying Savinkov to Headquarters?

*Kerensky.*— He went as Chief of the Military Cabinet, mainly to investigate the question (of the exclusion of Petrograd) from a military point of view, and was only present at the meeting at which this question was discussed.

*Raupakh.*— Does that mean that he was instructed to insist on the exclusion of Petrograd?

*Kerensky.*—The military authorities were always against the exclusion of Petrograd, as were also Iakubovitch and Prince Tumanov at the meeting in my room mentioned above. But for considerations of my own, I desired to make the military aspect of the question clear to Kornilov, and as all here were more or less unanimous, Baranovsky was sent to Headquarters to defend my point of view.

## § 16

*Shablovsky.*—When you first discussed with Lvov the question of reorganizing and strengthening the Government, who initiated the discussion, and what were the concrete suggestions made by Lvov?

*Kerensky.*—I had no such discussion with him.

*Shablovsky.*—What were the concrete suggestions he made?

✓ *Kerensky.*—Among the infinite number of people who come to me with all sorts of serious propositions and “schemes,” useful advice and idle talk (everybody being convinced that the real cause of all the disasters is that I did not give him a hearing), came Lvov. He did not talk much about his “schemes” or the changes in the Provisional Government, but tried to persuade me that my “song was sung,” that I had no support anywhere, because I was now “hated by the Right,” and that I had “lost my influence” with the democracy owing to my resolute repressive measures against and persecutions of the Bolsheviks, that I and my Provisional Government had “lost our footing,” that support must be found, that he could help, that Cabinet changes were necessary, and that elements even more moderate than the Cadets ought to be included. As this happened soon after the Moscow Conference, I considered it

natural for a man to come and express such opinions. I answered in general terms that I was a convinced adherent of Coalition Government, etc. I do not now remember the details of the conversation, but the gist of it was that V. Lvov tried to show that I "had no support," whereas he had something or somebody behind his back. He kept on repeating: "We can do this. We can do that." I asked him who "we" were, what he could do, in whose name he was speaking. To these questions he replied: "I have no right to tell you. I am only authorized to ask you whether you are willing to enter into discussion." I could see from what he said that he came on behalf of a *distinct group*. There was no doubt about it. More than once he hinted that he had just come from somewhere, and that he must return the same day, but "before leaving I must have your answer." He emphasized the following: "I am instructed to ask you whether you are willing or not to include new elements in the Provisional Government, and to discuss the question with you." I replied: "Before I give you an answer, I must know with whom I am dealing, who are those you represent, and what they want." "They are public men." "There are various kinds of public men," said I. At last I said: "Well, supposing I have no support, what can you offer, what are the actual forces you rely upon? I can imagine of whom your group consists, and who those public men are." He then hinted that I was mistaken, that "they" were backed by a *considerable force* which nobody could afford to ignore.

Such was my conversation with Lvov. Of course I gave him no instructions, no powers. I believe he had admitted that in speaking as he did at Headquarters on my behalf he "exceeded" his warrant. Of course he did, because I



told him nothing of the sort. I plainly told him: "Before I can give you any answer, you must tell me whom I am dealing with."

*Shablowsky.*— And he said he was not entitled to tell you?

*Kerensky.*— Yes, that was what puzzled me most. In the tangled mass of information I had about the intended lines of action of various groups, this *secrecy* attracted my attention. I have known Lvov for a long time: I saw that he did not merely drop in to have a chat. He said he wished me well, that my personality interested him, and he did not desire my ruin, etc.

*Shablowsky.*— As he did not say from whom he came, because he was not authorized to do so, did you not suggest that he should obtain such authority?

*Kerensky.*— I did not say "authority." I said, "Before I express my opinion, I must know whom I am dealing with and in whose name you are speaking."

*Shablowsky.*— How did he end the conversation?

*Kerensky.*— He did not. He asked: "Will you negotiate if I tell you?" I replied: "Tell me more definitely what you want to learn from me and why." He said "Good-bye" and departed. That was the end of it. Headquarters were not even mentioned.

*Shablowsky.*— Did you expect him to come again after this conversation with clearer and more definite proposals, or did you consider the matter finished?

*Kerensky.*— I thought the matter would end at that. Generally speaking, I did not attach any importance to it, but some of the details, and more particularly Lvov's manner, attracted my attention. I suspected that V. Lvov was referring to that Rodzianko group, the group of "men who have been," which then had its Headquarters in Moscow. It must not be forgotten that it was a time of all sorts

of talk and idle scheming. Even in June-July people sometimes came to me with various suggestions as to the proper organization of the Government. Direct offers of dictatorship were even made to me. Such offers made it easier for me to keep an eye on those round Kornilov, because they were *the same men* who had previously tried to gain my ear.

*Shablowsky.*—Did Lvov suggest inclusion in the Government of only those elements of the Right whose support could be relied upon, or did he suggest strengthening the Government by gaining the support of wider masses? Or did he suggest any real force, aiming at strengthening the Government?

*Kerensky.*—When he first came we talked about the inclusion of new elements to widen the range of influence of the Provisional Government, and when I asked: "Who can raise the authority of the Government; what is the use of appointing two or three more Ministers?" he answered with a smile, "Oh well, you may be mistaken; *there are forces behind us.*" "What forces?" "You don't know, but there are." This was what particularly impressed me. Lvov seemed to know something; he was not talking for himself.

*Shablowsky.*—Did you speak to your colleagues Zarudny or Nekrassov or to somebody else about Lvov's suggestions to the effect that here was an attractive offer, and did you instruct any one to find out who was behind his back and who was responsible for the offer?

*Kerensky.*—I don't remember. . . . No, indeed, I gave no such instructions.

*Shablowsky.*—Did you mention the matter at all?

## § 17

*Kerensky*.—I could not tell you. I believe I merely mentioned casually to one of my colleagues that Lvov had been talking with me, but I cannot speak with certainty for the moment, because I did not attach much importance to his visit. I must say that on his second visit on August 26th he completely changed his manner. He tried hard to arrange an interview with me. I remember; I had neither time nor desire to see him, particularly as he was incensed when he left the Provisional Government. I believe he then said to Terestchenko, "*Kerensky — c'est mon ennemi mortel.*" The second time he came, I met him with the following words: "You have come again to talk about the inclusion of new elements in the Provisional Government." (I am not certain about the actual words, but such was the meaning.) He answered: "No, I have come to discuss a totally different subject; the situation has completely changed." This time he made no mention whatsoever of the necessity to include new elements in the Provisional Government or of extending its range of support. He told me bluntly that he had come to warn me that my position was extremely precarious, that I was *doomed*; in the very near future there would be a Bolshevik rising, when the Government would receive no support; that no one would guarantee my life, etc. When he saw that all this made no impression upon me and that I took it in a jocular way: "It can't be helped, such is fate," and so on, he abruptly broke off the conversation. Then, apparently much excited, he added: "I must make you a formal offer." "From whom?" "From Kornilov." When I listened to all this nonsense, it seemed to me that either he was insane or something very serious had hap-

pened. Those who were about me can testify how much I was upset. When Lvov left my study, V. V. Virubov was shown in. I showed him the document just drawn up, and said: "This is what we have come to, such is the state of affairs."

[I must apologize for inevitable repetitions, but I deem it necessary to reproduce the events of the evening of August 26th as precisely as I can. As a matter of fact, I was cross-examined on certain particular episodes of the affair of which the nature was sufficiently familiar to the Commission of Inquiry, but which may not be grasped by the reader.

The evening of August 26th was of exceptional importance. Thanks to the coming of Lvov, it was possible — quoting Nekrassov's vivid expression — "to explode the already prepared mine, two days before the time fixed for it" (August 28th), and it was just because of the events of that evening that General Kornilov talked of "great provocation," and all his followers conducted against me and a certain part of the Provisional Government a most obdurate campaign.

So about six o'clock on August 26th V. N. Lvov came to me in my official study, and after a long conversation about my "doom" and about his anxiety to "save" me and so forth, said in so many words that —

General Kornilov declared to me (Kerensky) through him (Lvov) that no assistance whatever would be given to the Provisional Government in its struggle with the Bolsheviks, and that in particular Kornilov would not answer for my life anywhere but at Headquarters; that the continuance of the Provisional Government in power could no longer be permitted; that General Kornilov invited me to urge the Provisional Government to transfer its powers that very day to the Generalissimo, and, pending the for-

mation by him of its new Cabinet, to hand over the direction of current affairs to the Assistant Ministers and to proclaim martial law throughout Russia. As to myself and Savinkov, we were urged to go away that night to Headquarters, where Ministerial portfolios awaited us — for Savinkov the position of War Minister, for me that of Minister of Justice.

To this V. N. Lvov added that this last condition — that is to say, our going to Headquarters and the rest — was put to me privately, and was not to be disclosed at the session of the Provisional Government.

This communication was an absolute surprise to me, and especially the fact that it came from the lips of V. N. Lvov, because his name had never before been mentioned in any of the reports or statements concerning the plot which I had in my possession.

At first I burst out laughing. "Don't joke, V. N.," I said.

"There is no time to joke; the situation is very serious," Lvov answered; and with extreme excitement and evident sincerity, he began to urge me to save my life. For that there was "only one way, to yield to Kornilov's demands." He was beside himself.

I walked hastily up and down my large room, trying to understand, to feel, what was the real meaning of all this — Lvov's coming, and the rest of it. I remembered what he had said at his first visit about "real force," and compared it with the feeling that existed against me at Headquarters, and with all the reports about the ripening conspiracy which was without a doubt connected with Headquarters; and as soon as I had got over my first surprise, or rather shock, I decided to test Lvov once more, to verify his statement and then to act. And to act in-

stantly and resolutely My mind was at work. I did not hesitate for an instant in my acting. I rather felt than understood all the extraordinary seriousness of the situation, if . . . if only Lvov's words were even remotely in accord with reality!

Calming myself a little, I deliberately pretended that I had no longer any doubt or hesitation, and that personally I had decided to agree.

I began to explain to Lvov that I could not convey such a communication to the Provisional Government without proofs. He reassured me, saying that every word he had uttered was true. At last I asked him to put into writing all Kornilov's points. The readiness, the assurance, the quickness with which Lvov agreed and wrote down Kornilov's proposals gave me full confidence that Lvov was not only fully informed, but that he had no doubt as to the realization of the plan.

Here is the text of the note Lvov wrote:—

General Kornilov proposes —

- (1) That martial law shall be proclaimed in Petrograd.
- (2) That all military and civil authority shall be placed in the hands of the Generalissimo.
- (3) That all Ministers, not excluding the Premier, shall resign, and that the temporary executive power shall be transferred to the Assistant Ministers till the formation of a Cabinet by the Generalissimo.

V. Lvov.

PETROGRAD, *August 26, 1917.*

As soon as he began to write, my last doubt disappeared. I had only one desire, one overmastering impulse: to check the madness at the outset, not giving it time to blaze up,

and preventing the possible breaking-out of its partisans in Petrograd itself. All that had previously occurred — the activity of various organizations, the commotion around the Conference in Moscow, the campaign in the Press, reports concerning conspiracies, the behaviour of individual politicians, the series of ultimatums sent to me by Staff Headquarters, Aladin's visit to Prince G. E. Lvov, Kornilov's recent telegram supporting the railwaymen in their *impossible* demands, the insistence that the Petrograd army should be handed over to Staff Headquarters — all, all instantly shone clear in a very brilliant light and merged into one clear picture. The double game was manifest.

Certainly I could not then prove every point, but I saw everything with extraordinary clarity.

In those instants while Lvov was writing, my brain worked intensely. It was necessary to prove at once the formal connection between Lvov and Kornilov so clearly that the Provisional Government would be able to take resolute measures that very evening. It was essential to make Lvov commit himself, by making him repeat in the presence of a third person all his conversation with me. I felt I must act thus, and in no other way. . . . Meantime, Lvov finished writing, and giving me the document, said, "That is very good: now everything will end peacefully. People *there* think it very important that the powers of the Provisional Government should be transferred legally. Well, and as for you," he concluded, "will you go to Staff Headquarters?"

I do not know why, but this question stabbed me, put me on my guard, and almost involuntarily I replied, "Certainly not. Do you really think that I can be Minister of Justice under Kornilov?"

Here something strange happened.

Lvov sprang up; his face brightened as he exclaimed: "You are right! You are right! Don't go there. A trap is set for you; he will arrest you. Go away — somewhere far away; but get out of Petrograd you must. They hate you." Lvov said this excitedly.

We then "decided" that Kornilov should learn by telegraph of my resignation, and that I should not go to Staff Headquarters.

"And what will happen, V. N.," I said, "if you are mistaken, or if they have played a practical joke on you? What position will you be in then? You know, what you have written is very serious."

Lvov began energetically to prove that it was not a mistake, that it could not be a joke, that it was indeed a very serious matter, and that "General Kornilov would never take back his words."

At that moment the idea came into my head that I would get direct confirmation from Kornilov himself on the direct telegraphic line. Lvov jumped at the suggestion, and we arranged that we should meet at eight o'clock at the house of the War Minister to speak together to Kornilov on the direct telegraph.

Lvov had come to me a few minutes after five o'clock, and he left, as far as I remember, after seven. Nearly an hour was left before we were to meet at the War Minister's house. As he went out, at the door of my room Lvov met Virubov, who was coming to me. After I had acquainted him with what had happened, and asked him to stay with me, I sent my aide-de-camp to arrange for a direct line, and to summon to me at my Palace at nine o'clock in the evening the Chief Assistant of the Military Staff, Balavinsky, and the Assistant to the Commander of the Military District, Captain Kosmin.



At eight o'clock in the evening I went with Virubov to the telegraph. Everything was ready. Kornilov was waiting at the other end of the line. Lvov was not yet there. We tried to ring him up at his house, but there was no reply. Kornilov waited at the telegraph for twenty to twenty-five minutes. I decided to speak alone, as the character of the conversation made it indifferent whether only one or both of us were there; the subject had been agreed upon beforehand. I must confess that apparently both Virubov and I were still hoping that General Kornilov would ask in utter bewilderment: "What is there for me to corroborate? Which Lvov?" But the hope was not realized. Here is the full conversation as recorded by the Hughes tape machine.

THE CONVERSATION BY THE HUGHES TAPE MACHINE OF THE PRIME MINISTER (KERENSKY) WITH THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF (GENERAL KORNILOV). Italics and figures are partly mine.

(1) "Good day, General. V. N. Lvov and Kerensky at the apparatus. We beg you to confirm the statement that *Kerensky is to act according to the communication made to him by V. N.*"

"Good day, Alexander Feodorovitch; good day, V. N. Confirming again the description I gave V. N. of the present situation of the country and the army as it appears to me, I declare again that the events of the past days and of those that I can see coming *imperatively demand a definite decision in the shortest possible time.*"

(2) "I, V. N., ask you *whether it is necessary to act on that definite decision* which you asked me to communicate privately to Kerensky, as he is hesitating to give his full confidence without your personal confirmation."

"Yes, I confirm that I asked you to convey to Alexander Feodorovitch my urgent demand that he should come to Mohilev."

(3) "I, Alexander Feodorovitch, *understand* your answer as *confirmation* of the words conveyed to me by V. N. To do that today and start from here is impossible. I hope to start tomorrow. Is it necessary for Savinkov to go?"

"I beg urgently that Boris Victorovitch shall come with you. Everything I said to V. N. refers *in equal degree* to Savinkov. I beg you earnestly not to put off your departure later than tomorrow. *Believe me, only my recognition of the responsibility of the moment urges me to persist in my request.*"

(4) "Shall we come *only* in case of an outbreak, of which there are rumours, or in any case?"

"In any case."

"Good day. Soon we shall see each other."

"Good day."

The above is a classical specimen of a "code" conversation in which the one who answers understands from half a word the one who questions, because the subject of the conversation is known to them both. For instance, take the first and second answers, "Confirming again," etc., where everything is puzzling to the outsider and clear only to the initiated, who knows the real point of the dialogue. There is not a single leading question, not a single question whence one could gather what is already known by the questioner about the subject of his interrogation. Nevertheless the answers were precisely what were expected. They were in exact accordance with V. Lvov's communication to me, especially the second and third.

This conversation yielded more than could have been expected; it not only confirmed V. Lvov's authority to speak directly on behalf of Kornilov, but also *verified the accuracy which Lvov had passed on to me Kornilov's words. . . .*

It was now necessary to strengthen this evidence by the repetition in the presence of a third person of my "private" conversation with Lvov.

We went back to the Winter Palace. On our way a scene occurred which is mentioned later in the evidence. On my return to my study, the conversation with Lvov was repeated. S. A. Balavinsky, at that time present in my room, gave the following account of it next day, August 27th, to the examining magistrate, among other evidence.

"I was in M. Kerensky's cabinet and wanted to leave in view of his approaching interview with Lvov, but Kerensky asked me to remain, and I stayed in the room all through the conversation. Kerensky had brought with him two documents. At the very beginning Kerensky read to Lvov the tape from the telegraph to Staff Headquarters containing the Kerensky-Kornilov conversation, the same tape that you now produce before me" (they showed the witness the tape produced by Kerensky at the examination), "and *Lvov confirmed the accuracy of the conversation recorded on the tape.*

"Then A. F. Kerensky read aloud to Lvov those notes in Lvov's own handwriting which you show me now, and *he confirmed the accuracy of those notes*, certifying that every proposal in those notes had been made by Kornilov himself. Further, V. N. Lvov said that the general opinion of the people and of *everybody at Staff Headquarters* was so strongly against Kerensky and the Provisional Government, that General Kornilov could not answer for A. F.

Kerensky's personal safety in any place in Russia, and that was why it was necessary that A. F. Kerensky and Savinkov should go to Staff Headquarters, and Lvov privately gave Kerensky friendly advice to accept and carry out General Kornilov's conditions. Advising Kerensky to fulfil Kornilov's demands, V. N. Lvov said that General Kornilov offered in the Cabinet he was forming the portfolio of Minister of Justice to Kerensky, while Savinkov was to have the Ministry of War and, as it seemed to me, the Ministry of Marine.

"In his conversation with Lvov, Kerensky several times returned to the same question: according to the accurate information he had received, there would not be a Bolshevik outbreak on August 27th; what then were the reason and motive that made General Kornilov say it was imperative for Kerensky and Savinkov to go to Staff Headquarters? But to this question Lvov made no answer. In his conversation Lvov mentioned that he had not slept for four nights, and that he felt very tired, and he asked Kerensky to come to a decision quickly.

"I did not know previously with whom Kerensky, who had just returned, was going to talk, and while witnessing the conversation between Kerensky and Lvov, I was not seen by the latter."<sup>1</sup>

After this conversation, which took place about ten o'clock in the evening, V. Lvov was put under arrest. . . . The reckoning began.

<sup>1</sup> This was one of the most important testimonies in the Kornilov affair, and although almost the first, it was not printed in a single one of the hosts of newspapers which filled their columns with "truth" about this matter.

## § 18

Now comes the question: had I not the right, after all that had happened on August 26th between five and ten o'clock in the evening, to declare to the population:—

"On August 26th General Kornilov sent V. Lvov, member of the Duma, with a demand for the handing over of the whole civil and military power of the Provisional Government, so that he might at his own discretion form a new Government to rule the country. That Lvov, member of the Duma, possessed full authority to make this proposition was afterwards confirmed by General Kornilov in his conversation with me on the direct line."

Or was the "telegram of the Prime Minister in the whole of the first part a *lie*," as Kornilov dared to declare to the Russian people? Or, lastly, was the whole thing a "mutual misunderstanding," to quote the timorous expression of Kornilov's cautious partisans?

Kornilov himself *does not deny* that he sent V. Lvov, member of the Duma, to tell me something, and conversing on August 27th about five o'clock on the direct line with Savinkov, Kornilov, among other things, said: "Yesterday evening, when I was talking with the Premier on the telegraph, I confirmed to him what I had asked Lvov to communicate to him, and I was quite satisfied that the Premier, convinced of the serious condition of the country and willing to work in full agreement with me, had decided to leave for Staff Headquarters today, to come to some definite decision here."

It is true that, giving later his evidence before the Commission of Inquiry, General Kornilov stated that he "had

*only* confirmed his request to Kerensky to come to Staff Headquarters." But it is enough to glance at the text of the communication on the tape to see that, before confirming the necessity of my going to Mohilev, General Kornilov (point 1) had already answered in the categorical affirmative the general question whether I was *to act* on Lvov's statement.

Besides that, the whole character of the second question and General Kornilov's answer to it, in relation to his further words "everything Lvov said applies in equal degree to B. V. Savinkov," undoubtedly showed that Kornilov understood quite well *why* "A. F. is hesitating to give his full confidence," understood *what* was meant by, not only to "start," but "*to do that*" today was impossible, etc.

In one word, all the text on the tape left no doubt whatever that General Kornilov did not dare to tell the Commission of Inquiry the truth, and if General Kornilov only confirmed his invitation to me to come to Staff Headquarters, why was it that "after this conversation," Prince Trubetskoy tells us, "a sigh of relief came from Kornilov's breast, and on my question: 'Then the Provisional Government will meet you in everything?' he said: 'Yes.'"<sup>1</sup> Why?

So it was not a "lie" when I declared that General Kornilov had sent Lvov to me with something.

Also it was not a "lie" when I declared that this something was the "demand" for my transference of the full power of the Provisional Government to General Kornilov, and that Lvov came to me on this mission. "Events demand quite definite decision in the shortest possible time," said Kornilov on the direct line. Moreover, next day, in conversation with Savinkov on the same subject, Kor-

<sup>1</sup> The italics everywhere are mine.

nilov said: "After your departure<sup>1</sup> I received two alarming communications about the state of affairs at the front and at the rear" (and I may add that Krimov was then already moving on Petrograd). "I told Lvov it was my profound conviction that the only solution was to be found in *the establishment of a Dictatorship* and the proclamation of martial law throughout the country. I asked V. Lvov to tell Kerensky and you that I considered it absolutely imperative that you and Kerensky should take a share in the Government. I asked him to *convey* my insistent appeal that you should come to Staff Headquarters to take some definite decision, and I added to that, that in view of the accurate information in my possession concerning a Bolshevik rising in Petrograd, I considered the position extremely serious, and in particular I believed that your and Kerensky's presence in Petrograd was very dangerous for both of you, and for that reason I *offered* you to come to Headquarters, *guaranteeing by my word of honour your absolute safety.*" Is it not more than obvious that Lvov's *rendering* entirely coincides with the actual thoughts of General Kornilov? Whilst the "apprehension" of Lvov for my life so strangely coincides with the promises of "safety" of the General. Why, however, should the Commander-in-Chief have to pledge his "word of honour" that the Prime Minister, the Supreme Chief of the State, will remain alive if he comes to the Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters at his own invitation?

That which had taken place at Headquarters after the conversation carried on by means of the Hughes tape machine and "the sigh of relief" confirms once more that Lvov was not indulging in any fancy of his imagination

<sup>1</sup> Between Savinkov's departure from the G.H.Q. and Lvov's visit to Kornilov five or six hours passed.

when he made his demands to me, to be immediately fulfilled ("within the shortest possible time," according to General Kornilov's Hughes' communication).

"The Commander-in-Chief" (so Prince Trubetzkoy continues his narration), "assuming that he had come to a complete understanding in principle with the Prime Minister, gave orders *confirming* orders previously given by him for the dispatch to Petrograd of the necessary troops. At the same time he sent telegrams to certain prominent political men *inviting* them to come to his Headquarters to discuss the situation that had arisen, with a view to induce them, together with some members of the Provisional Government (Kerensky and Savinkov), to form a new Cabinet, which, in General Kornilov's opinion, was to have carried out a strictly democratic program, consolidating the people's liberty and having for its main feature the solution of the agrarian question." I have to add that already, about a fortnight previous to August 26th, a certain professor arrived from Moscow at Headquarters for "conversations" upon the agrarian question, and by August 26th a full agrarian law or manifesto was already drafted.

It appears therefore that at the time of the Moscow Conference General Kornilov was already taking an interest not only in discussions of financial and international questions and had conversations not only with railway men.

✓ The picture therefore is perfectly clear. *On August 28th there would have been assembled in Headquarters, with the Commander-in-Chief, "the elders of the nation" and the Prime Minister, with the War Minister, who have "agreed" to hand over the power to General Kornilov, whilst at Petrograd there would have been the troops of Krimov, the "beheaded" Provisional Government, the*



*"Bolshevik majority" of the Soviets exercising pressure on that Government, and . . .*

*The Provisional Government would thus "loyally" have ceased to exist.*

General Alexeiev, perfectly well informed of the intentions of the conspirators, asserts in the same confidential letter to Miliukov that Kornilov's movement "was directed solely against the persons who one after the other joined the Ministry and quickly left it," that is to say, against the Provisional Government of that time, and acknowledges that it was *precisely for that purpose that the 3rd Cavalry Corps* was moving on Petrograd.

To what extent by the eve of August 26th everything had been prepared and arranged at Headquarters is borne out by the following characteristic conversation of Kornilov with the same Prince Trubetzky: "To my question why Kornilov insists on the participation of Kerensky and Savinkov in the Cabinet (consequently there were some who did not insist!) I received the reply: 'The new Government will be compelled by the force of circumstances to take some very stringent measures, and I desire that these measures should not be more stringent than are required. Moreover, democracy should see and know that it is not being deprived of its favourite leaders and most precious conquests.'" This statement of motives does not err on the side of bashfulness, and is quite sufficiently frank.

I think that no one who knows and has thought over the Kornilov affair can deny that the intentions of the Kornilov group towards the Provisional Government *as such* were perfectly definite; that the Provisional Government was to yield to the will of the Dictator; that no kind of "misunderstanding" as regards the Provisional Government as a whole existed at Headquarters; that on

August 28th the fatal question would have been settled as to the purpose for which Headquarters troops were being moved on Petrograd; that Lvov indeed caused, whether wishing it or not, the mine that had been prepared for the Provisional Government to explode two days before the appointed time.

### § 19

The participators in the rebellion themselves did not deny, and do not deny, their intentions towards the Provisional Government; they did not deny it even when they declared the words of the Prime Minister to be "an absolute lie." It is necessary to read very carefully the first lines of the appeal or manifesto of the Commander-in-Chief to the "people of Russia" in order to understand their true meaning and to appreciate the skill of the author of the appeal — Zavoiko. Here are these lines: "Telegram No. 4163 of the Prime Minister is absolute lie in the whole of its first part; it was not I who sent the member of the Duma, V. Lvov, to the Provisional Government, but Lvov came to me as an envoy of the Prime Minister, as Aladin, another member of the Duma, can witness. And so a great act of provocation was committed, which placed at stake the fate of the country." How can the direct meaning of these lines be understood on comparing them with my telegram No. 4163? There the Prime Minister states (1) "Lvov came to me on behalf of General Kornilov. (2) He called upon the Provisional Government to hand over the power to Kornilov. (3) Kornilov confirmed that he had given Lvov the necessary authorization." "All that is an absolute lie," replies the Kornilov manifesto, whence the simple-minded reader will conclude (1) that Lvov did not come at all to Kerensky; (2) that he did not communi-

cate any demands to the Provisional Government; (3) that accordingly Kornilov was not in a position to confirm that Lvov was acting with due authority. More than that, the simple-minded reader will infer that not only did nothing of the kind take place, but that it was all the other way about: Lvov was Kerensky's envoy who came to Kornilov. That undoubtedly is the *direct* meaning of that part of Kornilov's appeal or statement which was communicated in the night of August 27th-28th on all railway lines to "all persons in authority" and to the "railway committees." These are words which clearly reveal the distinct intention, that, to put it vulgarly, all those should be "taken in" by surprise in whose chest, in the words of the same statement, "a Russian heart is beating, and who believe in God and in the temples." The people had to be taken in and to respond before they would have had time to understand and to learn the truth.

But this bold demagogic text adapted for circulation in the masses has a different, real meaning, which can be understood only by a very thoughtful or well informed reader: Yes, I did make demands on the Provisional Government, I don't deny it, but I made those demands with the *knowledge* of the Prime Minister. It was he who first sent Lvov to me for negotiations; it was Kerensky who was "provoking" me. That is the real meaning.

It was then that the carnival of lies was started. Kerensky was insincere and betrayed Kornilov — that is the calumny of the Right. Kerensky is a "Kornilovite," a counter-revolutionary, he meant to betray democracy; that was the shameful lie, one regrets to say, not of the Bolshevik demagogues alone. "Kerensky's participation is beyond every doubt"; thus General Alexeiev, as if summing up the various legends. Even if that had been so, nevertheless that

in which I participated *would remain a crime*; there would only have been one criminal more. But what evidence is there of my participation? There is the circumstantial evidence — the calling out of the 3rd Cavalry Corps (which already has been referred to) in connection with certain actions and statements of Savinkov, the behaviour at Headquarters of Filonenko (to him I will refer later), and finally the mission of Lvov.

It seems to me that the above sufficiently demonstrates the absurdity of this last proof of the clumsy invention of the conspirators. In their hurry they overlooked even this simplest consideration. Supposing, indeed, that through Savinkov and Filonenko I was in agreement with Kornilov, why should I at the last moment "introduce into the business" an outsider who, moreover, since he ceased to be a member of the Provisional Government, was no friend of mine?

How, then, stood matters in reality, and how did it come about that on the evening of August 26th V. N. Lvov was in my room? This is how it happened: V. N. Lvov, having come to take part at the Moscow Conference, met at the National Hotel (the Moscow headquarters of Zavoiko and Aladin) an old friend, a certain Dobrynski, a member of the Executive Committee of the Union of Knights of St. George, a fellow-officer of Krimov, and at that time a frequent visitor at Headquarters. Dobrynski introduced Lvov to Aladin, and they both to some extent initiated Lvov into their plans. At that time (immediately after the Moscow Conference), feverish preparations went on, and a man was urgently required for a special task: to contrive to see me otherwise than through the usual channels of our communications with Headquarters (through Savinkov or Baranovsky). Aladin knew by his own experience

that men of his kind have no chance of being admitted to me personally. An attempt of the same Aladin to obtain an interview with me through an intermediary fell through: Prince G. E. Lvov, to whom Aladin applied a short time before V. N. Lvov's arrival, asking the Prince to obtain my consent to see him (Aladin) on a matter of exceptional importance, refused Aladin's request. When leaving Prince Lvov, Aladin nevertheless took the precaution to mention that for so many (I do not remember how many) days he would wait for a decision at the National Hotel, and in the course of his conversation with Prince Lvov, Aladin emphasized the fact that he came from Headquarters. Aladin did not, however, receive any message, and *thereupon* V. N. Lvov was sent, who as a member of the Duma and former member of the Provisional Government had naturally a right to be received by me.

The following particulars are relevant and very interesting. Between August 16th and 21st Aladin had been to Prince Lvov. On August 17th Dobrynski returned from Mohilev with the news that "Headquarters have decided to insist on reforms" and told it to V. N. Lvov. On August 21st, Dobrynski, as Aladin put it, "introduces" Lvov to Aladin, and Lvov there and then informs Aladin that he will go to Petrograd to Kerensky and as his "personal friend" will insist on the necessity of forming a Ministry that will enjoy general confidence. On August 21st Lvov leaves Moscow to see me; on August 23rd he returns to Moscow. At the same National Hotel, in Dobrynski's presence, Lvov informs Aladin that Kerensky has agreed to enter into negotiations with *Headquarters*. It is true that Lvov's statement before his departure for Petrograd to see me (as the same Aladin had put it) hardly agrees with what he said about Headquarters after he saw me. But

that does not make any difference to Mr. Aladin. On the same day, August 23rd, Lvov and Dobrynski both hurry back to Headquarters with a *letter from Aladin to Zavoiko*.

On August 24th Aladin goes to Headquarters. On the evening of that day General Kornilov receives Lvov. They speak at first without anybody else being present, but afterwards, in the presence of "the orderly officer, Zavoiko, I (General Kornilov) confirmed to Lvov the *essential points* of my statements." After his interview with Kornilov, Lvov spends most of the night with Zavoiko, Aladin, Radionov (if I remember rightly, the author of "Our Crime") and Company.

On August 26th Lvov hurries to Petrograd, and almost straight from the train goes to my waiting-room. A telegram from Headquarters follows, addressed "Winter Palace, Kerensky for Lvov. On your return, find and bring Rodzianko.—DOBRYNSKI." Alas! that wire arrived when Lvov was already under arrest.

Thus since August 21st (the day when he was "introduced" to Aladin) Lvov did not spare himself and had no rest. It was not without reason that in speaking to me he complained that he had not slept for four nights. Was he not peculiar, my "envoy"? He made journeys not going from me, but coming *to me*—once from Moscow, sent by Aladin and Dobrynski, another time from Mohilev, where he was spending his time in the company of Kornilov, Zavoiko, and again with Dobrynski and Aladin.

After that, who could testify better than Aladin to all those "who believe in God and the temples" that Lvov was "my envoy" and that everything else is "complete lie"?

I have taken the trouble to give the details of Lvov's movements during the relevant days, together with some

explanatory extracts by the persons *themselves* concerned, so that the clumsy efforts of the conspirators to prevent the truth coming out should be perfectly clear to every reader. What was Lvov's position in that crowd, and to what extent he was initiated into their plans, I have not yet succeeded in ascertaining. It seems, however, fairly certain that he was not one of the chief conspirators, but was one of the men whom the principals used for such services as they were supposed to be fit for.

The statement of the outside observer, Prince Trubetzkoy, well illustrates my surmise. "When I heard that V. Lvov had visited Kornilov, I asked one of the aides-de-camp: 'Is Kornilov aware that Lvov is not a very bright intellect?' The aide-de-camp smiled and said, '*Everybody knows that*, but General Kornilov said that *anyhow he is capable of delivering a message given to him*, and moreover, until quite recently he was a member of Kerensky's Cabinet.'" "He is capable of delivering a message given to him"—that is the worth of Lvov as weighed at Headquarters. He was treated accordingly. First he was sent to me with demands, and when the game failed, an offer "from me to Kornilov" was put into his (Lvov's) mouth—"that Kornilov should accept the dictatorship which should be proclaimed by the present *Provisional Government*" (General Kornilov's words to Savinkov on August 27th, communicated by the Hughes apparatus). Here we see once more a complete agreement of Lvov's version with what General Kornilov actually did say: on the 26th of August in the evening Lvov was insisting to me on the importance of the "lawful" transfer of power. And what is of especial importance, these words of Kornilov through the Hughes apparatus completely bear out the fundamental point 2 of Lvov's written ultimatum.

V. Lvov himself, after a series of his muddled semi-truthful or not entirely mendacious statements, although he affirmed in his last deposition (which was entirely directed against myself) that I gave him a commission, admitted, however, that it was not to make any offers or proposals on my behalf, but to find out the *desires* of others — the desires of certain political groups, including that of Headquarters.

It must be said that later, when giving evidence before the Commission of Inquiry, General Kornilov, who knew by that time that a third person heard my apparently private conversation with Lvov, has transformed Lvov from a "*proposer*" into an "*inquirer*," and takes the initiative as to the dictatorship upon himself.

"V. Lvov told me on behalf of Kerensky that if in my opinion Kerensky's continuation in office deprives the Government of the necessary strength and firmness, Kerensky is prepared to leave the Provisional Government. If Kerensky can count on support he is willing to remain. To that, I, having stated briefly the general position of affairs in the country and in the army, *declared* that the only way of helping the grave state of affairs, as I am profoundly convinced, is a *dictatorship* and the immediate proclamation of martial law throughout Russia." (Compare point 1 of Kornilov's reply through the Hughes apparatus on August 26th). "I stated that personally I am not after power and am prepared to obey immediately the man who will be made dictator. Lvov stated that such a decision is not impossible; that, in view of the difficult general situation of the country, the Provisional Government, as at present constituted, will of itself come to the decision of the necessity for the appointment of a dictator, and it is *quite possible*



that I will be chosen to accept that appointment." What a change, thank God!

The story of my sending an envoy to Headquarters with a most humble request, "come and lord over us," is simply a desperate attempt of men who have lost their heads after having been caught red-handed, and now try to hide behind other people's backs and to obliterate all their own traces — and who are not very particular as to their methods. Unfortunately, this was not by any means the only attempt of the kind. On the same day when the proclamation was sent out containing the absolute lie about the "great provocation," General Lukomsky sent me a telegram (No. 6406) in which he wrote, *inter alia*, that General Kórnilov had taken his "final decision" after the "arrival of Savinkov and Lvov, who made General Kornilov a proposal on your behalf to the same effect . . . and in accordance with your proposal, has given final orders which it is now *too late* to countermand." Having read the telegram, Savinkov immediately handed me a statement in writing. That statement was immediately handed by me to the Provisional Government, from whom it was sent to the Chairman of the Commission of Inquiry, for which reason I can only quote it from memory. "Having become acquainted with the reference to myself contained in the telegram of General Lukomsky, No. 6406, dated August 27th, I state that it is a *libel*. No political statements whatsoever were made or *could have been made* by me on your behalf to General Kornilov.—(Signed) SAVINKOV, August 27, 1917." Savinkov was indignant over that libel, and expressed his anger by the direct wire to General Kornilov, repeating that the words of General Lukomsky concerning him, Savinkov, were a libel. To which immediately the only possible reply was made — that Lukomsky's telegram

referred *only to what* Savinkov had said in the presence of General Lukomsky, General Romanovsky and Colonel Baranovsky on sending troops at the disposal of the Provisional Government and the proclamation of martial law.

This time the attempt failed at once. It is to be regretted that the conversation with Lvov took place either without the presence of anybody else or in the presence of such a "witness" as Zavoiko. It is accordingly extraordinarily difficult to establish the truth here. Nor was it by accident or chance that General Lukomsky mentioned Lvov and Savinkov together. They both saw me on August 22nd at Petrograd. Both left the capital the same evening — Lvov for Moscow and Savinkov for Mohilev; they were both at Mohilev on August 24th — Savinkov was leaving and Lvov had just arrived. It may be asked — why should I have chosen for a "conspiracy" the roundabout way via Moscow-Lvov and ignored the more direct and convenient means of communication — Savinkov, who, moreover, could have much more easily and without being observed by any outsiders or third parties have had a strictly private *tête-à-tête* conversation with Kornilov.]

## § 20

*Chairman.*— On August 26th, when Lvov appeared here, did he first report himself through somebody, or did he suddenly appear? Further, did any information reach you that day as to Lvov spreading some extraordinary rumours over the city?

*Kerensky.*— To my regret I learnt of this only later, after Lvov had already left me. Before Lvov came I had with me the Supreme Commissary of Turkestan with a most important report. As soon as he left me, Lvov

came in. . . . Who told me? . . . One of my men told me that Lvov was seen in a fairly excited state. . . . Oh, yes, another man, who had spoken to Lvov just prior to my seeing him, afterwards told me that, not only in the street but even here at the Winter Palace, Lvov was speaking in very strong terms. I do not recollect who it was who told me.

*Chairman.*—Then, Lvov's report. How did he introduce it? What motive did he disclose? Did he connect it with any previous visit to you, or did he speak as if it were an entirely new, different matter?

*Kerensky.*—That's it. He was quite a different man. All the past had been wiped out, as it were.

*Chairman.*—So this occasion was entirely unconnected with what preceded it . . .

*Kerensky.*—Yes. I have already stated that I met him with the words, "Here you are again with your affair," and he replied, "No, circumstances have changed," or something to that effect. This time there was only one topic of conversation. I must hand over my office and quit. There was no mention of any "introduction of new blood" into the Provisional Government or of any "extension" of its basis. . . . I remain firmly convinced, and I expressed this conviction at the time, that this was perhaps the *only evening when Lvov was sincere*, and being aware of what was to come, was genuinely desirous of saving me from something. Whether his conscience raised its voice, or whether he became frightened, makes no difference. I was particularly confirmed in that conviction by our conversation in the motor-car (on the way from the direct wire station to the Winter Palace), when, in V. V. Virubov's presence, I purposely told V. N. Lvov that "I have changed my mind and will go to Headquarters." I said that to test

him. Thereupon he became greatly excited, and with his hand on his heart implored me: "May God prevent you from doing that. For God's sake don't go to Headquarters; you'd be lost there."

[When on August 30th, being under arrest, Lvov learnt of the complete failure of the Kornilov attempt, he sent me a note: "I congratulate you from the bottom of my heart. I am glad that I saved you out of Kornilov's hands. Yours, V. Lvov. 30th of August." I handed that note too to the Chairman of the Commission of Inquiry and am writing from memory, but I am quite certain of its general tenor.]

*Chairman.*—Did he tell you any details, why and how—or did he merely put an ultimatum before you?

*Kerensky.*—An ultimatum. He said, "I am instructed by General Kornilov."

*Chairman.*—Did he tell you in detail, did he have some information?

*Kerensky.*—No, he only stated the points. He obviously knew them very well indeed, for he stated them correctly both verbally and in writing: the proclamation of martial law, the handing over of the power and the resignation, and point 4 (for myself and Savinkov only): immediate departure for Headquarters. That is why I wished to fix point 4, which did not appear on paper, by the Hughes tape machine. From my point of view, the almost decisive words of our conversation by the Hughes tape machine were in my question: "Is Savinkov wanted?" Lvov told me that Kornilov insisted equally on the immediate arrival both of myself and of Savinkov. That is why I put the question whether the suggestion as to the immediate journey to Headquarters concerned myself only or both myself and Savinkov. A categorical confirmation—"Savinkov also"

—and then the statement that only the “sense of responsibility” compelled him “so insistently to demand,” made it perfectly clear to me that Lvov was *au courant* of the whole affair.

*Chairman.*—Did Virubov see that note?

*Kerensky.*—I handed it to him and said: “Read.”

*Chairman.*—What impression did it make on Virubov?

*Kerensky.*—He said, “What is to be done?” I told him what steps I was taking. Later in the evening Lvov was arrested.

*Chairman.*—So Lvov was not there at the time?

*Kerensky.*—Lvov went out, Virubov came in. I had asked Virubov to be in good time for eight o'clock P. M. at the direct wire in the house of the War Minister. Afterwards Balavinsky and Kosmin, the Deputy Commander of the Petrograd Military District, were asked to attend. In a word, I made all the preparation necessary duly to establish “the fact.”

*Raupakh.*—So Lvov set out those points not as an opinion of Kornilov, not as an advice, but as a demand, an ultimatum?

*Kerensky.*—There was no question of any opinions; it was a demand, an ultimatum. A further point of the communication over the Hughes tape to which I attached the greatest importance was the reply to my question whether our arrival was desirable only in case the Bolsheviks moved. When I was speaking to Lvov I was trying to find out whether the journey was thought desirable only in case of danger from the Bolsheviks or in any case. I wished to find out whether they really apprehended the Bolsheviks, or if that was *merely a pretext*. I put the question to Lvov several times: “Is all that required if the Bolsheviks really will act, or am I to go in any case, Bolsheviks or no

Bolsheviks?" The reply was, "Just the same." I put the same question to Kornilov. I do not remember how it was on the tape.

*Raupakh.*—"Is it necessary for me to come . . ."

*Kerensky.*—"Only in the event of the Bolshevik action or in any event?" Reply: "In any event." Thus the two men Kornilov and Lvov, hundreds of miles away from one another and not being aware what the other was saying, gave *the same replies to the same questions*. And then a third time, when I and Lvov were returning from the direct wire, I put the same question in Balavinsky's presence.

*Chairman.*—To Lvov?

*Kerensky.*—Yes. Whether I was to leave in any event or only in case the Bolsheviks acted. I myself *knew* for certain that on August 27th there would not be any move by the Bolsheviks.

*Chairman.*—So that you decided to have Lvov arrested after your conversation with Kornilov and in connection with that imminent journey?

*Kerensky.*—No, it was in connection with my growing conviction that this man was a party to something or knew something, and that he was *speaking the truth*. He several times, especially during the first conversation with me, used the plural "we."

*Chairman.*—To whom then, and in what order of sequence, did you tell of that episode with Lvov and of your conversation with Kornilov?

*Krokhmal.*—I wish to ask how that document was obtained.

*Kerensky.*—Oh, it was obtained perfectly simply. I have already referred to it at the first interrogation. Lvov had stated it all verbally and demanded of me categorical compliance. I finally told him: "You understand yourself,

Vladimir Nikolayevitch, that if I go before the Provisional Government and make that sort of statement, still no one will believe me, but will think I am mad, or they will first send to find out and verify whether Kornilov did make such a proposal to me, and I shall find myself in the position of a fool. What right have I to place such proposals before the Provisional Government? I know you and trust you, but I cannot speak without evidence." "No, I will guarantee it." "If you will guarantee it, please write it down." "With pleasure, because, as you know, I never say anything that is not true." So he wrote it down.

*Raupakh.*—Was this before the conversation over the tape?

*Kerensky.*—It was. I showed these points to Virubov, and thereupon I left, to communicate with Kornilov over the direct wire.

*Raupakh.*—Lvov was not with you?

*Kerensky.*—He was late, but he came. As we were going down the staircase he was coming up. It was because of that that I afterwards read to him the whole conversation on the tape, so that he should confirm it.

*Raupakh.*—Was the conversation carried on in your own name, or in Lvov's name?

*Kerensky.*—He told me that perhaps he would be a little late, but as Kornilov had already been some twenty minutes at the telegraphic apparatus, I did not wish to wait any longer and put the questions as coming from us both.

*Raupakh.*—Why did you consider it necessary to speak in the names of both? What cause was there for this? Was it more convenient to carry on the conversation with Kornilov that way?

*Kerensky.*—Because Lvov came to me on behalf of Kornilov. He said that he was acting under the instructions

of Kornilov. So it was arranged that we should carry on the conversation jointly. As we were going down and Lvov came up, he asked me, "Well, Alexander Feodorovitch, have I proved a true friend? I have not deceived you." I said, "You have not."

*Raupakh.*—That was after the conversation (with Kornilov)?

*Kerensky.*—Yes. And after that we came together here.

*Raupakh.*—Here, in Balavinsky's presence . . .

*Kerensky.*—Here, in Balavinsky's presence, Lvov repeated all the essential points of our conversation during the day. And above all I attached importance not so much to particular words of Lvov, as to the fact that I should be able to have some one else to witness the excited state of Lvov and to confirm that he considered all that business exceptionally important.

*Kolokolov.*—And did Lvov know that Balavinsky was there?

*Kerensky.*—He did not.

[Only now when I can pass in review the whole of the campaign which is carried on against me by both the extreme wings who are making capital out of the Kornilov affair, only now do I appreciate the great importance of the fact that on the 26th, in the whirl of events, I was able to see the necessity of making some sort of safeguard for myself. I can imagine what would have happened if my conversation with Lvov, which he thought was quite "private," had not been heard by a living though involuntary witness, a well-known public man.]



## CHAPTER III

### § 21

*Chairman.*— To whom and in what order of sequence did you communicate Lvov's proposal and the conversation with Kornilov over the tape; and after you had read the tape and the note, were any objections made by any of your colleagues?

*Kerensky.*— It was like this. We returned from the apparatus. The second conversation with Lvov took place. Then I ordered his arrest. By that time we were joined, as far as I remember, by Nekrassov, Virubov, Balavinsky; I am not sure whether Terestchenko was there or not. There were a fair number of seats occupied at the table, but I am not quite sure who was there. Savinkov came later.

*Chairman.*— No one of those gentlemen, having taken cognizance of the tape, had any objections to make to you on the subject?

*Kerensky.*— I recollect that Savinkov suggested an immediate conversation with Kornilov over the direct wire.

[I also remember very well that I refused that request of Savinkov. I refused it because Savinkov was of opinion that it was the duty of the Provisional Government to use every means for a peaceful settlement of the "conflict," which should remain unknown. I myself was of opinion that it was not a "conflict" between two equal parties, but a crime; it ought emphatically to be settled by peaceful means; not, however, by negotiations with the guilty General, but by the will of the Provisional Government, to which the

Commander-in-Chief, who had failed in his trust, should submit immediately. From the moment when my conversation with Kornilov satisfied me as to his plan, *nobody and nothing* could make me abandon this point of view.

The idea that Lvov "made a mess of it" and that the whole thing was a "misunderstanding" became popular only the next day — August 27th. Savinkov himself was saying to Filonenko over the direct wire on the morning of the 27th: "I regret to say that you are not well informed: General Kornilov confirmed the statements of his envoy in speaking to A. F. by the Hughes apparatus. The decision has now been taken." And in the evening of the 26th Savinkov suggested sending a telegram to the front to send a certain unit which he knew as being "reliable" to march on Headquarters. The information that arrived from Headquarters in the night of August 26th–27th could only increase our anxiety. About one o'clock in the morning Filonenko made the following fairly obscure communication over the Hughes apparatus in his "code" language: that the heights (Kornilov) were changing hands; that gallant generals were going to attack; that a dance was to take place between the Herculean Pillars (Kerensky and Kornilov); that some great men were expected to meet at Headquarters, and so on; the one definite conclusion that could be made from those communications was that something extraordinary was going on at Headquarters. What was going on can be now put thus: Pending the result of Lvov's mission, Kornilov was discussing in his study the final decision as to the form of the dictatorship. Two main schemes were examined; in one Kornilov was to be sole dictator, with the Council of Ministers subordinate to him; in the other a "Council of National Defence" was to be created, with Kornilov at the head, whilst the Council of

Ministers were to take their instructions from that "Council of National Defence." The second scheme was approved, and the One Man Dictatorship was rejected. By whom? By Messrs. Zavoiko, Aladin, and Filonenko. The honour of bringing about the rejection of the One Man Dictatorship was claimed by Filonenko!

Having settled, with those highly qualified advisers, the form of the Government, Kornilov in the same company makes a list of his Cabinet, discusses details of the program, etc. Finally, having received the communication of my "consent" to surrender the Provisional Government without a struggle, Kornilov with a sigh of relief hastily sends telegrams to some favourites — Miliukov, Rodzianko, Maklakov, and so on — to come immediately to Headquarters in view of the perilous state of affairs. That was the kind of "misunderstanding" that was going on at Headquarters.

Nevertheless, next day, August 27th, after Savinkov's conversation with Kornilov about 6 P. M., the version is being spread in Petrograd that Lvov simply "made a mess of it," that a "misunderstanding" arose. That version finds many energetic supporters. The same Savinkov, insisting on Filonenko's leaving Headquarters, was telling him in the morning: "Believe me that I am better informed than you are, and that you have been unaware of many things, just as I was when I was last time at Headquarters." But after his conversation with Kornilov, Savinkov proceeds about 8 P. M. to the Winter Palace and insists on the necessity "of attempting to clear up the misunderstanding and of entering into negotiations with General Kornilov." This in spite of the fact that, in the course of that conversation, Kornilov not only stated that he refused to give up the command, but acknowledged that he had sent Lvov to make

a statement as to the dictatorship. He only explained that that statement was a reply to *my* proposal. What, then, was the misunderstanding that made negotiations desirable? The Commander-in-Chief of all the active armies in the field, who informs the Government of an immediate proclamation of his dictatorship, cannot be left at the head of the armies by any Government for one minute, whilst a general who, in these circumstances, refuses to hand over his command is clearly committing the weightiest of crimes against the State. The only "misunderstanding," if Kornilov were to be believed, that in the circumstances could have happened, would be either that I really made such a proposal to him and afterwards repudiated it or that some one had caused General Kornilov to form a mistaken idea of my proposal. To those now who literally accepted Kornilov's words and accordingly considered me an accomplice, I say that any negotiations should have been conducted not with myself, but with the Provisional Government, who should have been asked to order my arrest.

Those who supposed that a *bona fide* error was made by General Kornilov could have held to that supposition until the moment when it was made clear to Kornilov that Lvov did not have and could not have any instructions from me for General Kornilov.

In any case, if until August 27th it was possible to believe that General Kornilov was making a *bona fide* mistake, it was impossible to deny that his action was criminal. Consequently any negotiations of the Provisional Government with a man acting criminally were out of the question. It could be submitted that there was reason to treat him mildly on the ground that his error was a mitigating circumstance. This was the sole reason for which I could see my way to listen at all to Savinkov and others in favour of

negotiating on August 27th, for I took it that they were assuming a *bona fide* error of Kornilov. I suggested that they should themselves "negotiate" with General Kornilov, that is to say, I asked them to use all their influence with him to induce him to submit to the Provisional Government before it was too late, before his action had led to serious consequences for himself personally and above all for the State. But it was impossible for me to allow any *pourparlers* between Kornilov and the Provisional Government. I could not allow even any delay in the taking of the necessary measures against General Kornilov. In my opinion, immediate and resolute action alone could prevent further development and save Russia from further bloodshed.

Obviously, those who genuinely believed the assumption that the whole trouble was caused by Lvov misleading Kornilov could be in favour of *pourparlers* only up to the morning of August 28th, that is to say, up to the day when Kornilov's proclamation was published concerning the "great provocation" and "Lvov's mission." From that moment any possibility of doubt had ceased: *the malicious intention was evident*. It should have been obvious for them that any possibility of *pourparlers* had disappeared. When Savinkov, towards the morning of August 28th, learnt not only that Kornilov had refused to hand over his command, but that he had detained Filonenko and sent the "Savage Division" in the van of the cavalry corps and had appointed Krimov commander of the corps — that is to say, that Kornilov had broken his promise — even Savinkov understood that "in the circumstances" it was no longer possible to enter into *pourparlers* with General Kornilov. Next day (August 29th), Savinkov, as Military Governor of Petrograd, issued an appeal to the inhabitants of the capital which began as follows: "In the perilous hour when the enemy

has broken through our front and when Riga has fallen, General Kornilov has attempted to discredit the Provisional Government and the Revolution and has joined the ranks of their enemies.”]

*Kerensky.*— In the night, when I read to the Provisional Government both documents (the tape of the conversation with Kornilov and Lvov’s “points”) one after the other, no objections were raised at all, as far as I can remember.

*Chairman.*— So that thereupon the meeting was called for the night of August 26th–27th, when . . .

*Kerensky.*— The meeting of the Provisional Government had already previously been appointed to take place that night. At the meeting I reported all the circumstances very fully — Lvov’s visit and all subsequent events. Then I made a proposal. . . . My proposal amounted to ordering General Kornilov to hand over his command, and nothing more.

## § 22

*Chairman.*— Was it not suggested by you to the other Ministers or by the Ministers to you that, in view of the circumstances, in view of the revolt which was evident, you should be given special powers — unlimited powers to fight the counter-revolution?

*Kerensky.*— Yes. I do not remember the exact wording. I do not think that I put it quite that way, but I pointed out that it was necessary that I should have a certain freedom of action. I was of opinion that this was indispensable.

*Chairman.*— Therefore the Provisional Government was dealing already on the night of August 26th–27th with the question of the rebellion of which we are speaking now?

*Kerensky.*— I do not remember whether the word “rebellion” had been mentioned. We spoke generally of the

extremely serious situation, of the obvious act of insubordination by Kornilov, of the attempt to overthrow the Provisional Government.

I forgot to say why "they" wished me to go to Headquarters. Lvov said several times that they thought it of the utmost importance that *a lawful transfer of power* should take place, that there should be no seizure of power, but that there should be a formal decision by the Provisional Government to transfer it. "They" seemed to lay particular emphasis on that. Lvov at least three times resumed that point, and insisted that they considered it of the utmost importance that the Provisional Government should decide the transfer of power, so that everything should be done in a perfectly legal form.

*Raupakh.*—Tell us, please, was not the surrender of their portfolios by the Ministers at that night sitting occasioned by an endeavour to leave you wider powers for combating the rebellion?

*Kerensky.*—Yes. The position was so complicated! The mutual relations within the Provisional Government had already been rather difficult, while now, under the newly created circumstances, the necessary steps could hardly be taken rapidly. The Government lacked cohesion and solidarity. The "polarity" between Kokoshkin and Tchernov was found to be particularly embarrassing. They were elements that could hardly act jointly, or even stay together, at such a moment.

[The powers obtained by me from the Provisional Government on the eve of August 27th for the suppression of General Kornilov's rebellion were thus formulated in my Message to the population, issued on the same date, August 27th: "The Provisional Government has found it necessary, for saving the country and the Republican order, to

empower me to take prompt and resolute measures for nipping in the bud any attempts to encroach upon the supreme authority in the State and upon the rights conquered by the Revolution for its citizens. I am taking all the measures required for the preservation of order and liberty in the country." This text confirms that on the night preceding August 27th I did not receive "entire plenitude of authority," but only defined powers for the solution of a definite problem, viz. the quickest and least painful "liquidation" of the Kornilov move. If then, after the almost instantaneous quelling of the rebellion, there came a "quinquevirate" period (the so-called Directorate), such a form of government accorded least with my own desires, whereas such a concentration of power as took place on August 27th seems to me to have been a clear necessity. While entering upon a struggle with a conspiracy directed by the will of a single person, the State must oppose that will by a power capable of prompt and decisive acts. No collegiate body can act as such a power, least of all one that is composed of a coalition.

The blow struck by Kornilov was aimed at the very junction of the coalition forces that governed the country, the Provisional Government, and could not but strengthen the centrifugal forces within the same. The Provisional Government was living through a crisis like the one it had experienced between the 3rd and the 5th of July; the only difference was in the parts played by the political wings (the Right and the Left)—parts which were now the reverse of what they had been before. The struggle with Kornilov had to be carried on in the name and with the participation of the whole people, and the Government had to act only as the people's common authority, without inclining towards the Right wing for an agreement with the rebels, or



towards the Left wing for combating whole groups and classes of the population under the pretence of suppressing the counter-revolution. As far as we can judge ourselves, the Provisional Government has fulfilled this task of a concentration of authority. At any rate, it did not shed a single drop of blood; and it did not permit a single superfluous victim to be made, nor has it deviated a single step from its sworn promise to govern in the name of the general interests of the whole State.

That is precisely my reply to the rhetorical question put to me on September 5th at the Democratic Conference by J. G. Tseretelli: "When, at the moment of Kornilov's rush, in order to have a free hand against Kornilov, who was marching upon revolutionary Petrograd with a dictatorship, the head of the Government felt it necessary (but only on that particular occasion) to confront Kornilov with the revolutionary power of a single person, was he right or was he wrong?" To which Tseretelli himself immediately answers that, in his opinion, "he was wrong." He thinks that, "as a matter of fact, only the union of the entire democracy at that moment, the indissoluble union of the Government and of all its representatives with the democracy, could and actually did save the Revolution."

If they did save it, what was wrong then? Why then did Tseretelli not only say of me that "at this time of his administration he committed blunders," but also think fit to declare: "Let democracy blame itself if at that height its representative's head *shall turn*." (Cheers.) In what way was the turning of my head made manifest? Was it in my declining to throw myself, between the 27th and the 30th of August, into the arms of the elements and to proclaim, with the support of the Soviets, a campaign against the whole of the Russia that exists outside the Soviets, thus

affirming my fulness of power by the horrors of civil war? Or was it in that, while remaining the representative of the *whole* democracy, of the whole of Russia that was free and devoted to freedom, I did not, in the night preceding August 28th, appear before the Central Executive Committee of the Councils of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies in order to "unite myself indissolubly" only with one portion of the democracy, though a very influential one? Was it not clear to every one that, if my head had really turned, I could have restored tyranny in Russia two months earlier (than it actually came), at this very Central Executive Committee on the night preceding August 28th, under the cover of the watchword: "All the power to the Soviets"? Or was, perhaps, the turning of my head shown in the fact that, on the very next day after the bloodless conclusion of the Kornilov rebellion, I insisted in reinstating the work of the Provisional Government as a whole, and was only prevented from carrying my wish into effect by impediments *from outside*, which compelled me to behold for three weeks, with set teeth, how the State was being ruined and the Revolution was perishing, merely because the victory of the whole of Russia, that had been of one mind, was entirely and exclusively attributed to the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, who (the imaginary victors!) were preparing all the time to dictate their terms to Russia and to the Government! No, the wine of victory did not go to my head; although, if you like, my head was really turning, but only from my consciousness that, in spite of all temptations, I remained sober to the last, though once more solitary. I had been solitary at the very outset of the rebellion, when, because of the conduct of Miliukov and the newspaper *Retch* the Left started to hunt down the whole party of the Constitutional Democrats, and the "Izvestia"

of the Central Executive Committee demanded the elimination of the representatives of that party from the Government. Then I was the only one who said what J. G. Tsere-telli vainly urged later at the Democratic Conference: "One must not approach political currents with a Penal Code criterion," and, "When they tell you that you must determine the degree of participation of individual persons or organizations, and that that participation obliges you to sweep away from political work an entire political party containing heterogeneous elements, then the problem has not, politically speaking, been stated properly."]

*Raupakh.*— From the moment, then, when the portfolios were handed over to you, you considered that the plenitude of power belonged to you?

*Kerensky.*— No, I did not consider it so, and that is why I declined to accept the resignations. The problem merely consisted in creating such conditions as would render it possible to act promptly and resolutely, and to effect, in case of need, a re-grouping within the Provisional Government. This led to the relations with some of the Cadets among the Ministers becoming somewhat strained, as a certain difference in our and their respective attitudes towards events manifested itself. The majority of the Ministers continued to exercise their functions, and actually contributed in every way towards ending the rebellion. Only a very small group of Ministers, not more than two, raised the question of resignation quite formally, and abstained decidedly from every contact with the Provisional Government. They laid stress on their being no longer Ministers. I impressed upon them there and then that this meant that they had resigned themselves, since I had not accepted the resignation of the members of the Provisional Government.

[Tchernov then also retired immediately from the Pro-

visional Government, but was energetic in repressing the rebellion; he made a tour of all the positions round Petrograd, and issued his appeal by the *Rural Minister* which became famous for a time. At present, when in Russia, or rather in Muscovy, the "knights of denunciation and execution" are raging as of old, I consider it a duty to emphasize the fact that the behaviour of those two Cadet Ministers was by no means typical. The other Constitutional Democratic Ministers remained with the majority of the Provisional Government. Still less could conclusions be drawn from the conduct of those two members of the Government as to the mood of the whole Cadet Party at the time. One ought to look at the facts, and remember what had happened from the 3rd to the 5th of July. Then it was the same thing, only *vice versa*. The attempted rebellion, then, too, originated with elements hostile to the coalition, only then they were the Left elements. Then too, it was necessary to take prompt and resolute measures, while there were also hesitations, but on the opposite wing of the Provisional Government. Those hesitations lasted until the peals of thunder from before Kalustch and Tarnopol reached Petrograd. Now, as then, nobody approved the "way of acting": on both occasions there was complete solidarity on that question between the two wings of the Provisional Government. On both occasions the question was only as to the manner of combating the rebels, whether resolutely, or by seeking a way to reconciliation. Just as on the 3rd-5th of July, to people who were utter strangers to Social-Maximalist mentality, mere hesitation on the question as to the necessity of resolute measures seemed to be a crime, so after the 26th-30th August all those were classed among "traitors to the Revolution" who offended in the same way, i.e. by too closely approximating to the sentiment

of the Kornilovites, or by too intimate an understanding of the motives of their activity. Both these parties in turn failed to "see the wood for the trees"; through their personal sentiment they overlooked the State and that terrible danger which lurked *equally* in Bolshevism and Kornilovism. On both occasions the position of the members of the Provisional Government who understood too well the motives of the criminal moves was all the more difficult because, within their own parties, now the Left, now the Right, Maximalism already found an active echo. Let us remember Kamkov or Martov, in the days of the 3rd-5th July, and Miliukov or Struve, in the days of the Kornilov movement.

Lack of sharpness to its edges constituted both the strength and the weakness of the Coalitional Government; it constituted strength so long as State-consciousness prevailed over class and group interests, but became a weakness when that consciousness was extinguished.

To return to the Cadet Ministers who were in the Provisional Government before, during, and after Kornilovism, I feel bound to testify to the intentional maliciousness of accusing such clean men as Kartashev, Oldenburg, Kishkin and others of any intrigues and conspiracies against democracy. If these Radicals by conviction represented the Russian bourgeoisie as members of the Cadet Party, it was that wise portion of the same which, according to the words of Tseretelli himself, "had understood that at this moment the Kornilov adventure did not mean the affirmation of the principles put forward by Kornilov, *but the complete destruction of the country.*" The Cadet Party also perceived the error of some of its members: after August 27th-29th, Miliukov soon left for a "rest" in the Crimea, while I, as Prime Minister, up to the very opening of the Provisional

Council of the Republic, in my negotiations with the Cadet Party, had to deal chiefly with that very sagacious, far-seeing, and real statesman, V. D. Nabokov.]

*Raupakh.*— I am putting this question as to your powers because the dismissal of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief would only be possible by an order of the Government.

*Kerensky.*— This was done *before* the resignation of the Ministers.

*Raupakh.*— There was then a ukase, a decision of the Government as to the discharge of Kornilov?

*Kerensky.*— That was resolved immediately.

*Chairman.*— And does it exist in writing?

*Kerensky.*— I don't know whether it exists in writing, as the sitting was a rather stormy one.

*Raupakh.*— The dismissal, then, was not your personal act, but a decision of the Government?

*Kerensky.*— Certainly. Only I can't say whether the decision was put into writing there and then. At the sittings are present the Chief Clerk of the Provisional Government and the Bureau officials, who afterwards enter all the resolutions in the journal. I only remember that my motion was to the effect that it was necessary immediately to request Kornilov to resign his post. Such was my declaration.

*Raupakh.*— Do you recollect how the telegram was drafted? In your own name, or in that of the Provisional Government?

*Kerensky.*— The telegram was composed in a hurry.

*Raupakh.*— Was it not entered in the journal of papers going out?

*Kerensky.*— It was drafted in a very great hurry. One must remember the circumstances of that night.

*Raupakh.*— But it must be in existence. It was trans-

mitted by the direct line. It must be here; we couldn't find it there.

*Kerensky*.—Where do you mean by "there"?

*Raupakh*.—At Headquarters. It was not to be found there.

*Kerensky*.—What do you mean by "it was *not to be found*"?

*Shablovsky*.—It proved to have been lost. It was taken by Kornilov; it was brought to the Staff; it was used as evidence, but it was not to be found there. We did not get it in the original.

*Raupakh*.—The dismissal of Kornilov was not, then, a personal act of your own, but a decision of the Government? This is very important.

*Kerensky*.—It was moved and adopted by the Provisional Government before the resignations had been handed to me. There is no doubt whatever about that. I made a detailed report, together with the conclusion arising therefrom.

[The Commission of Inquiry went so minutely into the question of the moment of General Kornilov's dismissal and the circumstances in which the telegram about it was dispatched to him because, in the course of the inquiry, formal defects of the telegram mentioned at that point of my interrogatory were advanced as one of the serious motives of Kornilov's refusal to lay down the command. The defects were the following: (1) the absence of a serial number; (2) the mere signature "Kerensky" without the addition of my status; (3) the absence of any reference to the decision of the Provisional Government. But if General Kornilov had really entertained any serious doubt as to the authenticity of that telegram, or as to my authority to send

it, he could and should first of all have immediately addressed an inquiry for verification; and secondly, his scepticism would have been somehow reflected in conversation with Savinkov on the Hughes tape machine on August 27th; but, of course, he made no such indications of uncertainty. Among motives for refusing to surrender his office set out on the Hughes tape machine is no mention of the formal defects of this telegram. Only in one of Kornilov's depositions known to me he says, by the way: "On the morning of August 27th, I received a telegram signed 'Kerensky,' but without any number, instructing me to hand over my post to Lukomsky." That is all!

Filonenko, if credence may be given to his deposition in this case, establishes that it was he who raised the doubt in General Kornilov's mind as to the authenticity of the telegram, and that it was he who ascertained the genuineness of the same on August 27th, in his conversation with Savinkov. In other words, it follows from Filonenko's version that the clearing-up of any doubt as to the genuineness of the telegram did not in the least influence Kornilov's further conduct. Nor did General Lukomsky doubt for a moment the genuineness of my telegram, since without any inquiries he sent me a telegram in reply with a reasoned refusal to undertake the command instead of General Kornilov.

I explained intentionally this insignificant episode of the telegram with greater detail in order to show with what care and attention the Commission of Inquiry was verifying every indication in favour of General Kornilov, and was eager to ascertain the slightest fact that might provide a motive justifying General Kornilov's conduct. How very different was the activity of the Commission of Inquiry, formed by me personally, from any attempt "to hide in snap judgments in Court and in graves the truth, the aims of the



movement, and the participation of members of the Government in the affair"! But it is exactly such a purpose that General Alexeiev attributes to the "invisible participators (in the Kornilov revolt) who came as the masters of destiny and the managers of the inquiry."

Does not the whole tenor of the minutes of my examination prove the real independence of the Commission of Inquiry, which enabled it to investigate so closely, and sometimes even captiously, the acts of the "master of destiny"? Alexeiev's insinuation only proves one thing: that the society educated by the justice of a Stsheglovitov only deserves a tribunal à la Stutchka! <sup>1</sup>]

### § 23

*Shablowsky.*—What happened, in chronological order, after you sent off the first telegram; what objections arose in view of the communication to the population of the Prime Minister of August 27th which was then being worked out?

*Kerensky.*—I think there arose a question as to the desirability of delaying this telegram, and, I think, it was delayed. But which telegram are you speaking of?

*Shablowsky.*—Of the communication in your name of August 27th. (One of the members of the Commission hands to Kerensky the telegram in question.)

[I remember that the dispatch by wireless of this telegram which I addressed to the population was delayed, but not on account of the motives insisted upon by those persons who proposed its delay. These persons were anxious to put off altogether the publication of the "conflict" between the Provisional Government and General Kornilov, in order not to lose the possibility of finding a "compromise" and

<sup>1</sup> Minister of Justice under the Bolsheviks.

to settle the misunderstanding by peaceful means, on the basis of "mutual concessions." As I explained before, I could not agree to that, and my agreement was the less possible as towards the evening of the 27th, especially during the night, most of the conciliators insisted on a compromise, no longer on the supposition of Kornilov's *bona fide* mistake (which by that time was already disproved by the facts), but on the ground of "sober calculation of the real forces." By that time General Kornilov was already a fighting party, which had mobilized its forces.

Among the public at large there is a conviction that General Kornilov's active move against the Provisional Government began *after* he became acquainted with my appeal to the population of August 28th, circulated by wire, and after the telegraphic prohibition to the railways from carrying out any orders of the "late" Supreme Commander-in-Chief, that is to say of Kornilov. This conviction is quite erroneous. It is an error which is strongly supported by the Kornilovites. Indeed, Kornilov himself, when he says that it was only on August 28th that "he resolved to move openly and to force the Provisional Government by pressure," is trying to represent his move as a consequence of "my having been declared by the Provisional Government on August 28th to be a traitor to the country."

As a matter of fact, my appeal did not play any part in Kornilov's resolve to make his move. This is clear even from the remark written down by General Kornilov on the very date of August 28th with regard to the copy of my telegram addressed to General Klembovsky, which had been reported to Kornilov. General Kornilov wrote on the copy of that telegram as follows: "I request General Klembovsky to let me know immediately his decision, since on the ground of his *yesterday's* telegram [that

is to say of August 27th] I have *already* taken a definite decision, the rescinding of which would be the cause of great convulsions in the army and in the country." On the same day (August 27th) Krimov's *echelons* began to force their way by violence, so that it proved necessary to remove the rails in order to keep them back. On August 27th, General Kornilov's communications with the fronts were concluded, and *an order was sent* to the Commanders of the rear districts to obey Kornilov *henceforward*. At least I know one such telegram that had been sent to the Commander of the Moscow Military District. General Denikin had already sent on that day to the Provisional Government his laconic but clear telegram No. 145, which began with the words: "I am a soldier and cannot play at *hide-and-seek*," and as well had undertaken on the spot a number of unequivocal measures. In short, on August 27th the mobilization of troops for operations on a wide front was proceeding most intensely at Headquarters. So that on the night of August 27th, while the conciliators were besieging me in the Winter Palace, at Headquarters the irretrievable decision had already been taken "to compel the Provisional Government to remove from its midst those Ministers who, according to my [Kornilov's] information, are traitors to the country, and, secondly, to reorganize itself in such a way as to secure for the country a strong and firm authority. In order to exercise pressure on the Provisional Government, I resolved to utilize General Krimov's 3rd Cavalry Corps, ordering it to continue its concentration towards Petrograd." This forms a most valuable confession by General Kornilov.

He thinks, however, that his soldier's word of honour will be believed by everybody and that nobody will ever doubt that it was only after his being *insulted* by the Government that Kornilov *suddenly* resolved to make an open

move; whereas, in fact, the draft of his famous Declaration to the People of Russia was already prepared on August 27th, while my Appeal has perhaps only accelerated its publication with a suitable alteration at the beginning of its text.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The following is the text of these two documents, to which I have to refer so often.

#### A MESSAGE TO THE POPULATION

I hereby announce:

On August 26th General Kornilov sent to me the member of the State Duma V. N. Lvov with a demand for the surrender by the Provisional Government of the whole plenitude of Civil and Military authority, with a view to his forming, at his personal discretion, a NEW GOVERNMENT for administering the country. The authenticity of Deputy Lvov's authorization to make such a proposal to me was subsequently confirmed by General Kornilov in his conversation with me by direct wire. Perceiving in the presentation of such demands, addressed to the Provisional Government in my person, a desire of some circles of Russian society to take advantage of the grave condition of the State for the purpose of establishing in the country a state of authority in contradiction to the conquests of the Revolution, the Provisional Government has found it indispensable:

To authorize me, for the salvation of OUR country, of liberty,

#### PROCLAMATION BY THE SUPREME COMMANDER- IN-CHIEF

The Premier's telegram No. 4163 is in its first portion a lie throughout: it was not I who sent Deputy Vladimir Lvov to the Provisional Government, but he came to me as the Premier's envoy. Deputy Alexis Aladin is a witness to this.

A great provocation has thus taken place, which jeopardizes the fate of the FATHERLAND.

#### PEOPLE OF RUSSIA!

Our great country is dying. The hour of its end is near. Being compelled to come forward in the open, I, General Kornilov, declare that, under the pressure of the Bolshevik majority of the Soviets, the Provisional Government is acting in complete accord with the plans of the German General Staff, at the time when enemy troops are landing on the Riga coast; it is killing the army and shaking the foundations of the country.

A grave sense of the inevitable ruin of the country commands me at this threatening moment to call

My telegram which the conciliators wanted to stop, far from "provoking" anything, even rendered essential assistance to Headquarters by providing them with an opportunity for still further covering up their traces. The

and of Republican order, to take prompt and resolute measures for the purpose of uprooting any attempt to encroach upon the Supreme Authority in the State and upon the rights which the citizens have conquered by the Revolution.

I am taking all necessary measures to protect the liberty and order of the country, and the population will be informed in due course with regard to such measures.

At the same time I order herewith:

I. General Kornilov to surrender the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief to General Klembovsky, the Commander-in-Chief over the armies of the Northern front which bar the way to Petrograd; and General Klembovsky to enter temporarily upon the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief, while remaining at Pskov.

II. To declare the city and district of Petrograd under Martial Law, extending to it the regulations for the localities declared under Martial Law.

(See Code of Law, vol. ii., on Provincial Public Institutions, Art. 23, with its supplement of 1892 and its continuation of 1912.)

I call upon all the citizens to preserve complete tranquillity and to maintain order, which is so in-

upon all Russian people to save the dying country.

All you in whose breast a Russian heart is beating; all you who believe in God and in the temples, pray to the Lord to manifest the greatest miracle of saving our native land. I, General Kornilov, the son of a Cossack peasant, declare to all and sundry that I want nothing for my own person, except the preservation of a Great Russia, and I swear to carry over the people, by means of a victory over the enemy, to the Constituent Assembly at which it will decide its own fate and choose the order of its new State life.

I cannot bring it upon myself to hand over Russia to its hereditary enemy, the German race, and to turn the Russian people into slaves of the Germans, but prefer to die on the field of honour and battle, so as not to see the shame and infamy of the Russian Land.

Russian people, the life of your country is in your hands!

GENERAL KORNILOV.

*The 27th day of August 1917.*

definite decision, the rescinding of which "would be the cause of convulsion in the army and in the country," was taken first, while the *refusal to surrender the command followed only afterwards*. This was the real sequence of events.

Only prompt and resolute measures could save the country, and did save it then, from great and sanguinary convulsions. I was all the more unable to admit any delay as, since the evening of August 26th, it had become clear to me that we had to deal with events which were unfolding themselves according to a previously thought-out plan, and that, while calculating upon taking the Provisional Government by surprise, the conspirators had also provided for the possibility of another turn of events. It was also necessary to take into account the possibility of surprise on the part of those elements who had been got ready in various localities, including Petrograd, with the intention of forming fighting bodies from them; about these we had information. It may be added that by the trains going from Mohilev towards Petrograd, which were stopped on the way on the 27th and the 28th of August, there travelled groups of persons who were intended to distinguish themselves at Petrograd by their active support of Headquarters.]

dispensable for the salvation of the country. I call upon all the ranks of the army and navy to carry on with calmness and self-abnegation their duty of defending the country against the external enemy.

A. F. KERENSKY,

Prime-Minister, Minister of  
War and of Marine.

*The 27th day of August 1917.*

## § 24

*Chairman.*— Were no objections raised against sending off that telegram of August 27th?

*Kerensky.*— Objections were made. It was urged that the affair would perhaps end in a compromise. That was said by those who held the point of view which was most clearly expressed afterwards by Miliukov, who called upon me to offer his mediation, declaring that I ought to understand that the real strength lay on the side of Kornilov.

Until it became finally clear that my predictions were correct, and that Kornilov found himself in a complete "vacuum," there remained up to the last moment a large number of adherents to a policy of compromise, or, to speak more correctly, of surrendering the positions to Kornilov.

[Miliukov's visit to my study took place during the day of August 28th.

In this connection General Alexeiev says in his deposition as follows: "As it seemed very likely that in this affair General Kornilov was acting in agreement with several members of the Provisional Government, and that only during the last days of August — the 26th to the 28th — this agreement was infringed or some misunderstanding had occurred in the interval, Miliukov and myself called once more on the Premier on August 28th at 3 P. M., to make an attempt to induce him to send to Mohilev several members of the Government together with Miliukov to clear up matters so as to reach an agreement; or, at least, to continue negotiations by the Hughes apparatus. But in this we met with a *resolute refusal*." I ought to mention that while he was in my study, General Alexeiev kept silent the whole time, except for a few words on the position at the front in the absence of command which had occurred, so that I was

rather in the dark as to the reason for his presence at my interview with Miliukov. At any rate, it never occurred to me then, on August 28th at 3 P. M., that there was sitting before me not only partisans, but such partisans as had come to me from a certain meeting, as I learnt afterwards. I need hardly say that the motives for the necessity of continuing negotiations, which are set out in the above deposition of General Alexeiev, were not even hinted at by Miliukov in our conversation; for, if he had done so, he would not have had the opportunity of carrying on his conversation with me to the end.

Miliukov reasoned on the ground of the interests of the State, of the patriotic motives of the move of General Kornilov, who was only mistaken in his methods, and, lastly, as an *ultima ratio*, he brought forward the reason which seemed to him the most conclusive and effective, namely, that the real strength lay on the side of Kornilov.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> On what real forces they were counting at Headquarters and on what they founded their assurance of the wide support and success of "the open move against the Provisional Government," may be seen from the following "diplomatic" telegram, No. 262, from Prince Trubetskoy, authorized by General Kornilov, which was sent on the morning of August 28th to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. I describe this telegram as authorized by General Kornilov because, before dispatching it to Petrograd, Prince Trubetskoy had shown it to General Kornilov, who, "after acquainting himself with the text of the same, said, 'Send it on.'" Here is the text of this telegram, which has become known to me only now:—

"On a sober estimate of the position, one has to admit that the whole *personnel* in command, the overwhelming majority of the officers, and the best part of the army at the front will follow Kornilov. *In the rear* there will stand on his side the whole of Cossackdom, the majority of the military schools, as well as the best elements of the troops. To their physical power must be added the superiority of a military organization over the weakness of the Government organs, the moral sympathy of all non-Socialist elements of the population, the ever-growing discontent with the existing order among the lowest classes,



As far as I remember, I replied that I would rather die than subordinate Right to the argument of Force. I added that I was astonished at the suggestion made to me, the Premier, to continue negotiations after General Kornilov had dared to declare the members of the Provisional Government to be agents of the German General Staff. Yes, I was very angry. I felt extremely indignant at Miliukov's complete indifference to this, to say the least, quite inadmissible sally of Kornilov, though among the members of the Provisional Government there were some of Miliukov's closest political friends. Even Prince Trubetzkoy, who experienced the strong pressure of the atmosphere at Headquarters, relates that when on August 28th he became acquainted with the contents of the Proclamation to the

and, among the majority of the popular and urban masses, who have become blunted in regard to everything, the indifference which obeys the *stroke of the whip*. An enormous number of those who were Socialists in March will doubtless pass over immediately to their side. On the other hand, the latest events at the front and in the rear, especially at Kazan, have demonstrated with unmistakable clearness the picture of the complete bankruptcy of the present order of things and the inevitability of a catastrophe unless a crisis takes place at once.

"This consideration seems to be decisive for General Kornilov, who is aware that only by resoluteness is it possible to stop Russia at the edge of the abyss into which it will otherwise roll. It is neither here nor there to say that Kornilov is preparing the triumph of the Kaiser, when there will soon remain nothing for the German troops to overcome except our wide expanses. It depends on the men now in power whether they will meet the inevitable crisis half-way, thus rendering it painless and preserving the real guarantees of popular freedom, or if they will take upon themselves, by their opposition, the responsibility for innumerable new calamities. I am convinced that only the immediate arrival here of the Premier, of the Deputy Minister of War, and of yourself, in order to establish jointly with the Supreme Commander-in-Chief the foundations of a strong authority, can avert the threatening danger of civil war."

Does not this telegram once more confirm that my urgent measures against General Kornilov's move had a sufficient foundation?

Russian People (Kornilov's Order No. 1), he was "so astonished at it that he doubted its genuineness," and it became clear to him that "adventurers had passed off on General Kornilov a document which he signed without proper consideration." The text of that document made it clear to Trubetzkoy that reconciliation was impossible.

I also remember that in the course of that conversation I pointed out to Miliukov that my attitude towards the move of Kornilov could not be any different from my attitude towards the Bolsheviks in July; that from the point of view of the authority of the State the position was in both cases exactly the same, and that the Government was faced by a similar attempt to snatch power by violence, etc. I remember how Miliukov argued, from the difference in the motives of the crime (which difference as to motives, I did not deny myself, nor do I deny it now); the necessity for a different attitude on the part of the Government towards the crime itself. I thus had before me *an inversion of Martov in July*. Indeed the leading articles in the *Retch* (the leading organ of the C.D.) at this time corresponded to the leading articles in the *Novaya Jizn* (the organ of Internationalist Mensheviks) during the period of the Bolshevik revolt.

I have already mentioned that prominent individual Liberals were giving by their conduct in the Kornilov days fruitful material to Bolshevik and semi-Bolshevik demagogues. *In the ranks of the democracy there began a final assault upon the sole State idea which had been saving the State from political death — upon the idea of a single universally national authority.* Some started the attack openly and others in a cowardly way, hiding themselves behind the watchword of "a coalition without the Cadets," though they knew full well that this watchword practically signified the negation of a coalition, since all that was progressive, but

not democratic, including the industrial aristocracy of Moscow, had then united round the Constitutional Democratic Party.

After Kornilov's move the Government remained solitary in its endeavour again to unite "the representatives of all those elements which placed the *eternal and general interests of the country* above the temporary and private interests of single parties or classes." The Government declared this aspiration to be its immediate task in its Message to the population of September 1st, in which it declared Russia to be a Republic. The "eternal and universal" was forgotten by all parties and classes in the name of the "temporary and private"; both among the democracy and the bourgeoisie the irreconcilable but active *minority* was rapidly capturing influence and power. If, however, one can understand Bolsheviks who, by letting loose all the dark animal instincts of the masses of the people, wished to capture and to utilize for their own purposes the really gigantic force of these masses, one must stand quite puzzled at the "Realist" policy of the irreconcilable wing of the bourgeois intellectuals, who made it their aim to free the State from the pressure of the whole "revolutionary democracy," without possessing at that time any real force at their disposal. Truly, God deprives of their reason those whom He wishes to chastise. But, while punishing themselves, these "sober" elements of the country have greatly helped the Anarchist-Bolsheviks to precipitate Russia into the abyss.]

*Kerensky.*—Apart from the attempts at compromise, there went on at this time a wholesale exodus from this place, known to be doomed to ruin. Indeed, on a certain night I walked about here, in the Winter Palace, almost alone, not because I did not wish to act together with anybody else, but simply because such an atmosphere had been

created all round that it was considered to be more prudent to keep away from such marshy ground.

[I must admit that in appearance Miliukov had selected a very convenient moment for proving to me that the real strength was on the side of Kornilov. The day of the 28th of August was precisely the time of the greatest hesitations and of the greatest doubts as to the strength of Kornilov's opponents, as well as of the greatest nervousness in the midst of the democracy itself. The lingering self-suggestion of a "counter-revolution" had induced a good many to exaggerate the strength of the adherents of the "Republican reaction" in the country. Bewildered by the noisy confusion of the "Kornilovist revolution," a good many people were as crudely mistaken as Miliukov himself. I shall never forget the painful long hours of that Monday, and especially of that Monday night. What pressure was I subjected to all that time, resisting while seeing the growing perplexity all round me! This Petrograd atmosphere of utter mental depression was rendering still more unbearable one's consciousness that the absence of a Chief at the front, the excesses within the country, and the dislocation of transport might cause at any moment irretrievable consequences to the as yet hardly recuperated mechanism of the State. During those painfully lingering days I was weighed down by a truly superhuman responsibility! I remember with a feeling of satisfaction that I did not then bend down under its weight. I also remember with gratitude those persons who supported me then simply as human beings. It was only on the next day, August 29th, that a mighty reaction against the mad attempt of the conspirators manifested itself throughout the whole of the country. I have already said, and I must point out once more, that the credit for the victory over Kornilov could not under any circumstances be especially

ascribed to the Soviets. The Kornilov movement was bloodlessly crushed at the very first moment only *thanks to the enthusiasm and the unity of the whole country, which had rallied to the national democratic authority*. This unity embraced immeasurably wider strata of the population than the Soviets circles at that time. The new municipal and Zemstvo local government bodies then played an enormous part in the popular movement. Hundreds and hundreds of telegrams from all corners of Russia were speaking out clearly that at this time the "unification of all the living forces of the country" was not yet an empty sound. It should not be forgotten that precisely at this time there was going on a healthy process of *decrease* in the political importance of the Soviets in the State. That process was interrupted by Kornilovism, which turned the Soviets into Bolshevik citadels. Nor should it be forgotten that the Government had taken all its decisions and issued its orders *before* any outsider was aware of the very fact of Kornilov's move. The legend of the Government's having taken its measures against Kornilov only under pressure from the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of the Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies is absolutely contrary to the facts. In looking through the newspapers of that period I came across, in the issue of the *Izvestia* of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of the Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies of August 27th, a characteristic little article entitled "A Night of Alarm," which shows strikingly how far even the most informed inhabitants of Petrograd were from the reality on the morning of August 27th. That paragraph relates the uninterrupted and alarming sittings of the Ministers and the Premier's consultations with the military authorities, explaining it all by the expectation of street demonstrations on the six months' celebration of the out-

break of the Revolution. The newspaper in question concludes its description of the night of alarm with a communication that, "on inquiries being made, the Bolsheviks and other organizations have made categorical statements that they had neither prepared nor were contemplating any movements. Similar declarations were made by all the democratic organizations." Indeed, the day of August 27th passed off at Petrograd most quietly, without there being seen any hint of the Bolshevik rebellion which V. Lvov had prophesied with such assurance. The author of that little article had not even the slightest idea as to how near he was to the truth when he reported "some conjectures as to the possibility of such movements being provoked by the organizations of the Right." The 28th of August was the hardest day, owing to its uncertainty, while on the evening of the 29th it has already become possible to issue the following Government communiqué: "The rebellious attempt of General Kornilov and of the handful of adventurers who had gathered round him remains quite isolated from the active army and navy. Only small detachments which had been moved by General Kornilov towards Petrograd still remain in error, but the further movement of these echelons has been stopped and communications between them interrupted. From everywhere in the provinces reports arrive affirming the complete loyalty of the troops and of the population to the Provisional Government, while all the public organizations send in declarations of their resolve to support the Government." On August 30th the Winter Palace was again full of people and animation, the calculators of the balance of forces having forgotten their hesitations. General Alexeiev left in the evening for Headquarters, but already on September 1st the Provisional Government had to write: "The insurrection of General

Kornilov is suppressed, but the trouble carried by him *into the ranks of the army and into the country* is great. There is once more a *great* danger threatening the fate of the country and its liberty. The Provisional Government considers it to be its main task to restore the order of the State and the *fighting capacity* of the army." In its issue of September 3rd the *Izvestia* of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of the Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, in an article headed "Do not Destroy the Army," had to put the terrible question: "Was it the unruly acts and the assassinations which are disgracing the name of the Russian soldier that have saved Russia from Kornilov's conspiracy? No; Russia was saved by something quite different." If a certain newspaper in a neutral State has recently put to the German Government the tragic inquiry as to whether it was going to erect in the Siegesallee at Berlin a monument to the conqueror of Russia — Lenin, I maintain very seriously that the Bolsheviks ought to erect on one of the squares of the former Russia an obelisk to Kornilov, with the inscription "In hoc signo vinces."]

*Chairman.*— Had you had no conversation, with regard to the position that had been created, with Terestchenko, Dutov, Karaulov, and Savinkov?

*Kerensky.*— These conversations had nothing to do with my telegram of August 27th. As far as I remember, Dutov and the Cossacks came on the night of that day.

*Chairman.*— That is so.

*Kerensky.*— They came with an intimation that they should like to go to Headquarters with a view to mediation, in order to try and arrange the relations with Kornilov. I repeated that I would grant the permission required. But when on the next day, August 28th, there followed on the part of Kornilov not only an open act of disobedience, but

also a declaration to the effect that we, the Provisional Government, were German agents, I refused permission for the Cossacks to start for Headquarters, saying that after the conditions now created any mediations or journeyings for arranging the affair had become impossible, since the matter had now passed into quite a different stage. The Cossacks were greatly excited and made a grievance of my having first promised to let them start and then withdrawing the permission. My answer was all the time to the effect that the position had changed in the interval in a radical manner.

[Altogether, in August the conduct of the Soviet of the Cossack armies was rather provoking, while in those days its members, and especially its President, only managed with difficulty to abstain from giving utterance to their real opinions and intentions. I had to speak to them very sharply, all the more so as I could oppose to their political declarations the temper of Cossackdom at the front, which, since the resolution passed by the Council of the Cossack armies as to the irremovability of Kornilov, had been protesting to me against the policy of the Council. When later, on the 29th and 30th of August, one deputation after another kept on arriving from the units of the third Cossack Corps, I had for the first time occasion to convince myself of the extraordinary exaggeration of the idea as to any special unity between the high and the low ranks in Cossackdom. I was able to convince myself of it once more through my personal experience at Gatchina. When a delegation from the Council of the Cossack armies arrived there and began, among other things, to work against me as the "betrayers" of Kornilov, they met with no success among the rank and file of the corps, where, on the contrary, there was found favourable soil for the Bolshevik propagandists who were



also agitating against me, but who concentrated their attention on quite different matters. In the end, after their having decided to "deliver me" to Dibenko, they nearly resolved to arrest their own officers as well. I was not, therefore, astonished in the least when news reached me of the sad issue of the fighting on the Don against Moscow Bolshevism.]

*Raupakh.*—What about the proposal of Iakubovitch, Tumanov, Savinkov, and Lebedev to enter upon a compromise?

*Kerensky.*—I do not remember any conversation with Iakubovitch and Tumanov. As for Savinkov, there had been a conversation with him about giving him an opportunity of talking the matter over with Headquarters by the direct line, already on the evening of the 26th of August.

*Raupakh.*—But after that, did he not say that it was still possible?

*Kerensky.*—He was given the opportunity of speaking by direct line, and he did so throughout the whole day. But when Lukomsky's telegram, which you probably remember, arrived and Savinkov read it, he handed me a declaration to the effect that the reference made to him was a calumny, and that he never did, nor could, carry on negotiations in my name. He made a similar declaration to Kornilov by the direct line.

*Raupakh.*—Did not that conversation serve as a reason for Savinkov to point out that there was some possibility . . . ?

*Kerensky.*—That was during the night.

*Raupakh.*—After the conversation by the direct line,

*Kerensky.*—Possibly. I don't remember.

*Raupakh.*—I am anxious to clear the matter up with regard to all the persons who have been mentioned.

*Kerensky.*— There were all sorts of persons; they should be divided into groups. As for the visit of the Cossacks, they were simply anxious to reach Headquarters *in time*. I have no doubt whatever that they were among those persons who, like Miliukov, for instance, were convinced that a victory would fall to the side of Kornilov, and not to that of the Revolution.

*Raupakh.*— To the side of the “real forces”?

*Kerensky.*— As I said before, all these persons must not be thrown into one heap. As for Iakubovitch and Tumanov, I do not remember having had any conversation with them. They spoke perhaps with me too, but such conversation must have been so insignificant that I remember nothing about it. I know only one thing: when I asked how it was that I did not see either Tumanov or Iakubovitch, I was told by somebody — by Savinkov, if I remember rightly — that the whole thing had had such an effect on Tumanov that he was in a most depressed condition. I think that Iakubovitch came later, and, if I am not mistaken, I requested him to invite several people to assist in organizing the defence. I remember, however, with certainty Savinkov's offer to speak by direct wire on August 27th, and then Miliukov's call on the 29th. Subsequently, at the meeting of the Provisional Government, when we discussed the question, I think, already on the eve of the solution of the crisis, part of the Government expressed itself for the necessity of a solution by compromise, in view of the “correlation of forces” and of the necessity to avoid commotions. Some argued that it would inevitably strengthen the Bolshevik current. There were various conversations, but they were in another connection — in connection with estimating the correlation of forces. *I stood on the definite position that*

*there were no two parties, but only the Provisional Government and a general who had transgressed his duties.*

There was a group of persons and a portion of public opinion who considered that there were two parties with equal rights to fight for power; to carry on with one another, so to say, peace negotiations, and to appeal for mediation. I was of opinion *that such a course would inflict a decisive blow to the idea of revolutionary authority and to the unity it had maintained since the outset of the Revolution.* I therefore could not accept the view of two camps negotiating through mediators, considering that I should break my *oath* by taking such a course.

*Raupakh.*— Was there no offer of negotiations in view of the possibility of misunderstandings?

*Kerensky.*— Savinkov made an offer on the evening of the 26th.

*Raupakh.*— After the conversation by tape. What about Terestchenko and Lebedev?

*Kerensky.*— I don't remember such a thing with regard to Lebedev, rather the opposite. . . . Lebedev was very suspicious of Filonenko's part in this affair, and Filonenko's exit was due, properly speaking, to Lebedev's communication of a certain conversation which had taken place at the Staff on the night of Filonenko's arrival from Headquarters. As for Terestchenko, he was at one time really in favour of an agreement. Indeed, he even said at one of the meetings of the Provisional Government that the business ought to be settled in such a way that *both Kerensky and Kornilov should be set aside*, thus satisfying both parties by a mutual sacrifice.

*Shablowsky.*— Who drafted the appeal to the Regional Commissaries of the provinces: did it bear your signature?

*Krokhmal.*—Excuse me, who drafted the communication of August 27th?

*Kerensky.*—I don't remember.

*Shablovsky.*—And the one to the provincial commissaries?

*Kerensky.*—I am unable to state that either.

*Shablovsky.*—We are interested in the part of Nekrassov; was it not drafted by him?

*Kerensky.*—What do you mean by the "part of Nekrassov"? He had no particular part whatever.

*Shablovsky.*—We ask it on account of a newspaper paragraph which states that the Provisional Government was prepared to refrain from sending out the telegram announcing the conspiracy, but that Nekrassov made haste and dispatched it against the opinion of the Government, thus placing the latter before an accomplished fact.

*Kerensky.*—I don't remember. I do remember that the telegram which was to have been sent by wireless was kept back merely because we thought that we ought not to overexcite public opinion and sentiment.

[Nekrassov's part! That is one of the malicious inventions in the Kornilov affair. One finds in the deposition of nearly every witness favourable to Kornilov some reference to the part of Nekrassov—to the part of the evil genius of the Premier, "who easily yields to outside influences." Here, Nekrassov is circulating, without the Government's knowledge, a telegram which "renders any further negotiations impossible"; there, he orders on his own initiative the rails on the road to Kornilov's detachments to be removed; then again, he comes forward in the capacity of an irresponsible adviser, and so on. I read myself in one of the pro-Kornilov newspapers how Nekrassov "has destroyed the possibility of an agreement between Kerensky

and Kornilov." Paragraphs in this style were appearing continually. Of course, all that was pure invention, and Nekrassov himself was quite right when he proved that *all* the leading instructions emanated from me, and that nothing of importance had been undertaken without me. Still, there is no smoke without a fire: Nekrassov has really done very much towards putting an end to Kornilov's move as promptly as possible. This was his crime for which the Kornilovists could not forgive him! They were taking revenge on Nekrassov because, as Deputy Prime Minister — that is to say, as my nearest assistant in the supreme administration — he carried out, in those alarming days of general uncertainty, the duties of his office most conscientiously and with rare energy. They took revenge upon him for having assisted me. I leave alone the consideration that, even as a simple citizen, Nekrassov would have been fully entitled to contribute towards the prompt suppression of the rebellion, even apart from any of his particular duties. The Kornilovists would perhaps somewhat have softened their attitude towards him if they had been aware that there was an hour when I did not see even Nekrassov near me!

But why the part of Nekrassov, who had accelerated the suppression of the insurrection, should have interested so much the Commission of Inquiry is not quite clear to me. I am reluctant to admit that any energetic activity in the suppression of the revolt should have interested some members of the Commission of Inquiry more than the revolt itself.

The unscrupulous baiting started in various Kornilovist publications against all those who had brought about Kornilov's collapse may be seen even from the way in which the *Novoye Vremya* of October 10th, reported my examination by the Commission of Inquiry, of which the original

minutes are now placed before the reader's eyes. I shall quote a few characteristic extracts from the *Novoye Vremya* version. After an introductory remark to the effect that "A. F. Kerensky frequently took part himself in the examination of witnesses" (which is a downright lie), that paper begins to report my deposition thus:—

"He first gave some *brief* explanations, setting out in a compressed form the whole course of his negotiations with General Kornilov. These explanations called forth, *however*, a number of supplementary questions. One of the members of the Commission of Inquiry evinced an interest in the question as to whether the Prime Minister had charged V. N. Lvov to carry on negotiations with Headquarters. A. F. Kerensky replied *in the affirmative* (? !). The Premier likewise *confirmed* (? !) that Lvov was not present at the conversation by the Hughes apparatus on August 26th, and declared that in view of the alarming moment and of the importance of the question to the State, he had taken recourse to such a *trick* (?). A series of questions were then put to Kerensky as to the reason for the retirement of several Ministers and as to the pressure (?) exercised in that matter on the Premier by his former Deputy, Nekrassov. Altogether, the Extraordinary Commission of Inquiry concentrated its attention greatly on the *part* of Nekrassov. The Premier was asked about the author of A. F. Kerensky's well-known "Appeal" to the people with regard to the move of General Kornilov, who was described there as a rogue (?), a betrayer (?), and a traitor (?). A. F. Kerensky stated that the *author* of that telegram was *N. V. Nekrassov* (? !). One member of the Commission of Inquiry *questioned in detail* (?) on Nekrassov's interference with purely military questions and on the pressure exercised by him in deciding questions on the re-

calling of members of the High Command of the army."

Such a mixture of perversions of the truth and downright lies was offered to the reader as a report of my examination. For the thorough appreciation of the editorial work of the *Novoye Vremya* and similar papers, one has to keep in mind that, possessing the advantage of a very good source, the Kornilovist papers had at their disposal all the *original* minutes and documents of the Commission of Inquiry almost on the very day of their production. Unfortunately I only learnt too late who had provided that source.]

*Chairman.*—What about Krimov and the third corps detachment? Were any orders given to stop it, to damage the road, etc.? Was it called forth by some document, or only by an apprehension that had but little foundation? Did Krimov commit any act of open disobedience to Staff orders?

*Kerensky.*—As I said before, Krimov participated in the revolt, which he joined, together with a small number of officers, with quite definite intentions. I remember one little incident: when Krimov shot himself, an officer, whose name I don't quite remember — I think it was Bagratuni — remarked: "Now all traces have disappeared." Krimov did not carry out the order to stop the movement and continued to go forward.

*Shablovsky.*—If such orders were given, they were, then, called forth by some documents?

*Kerensky.*—Yes, by communications as to the location of the units in question. The chief part was played in this case by the railwaymen, who reported even the slightest movements.

## § 25

*Shablovsky.*—What did Filonenko actually report on his arrival from Headquarters?

*Kerensky*.—Filonenko's arrival at Petrograd was not quite intelligible to me. I don't know the actual reason for his arrival. He reported nothing to me until I summoned him myself to the Palace. I had seen him at night at the District Staff. As soon as Filonenko made his appearance there, Savinkov intimated to me that he would like to have him as his nearest assistant in the defence of Petrograd. I objected, but ultimately agreed to this, as I considered the chief director of operations could select whomsoever he chose as his assistant, on his own responsibility. But the next day it transpired that Filonenko had been carrying on a most unsuitable conversation with General Kornilov. I then summoned him here, and he confessed the nature of the conversation, which he related. But Savinkov began to put forward a whole series of attenuating comments. I ought to say that Savinkov is a very trustful man, and when he once has faith in anybody, he does not notice any defects in him for a long time. This is what Filonenko related to me: Kornilov had asked him whether it would not be opportune for him to proclaim himself dictator. Filonenko replied that he was against a personal dictatorship, and refused to support Kornilov. The latter then suggested to him a "collective" dictatorship, to be composed of Kornilov, Kerensky, Filonenko, and Savinkov, to which Filonenko replied that he was ready to join such a combination.

I considered that this conversation was inadmissible in itself, apart from the fact that any one might conjecture that Filonenko had some reasons for speaking in that way, since he was the representative of the Central Government with the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. I therefore found that it was impossible to retain him in service any longer. At first I even wanted to arrest Filonenko, but afterwards I withdrew that order in view of the position which Savin-



kov had taken up on that question. I decided that this could be done later on just as well, and confined myself for the present to ordering him to vacate his post immediately.

[Filonenko arrived at Petrograd from Headquarters on the night of August 28th. Early in the morning of the 29th there called on me V. T. Lebedev (the former Deputy Minister of Marine, whom I had appointed on August 28th to be Assistant to the Governor-General of Petrograd). He appeared quite alarmed, and told me that, together with Colonel Bagratuni (the Chief of Staff of Petrograd Military District), he had heard Filonenko using quite an inadmissible phrase in his conversation with Savinkov. I ordered Filonenko to be arrested. Shortly afterwards Savinkov called on me, requesting me either to arrest him together with Filonenko or to examine Filonenko's accusers in the presence of both of us. I thereupon ordered Lebedev, Bagratuni, and Filonenko to be summoned to my study, where all of them appeared about 11 A.M. The sequel I shall quote from the very exact report made by V. T. Lebedev in No. 145 of the *Volia Naroda*:—

“A. F. Kerensky addressed us thus: ‘I call you together, gentlemen, for the following reason: V. T. Lebedev told me that in his report to B. V. Savinkov, M. M. Filonenko had made use of the following phrase: “But I kept on defending our scheme: Kornilov and Kerensky as the two pillars of the dictatorship.” Do you confirm it, Colonel Bagratuni?’

“‘Yes, I confirm it,’ replied Colonel Bagratuni.

“‘And you, M. M. Filonenko?’

“‘Yes, I made that remark.’

“M. Filonenko then related that, after the arrival of V. N. Lvov, he had discussed together with Kornilov a

plan of a dictatorship in the form of a ' Council of Defence,' composed of the following persons: General Kornilov, A. F. Kerensky, Savinkov, and himself. He had been discussing that plan in order to counteract the contingency of the sole dictatorship of Kornilov, which would otherwise become *inevitable*. The Premier was quite astounded at this confession.

" ' How could you, the Supreme Commissary of the Provisional Government, carry on such a conversation with Kornilov! Who authorized you to do so? General Kornilov might now indeed say that he had been led indirectly into error.'

" Filonenko endeavoured to prove that he had put forward this plan as a counterpoise to the schemes of the conspirators; that there was no time to be lost, and lastly, that this conversation had been carried on in the spirit of private relations and personal friendship.

" ' For General Kornilov you were the Supreme Commissary, and this conversation of yours was a conversation between the Supreme Commissary and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. You appeared to General Kornilov as representative of the Provisional Government, which, however, had never authorized you to make any such declarations.'

" When Savinkov and Filonenko pointed out that an essentially similar plan of a Council of Defence had been brought forward by the Provisional Government, A. F. Kerensky replied:—

" ' Never, never! A question was raised and passed as to the formation of a " Council of Defence " [rather a War Cabinet than a Council of Defence] *from the midst* of the Provisional Government itself, for concentrating in its hands the defence of the whole country, after the

example of England. But it never occurred to any one that General Kornilov, a subordinate of the Provisional Government, could ever enter such a Council. You, however, who are a Commissary of the Provisional Government, discussed with General Kornilov, without the Government's knowledge, plans for a Directorate into which there should enter three persons who are not members of the Provisional Government — yourself, B. V. Savinkov, and General Kornilov — and one person who does form part of the Government, namely myself, who knew nothing about it !'

"As a result of the conversation, A. F. Kerensky said that he looked upon M. M. Filonenko's action as tactless, to say the least, and that he considered it impossible for the latter to continue any political work.

"I, for my own part, declared that I considered M. M. Filonenko's behaviour at Headquarters had been criminal.

"Filonenko consented to submit to A. F. Kerensky's decision and to retire from any participation in the political life of the country, whereat Savinkov came out with a protest, defending the correctness of Filonenko's conduct and explaining away Filonenko's confession in such a manner that A. F. Kerensky corrected him several times by saying:—

" 'All three of us — myself, V. T. Lebedev, and Colonel Bagratuni — have heard what M. M. Filonenko has said. He said something different.'

"As Savinkov went on insisting on the correctness of Filonenko's actions and expressing solidarity with him, the Premier offered to refer the whole business to the Provisional Government, which, however, Filonenko declined, declaring that he preferred to submit to A. F. Kerensky's decision."

Towards the evening of that day Filonenko was officially

dismissed. As I pointed out before, Filonenko's behaviour at Headquarters is being used as one of the three proofs of my collusion with Kornilov. General Alexeiev said, indeed, straight out that the question of Kornilov's move had been discussed with Kerensky *through* Savinkov and Filonenko. I have already spoken of Savinkov, to whom I shall still have to revert; but as far as Filonenko is concerned, I think that the scene in my study is sufficiently convincing proof that no discussion whatever had taken place with me through Filonenko, and I shall not touch upon that question again.

This confession of Filonenko, however, is most important in itself, since it coincides with a corresponding deposition of General Kornilov and with his Hughesogram of August 27th. By adding to it the evidence of Trubetzky, Lukomsky, and several others, one gets an exact picture of the alterations that the scheme of dictatorship had undergone at Headquarters, as well as on *whose* initiative the whole question had arisen altogether. Kornilov's conversation with Filonenko about a dictatorship took place in the evening of the 26th. The declaration concerning a dictatorship, however, was made by Kornilov to V. N. Lvov on the 24th. On that day a *fictitious* consent was given to Savinkov not to send Krimov with the "Savage Division" to Petrograd, and on the same day this division was placed by special order under General Krimov and started for Petrograd. According to the admission of General Kornilov himself in his conversation with Lvov, he had declared the necessity of introducing a dictatorship on his own initiative. Lvov's arrival at and departure from Headquarters became known to Filonenko afterwards from Zavoiko and Aladin, who called on him on a visit. From the telegraphic negotiations of August 27th by the Hughes apparatus and

the corresponding depositions of Kornilov and Filonenko, it can be ascertained that up to the very evening of August 26th the introduction of Kornilov's sole dictatorship was contemplated. The depositions contain no data for either affirming or denying Filonenko's participation in any consultations on the question of a dictatorship previous to the evening of the 26th. Nor are there any indications as to Filonenko having suddenly changed his point of view on this question when he supported a collective dictatorship on August 26th. Filonenko cannot therefore be recognized as the initiator of the introduction of an individual dictatorship, no matter what his part at Headquarters may have been. I think that one may assert in complete conformity with the facts that the very question of a dictatorship had arisen *independently* of Filonenko, and that the position of that question at Headquarters was not known to him in its *full* extent. Unfortunately, General Kornilov's consultation with Krimov and the other military participators in the conspiracy does not seem to have been cleared up at all by the Inquiry. I am convinced, however, that the practical part of the venture was precisely discussed with such clever men as Krimov, and that among them there could perhaps have been found the real initiator of the whole affair. On the strength of the materials known to me, the most active adherent at Headquarters, if not the initiator, of the idea of individual dictatorship *must be recognized to be Kornilov himself*.

All the circumstances of the final consultation about a dictatorship held on August 26th seemed to point to the probability of Filonenko having said perhaps the truth, when he affirmed in my study that only after being confronted by the fact of the inevitable declaration of Kornilov's sole dictatorship he had put forward the counter-proposal of a

collective dictatorship as the lesser evil. At any rate, the Inquiry has firmly established that this scheme had only arisen on the 26th of August at the consultation between Kornilov, Zavoiko, Aladin, and Filonenko; and of all the data of the Kornilov affair, Filonenko's version is the only one I could find which provides an explanation of this sudden alteration of the plan of action. But even Filonenko's story does not reveal those motives which had compelled General Kornilov to agree to such an alteration in the form of a dictatorship. It is not clear whether Filonenko had really convinced Kornilov that his scheme was more to the purpose, or whether, standing in need for some reason or another of Filonenko's consent on that evening, General Kornilov only pretended for a time to have been convinced by Filonenko. I would rather suppose the latter, because it is hardly possible to assume that General Kornilov did not perceive the whole absurdity of such a dictatorial quartet, composed of Kornilov, Kerensky, Savinkov, and Filonenko! I am simply of opinion that on that evening Kornilov did not take any particular interest in the forms of a dictatorship, since he understood, or at least felt, that, *on the day following the coup d'état* the final decision would belong to him who would remain in power.

As for the degree of the participation of Filonenko himself in the conspiracy, I am rather inclined to think that he, as well as Lukomsky, for instance, was dragged into the affair at the last moment, being placed before the fact and bound by his boastful loquacity. It is not impossible, however, that a careful judicial inquiry would have revealed that Filonenko had been more deeply concerned in the conspiracy. At any rate, it is very difficult to clear up Filonenko's part at Headquarters, because on the one hand his conduct was very slippery, while on the other hand the

attitude of Headquarters towards him was rather changeable. Now he was *persona grata* with Kornilov; now they could hardly put up with him; now he was ordered to be arrested, and now he was given a special train to start for Petrograd. According to the witnesses, he was now attacking me, now insisting that no Government was possible without me; now he demanded the removal of Lukomsky, and now he would discuss together with him and Kornilov the composition of the future Cabinet in which he claimed the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs, and would only at worst "agree" to act as Minister of the Interior. Lukomsky writes, as far as I remember, that in all his relations with Kornilov, Filonenko manifested complete agreement with all his schemes and used to say that he was going hand in hand with him, while at the same time "they did not trust" Filonenko at Headquarters.

Even about the arrest of Filonenko two versions are in existence. According to one, he himself asked to be arrested, since "as a representative of the Provisional Government he ought to be on its side, whereas he sympathized with his whole heart with Kornilov." According to the other version, "on noticing a complete change in Filonenko and taking account of the circumstances, General Kornilov announced that he detained him at Headquarters." What was happening? On the morning of the 27th, on receipt of my telegram dismissing Kornilov, there gathered in his study Lukomsky, Zavoiko, Aladin, and Filonenko. They discussed the position that had been created, when Filonenko stated in the course of the conversation that he had to start for Petrograd, whither he had been summoned. After the conclusion of the conversation, Kornilov and Lukomsky left the study and went away together. Immediately afterwards Zavoiko came out of the study into the

hall, telling those present that "Filonenko had just asked to be arrested." On the other hand, Lukomsky, on meeting Trubetzkoy, told him that "Filonenko had been put on parole not to leave the place." Filonenko himself positively asserts that it was not he who asked to be arrested, but that he was detained by Kornilov, and that this happened during that morning conversation in Kornilov's study. Lukomsky's confirmation of the words of Filonenko renders the latter's story more credible.

Now, what made Zavoiko represent Filonenko in the character of the wife of the non-commissioned officer in Gogol's "Revisor," who, according to the excuse of the local Governor, had inflicted a flogging upon herself? Why does Filonenko's rôle appear so slippery and changeable at Headquarters? Why, after sending on August 27th from Headquarters a telegram to Petrograd upon the necessity of retaining Kornilov in the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief and of arriving at an agreement with him, did Filonenko, when he succeeded in getting to Petrograd, issue there a fighting proclamation *against* Kornilov? For want of sufficient evidence I am unable to give a definite reply. At any rate, Filonenko's behaviour at Headquarters, as Commissary of the Provisional Government with the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, urgently needed a judicial investigation, and I feel no compunction for having wished to arrest him.]

*Shablovsky.*—Was the advancement in Filonenko's service career occasioned by his personal qualities as well, or was he merely a protégé of Savinkov?

*Kerensky.*—Before meeting him during the retreat and the operations on the South-western front, Savinkov knew him very little. I remember, at least, that before being



appointed to the army Filonenko referred me to Savinkov, whereas Savinkov afterwards told me that he knew very little of him. Filonenko was one of those young military men who had done much for the organization of the army Commissariats and for dispatching to the front Commissaries who undertook to act there not only by persuasion, but also by personal participation in the battles. These were the "Commissaries of personal example." He personally displayed great courage in the 8th Army during the offensive and the retirements. There at the front Savinkov and Filonenko evidently became intimate. Later on, when Kornilov's appointment became inevitable, in view of his "peculiarities" I wanted to appoint Savinkov as Supreme Commissary with him. I did not go any further than that. Savinkov, however, pointed out that it would be more correct to have Filonenko as Commissary, since the latter had got accustomed to the ways of Kornilov, with whom he had been working. I saw Filonenko once or twice at Petrograd in the spring, and also when I spent a day in the sector of the 8th Army, but hardly ever had a talk with him. I also saw him at Headquarters and in the train, after the conference of the 16th of July. Then it was that a commissary had for the first time to be appointed with the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, for the purpose, among other things, of being always sure as to the correctness of the political course at Headquarters, in view of the peculiarities in the character of General Kornilov. I had wished that Savinkov, who had originally been intended to act as Supreme Commissary, should control and direct this political and public work. When Savinkov was appointed Deputy Minister of War, the question as to the personality of the Commissary with the Supreme Com-

maunder-in-Chief became a matter of indifference to me, since the direction of the political work at Headquarters remained in the hands of Savinkov.

### § 26

*Shablowsky.*—We were impressed in Savinkov's deposition by his support of Filonenko. He even identified himself with him. When you wished to set Filonenko aside, Savinkov almost coupled it with his own retirement.

*Kerensky.*—Yes, I told Savinkov: "I trust you completely; I think that you might commit errors, but I do not doubt in the least your devotion to the Revolution, whereas Filonenko I do not know at all." In this case, too, Savinkov's special feature of standing up to the very end for men "devoted" to him manifested itself. Every time he put the question about Filonenko as if it concerned his own person. When I suggested to Filonenko to cease immediately the execution of his service duties, Savinkov brought up the question of his own retirement, so that I had to postpone for a while Filonenko's official retirement [as I did not want to lose Savinkov]. I considered it, however, impossible to retain Filonenko in office, and Savinkov retired almost immediately. He declared to me categorically that he did not wish to serve with me any longer, as he did not approve of the new appointments of Verkhovsky and Verderevsky, and absolutely insisted on resigning.

[With regard to Filonenko's confession, there might arise the puzzling question as to why, when Filonenko spoke of "our scheme," that is to say, not only of his own scheme but also that of Savinkov, I wanted to arrest Filonenko alone and told only him to resign? I must answer straight

out: because I was perfectly sure that Savinkov had *no part whatever* in the conspiracy, and I interpreted these words of Filonenko as a mere attempt to justify before Savinkov his participation in an inadmissible and criminal conversation. At the same time, I only saw in Savinkov's persistent and hopeless attempt in my study to put in the mouth of Filonenko such words as the latter had never uttered, a passionate desire to save Filonenko.

That Savinkov was by no means initiated into that conversation at Headquarters may be gathered, first, from the fact that even on the 23rd and the 24th of August he was carrying on at Headquarters a struggle with the Main Committee of the Officers' League and with the political section of Headquarters (at the head of which was a member of the same Main Committee of the Officers' League, Captain S.)—that is to say, with the two organizations, numerous members of which were active participators in the events; secondly, from the fact that General Kornilov personally deceived Savinkov on the question of Krimov and of the Native Caucasian Division (as far as I remember, even the very presence of Krimov at Headquarters remained unknown to Savinkov); thirdly, from the fact that even at the most critical moment, after Lukomsky's telegram on Lvov's and Savinkov's proposals, at the latter's direct declaration that the reference made to him was a calumny, Kornilov was not only unable to make any rejoinder, but was compelled silently to admit it; fourthly, from the circumstance that Savinkov had never been in close intercourse with Zavoiko and Aladin, and could not endure the former at all, looking upon him with great suspicion and avoiding him, while on the one occasion he had even obtained his temporary relegation; fifthly, from the fact that Savinkov was himself suspecting and trying to dis-

cover the conspiracy at Headquarters, though making a reservation about Kornilov himself, whom he considered to be a patriot and "a stranger to politics"; and sixthly, from the fact that from the 27th to the 30th of August Savinkov did not hesitate for a single moment on whose side he ought to stand.

In order to illustrate the character of the mutual relations of Kornilov and Savinkov and of my own part in their relationship, I shall quote a few extracts from Savinkov's conversations with Kornilov, as written down by Savinkov himself:—

"Lavr Georgievitch," Savinkov said to Kornilov on August 23rd, "I should like to speak with you in private." (At these words, Lukomsky and Filonenko got up and left the room.) "The matter is this: the telegrams lately received by the Ministry and signed by various persons belonging to the Headquarters Staff, I must tell you frankly, inspire me with alarm. These telegrams frequently treat of questions of a political character, and that in an inadmissible tone. I have stated to you already that I am convinced that you will loyally support the Provisional Government, and will not go against it. But I cannot say the same about your Staff."

*Kornilov.*—"I must tell you that I do not *trust any longer* Kerensky and the Provisional Government. The latter has not the strength to stand on the ground of firm authority which alone can save the country. As for Kerensky, he is not only weak and vacillating, but even *insincere*. He insulted me undeservedly [at the Moscow Conference]. Moreover, he carried on conversations behind my back with Tcheremissov, and wanted to appoint him Supreme Commander-in-Chief." [Nothing of the kind ever happened. —A. K.]

*Savinkov.*—"It seems to me that in questions of State there is no room for personal grievances. As for Kerensky, I can't share your opinion about him. I know Kerensky."

*Kornilov.*—"The composition of the Government ought to be altered."

*Savinkov.*—"As far as I know, Kerensky is of the same opinion."

*Kornilov.*—"It is necessary that Kerensky should not meddle with affairs."

*Savinkov.*—"This is impossible at present, even if it were necessary."

*Kornilov.*—"It is necessary that Alexeiev, Plekhanov and Argunov should be in the Government."

*Savinkov.*—"It is necessary rather that the Soviet Socialists should be replaced by non-Soviet Socialists. Is that what you mean?"

*Kornilov.*—"Yes; the Soviets have proved their impracticability and their inability to defend the country."

*Savinkov.*—"All that is a matter for the future. You are dissatisfied with the Government; talk it over with Kerensky. At any rate, you must admit that without Kerensky at its head no Government is conceivable."

*Kornilov.*—"I shall not enter the Government. You are right, of course, that without Kerensky at its head no Government is conceivable. But Kerensky is vacillating; he hesitates; he promises and does not fulfil his promises."

*Savinkov.*—"This is not correct. Allow me to inform you that during the six days that elapsed since the Moscow Conference, at which Kerensky declared that he was adopting methods of firm authority, the Ministry of War did much, namely . . ."

This conversation took place on the 23rd of August.

Here are some extracts from a conversation on the following day:—

*Kornilov.*—"Very well, I shall not appoint Krimov."

*Savinkov.*—"Alexander Feodorovitch [Kerensky] would like you to appoint General D."

*Kornilov.*—"Alexander Feodorovitch has the right of objecting to an appointment, but he cannot instruct me whom to appoint."

*Savinkov.*—"Alexander Feodorovitch does not instruct you, he only requests."

*Kornilov.*—"I shall appoint D. Chief of the Staff."

*Savinkov.*—"And what about the Native Division?"

*Kornilov.*—"I shall replace it by the regular cavalry."

*Savinkov.*—"Many thanks. Alexander Feodorovitch also charged me to request you to detach for his disposal Colonel Pronin [Assistant President of the Main Committee of the Officers' League]."

*Kornilov.*—"Pronin! What for? I understand. It is a concealed arrest! I shall not let Pronin go. Give me proofs, and I will arrest Pronin myself."

*Savinkov.*—"Very well. I shall report it in that way to Alexander Feodorovitch."

*Kornilov.*—"Certainly."

(Follows the conversation about Mironov, which I have already quoted.)

*Savinkov.*—"Will you allow me, Lavr Georgievitch, to come back to yesterday's conversation? What is your attitude towards the Provisional Government?"

*Kornilov.*—"Tell Alexander Feodorovitch that I shall support him in every way, for the welfare of the Fatherland requires it."

*Savinkov.*—"Lavr Georgievitch! I am happy to hear

these words. I never doubted you. I shall tell Alexander Feodorovitch what you have just said."

After this conversation, Savinkov, reassured and confident with regard to Kornilov, leaves at 3 P. M. for Petrograd. But a few hours after his departure there takes place the reception of V. N. Lvov, to whom is made the famous declaration for communication to me. . . . Such was the sincerity and truthfulness of Kornilov, even in his relations with Savinkov! Trying to explain somehow to Savinkov the duplicity of his conduct, Kornilov, when conversing with him by direct line on the 27th of August, says: "After your departure I received alarming news on the position of affairs at the front and at the rear." And this within the three or four hours which had elapsed between Kornilov's taking leave of Savinkov at the station and Lvov's call at his study! Let us suppose it was so. But when General Kornilov enumerates the new alarming news (which, by the by, contained nothing that was new), he does not mention any particular news he had received during those hours from Petrograd. Why then did he not at least warn Savinkov personally, at the station, that on the strength of "exact information" from Petrograd he considered the position to be "extremely threatening" and the presence of myself and of Savinkov at Petrograd to be "very dangerous" for both of us?

Why then, after his most friendly last interview with Savinkov, did Kornilov think it necessary, not only to communicate such alarming news through a man who called by chance, but even to "guarantee" through him the complete "safety" of our stay at Headquarters? The wisest man will fail to solve this enigmatical conduct of Kornilov, so long as he assumes that he has to deal with a sincere and

truthful soldier who is a "stranger to politics." But to any one who seeks the truth impartially, this day of August 24th throws a deeper light on the events than a whole bundle of documents. He would perceive how, while he was conversing "sincerely" with Savinkov, matters were — not being talked about but being *done* with Krimov, Zavoiko, and other initiated persons.

Savinkov is guilty indeed, but not of any conspiracy with Kornilov, nor, as Alexeiev imagines, of my having been previously "informed" *through* him of Kornilov's move; his guilt was that while being *utterly unconscious* of the character and the real intentions of Kornilov, he unwittingly assisted him in his struggle for power by putting forward Kornilov as a political force with rights equal to those of the Government. He is also guilty of having, while at Headquarters, exceeded the powers granted to him, and of having, besides acting in the capacity of my nearest assistant, also undertaken special political tasks on his own account. He is guilty in that, being insufficiently informed with regard to the general condition of the State, and being unable after a long exile abroad to find his way as yet in the complicated political relations and the real dispositions of the masses, he self-confidently began to carry on a *personal* policy, without taking into account the experience and the plans even of those who, by advancing him to an exceptionally responsible post, had taken upon themselves formal responsibility for his entire activity as a statesman.

But, whatever my personal estimate of such conduct on the part of Savinkov, I must decidedly protest against the declaration made with reference to him at the fourth Conference of the Social Revolutionary Party by V. M. Tchernov on November 28th of last year, to the effect that in



the Kornilov affair "a more than equivocal, one may say a treacherous, part had fallen to the share of a man who had been once a member of the Social Revolutionary Party." The Kornilov case affords *no data* whatever for such a declaration. To hurl a similar, more than careless, accusation was especially unpardonable at a time when Russia, in November last, was living through an orgy of bloodthirsty instincts!

Just because I knew that Savinkov was not concerned in the conspiracy, it never occurred to me to dismiss Savinkov along with Filonenko. Savinkov himself, however, continued with particular insistence to take Filonenko's part, and after the morning of the 29th of August I saw that he was only looking out for a pretext for retiring. Such a pretext was found by him in my "lack of correctness towards him" (which I shall not touch upon here, as it is a purely personal question), and in the appointment of Verkhovsky and Verderevsky as Ministers of War and of Marine respectively.

Against the latter reason for his resignation on principle I could not raise any objection, whereas now I must admit that Savinkov's negative attitude towards those appointments has been justified by the facts, since the results that were expected from appointing in my place "real" military men have in no way been obtained. It ought to be recognized, however, that between Verkhovsky and Verderevsky there existed an essential difference. The clever and most diplomatic Verderevsky perfectly understood the position created by Kornilovism, and wanted to save whatever could still be saved. He considered it to be his chief task to protect the still uninjured naval officers from any further lynchings and final extermination. This explains his excessive opportunism in his relations with the sailors' organiza-

tions. But while "kicking off" somehow the inrush of the rank and file, Verderevsky devoted himself entirely to the task of working out and preparing a number of important measures intended to attempt during the winter the restoration of the fighting capacity of the navy. General Verkhovsky, on the other hand, was not only quite unable to master the situation, but could not even grasp it. He was caught up by the political gamblers of the Left, and he rapidly floated without sail and rudder straight towards catastrophe. There may be imputed to me with much reason the guilt of having appointed Verkhovsky to the post of Minister of War, and I accept that reproach. This was the most unlucky of all the appointments: Verkhovsky introduced into his activity a vague element of comedy. Nevertheless, not by way of justifying myself, but merely as a matter of fact, I ought to say that, previous to his being appointed Minister of War, Verkhovsky had appeared a somewhat different personality. I shall not speak of his activity at Sebastopol and before, but even on August 27th, in a telegram to Kornilov, he expressed his solidarity with the substance of Kornilov's measures, only protesting against Kornilov's method of acting: "One may and ought to have changed the policy, but not to undermine the last strength of the people at a time when the front was broken through." On arriving at Petrograd after his appointment, Verkhovsky was introducing himself to everybody as a "Kornilovist." Besides, owing to some vagueness in the conduct at the time of the Kornilov movement of other desirable candidates, I literally had no one to choose from, while both from the Right and from the Left there was a sudden desire to see a military man at the post of Minister of War.]

## § 27

*Shablowsky.*— Did the Government possess any data when committing Kornilov, Lukomsky, Kisliakov, Denikin, and Markov for trial: something that we have not got, any information that we have overlooked? We have just made an inquiry at Petrograd, interrogating individual persons, but the Government has perhaps something we are not aware of?

*Kerensky.*— As far as I know, all who had manifested their activity after the formal removal of Kornilov from office were committed for trial. General Kisliakov continued to give orders. Lukomsky — well, I think his position is clear, while the story of Denikin and Markov is known to you.

*Shablowsky.*— Were there no special reports?

*Kerensky.*— On the contrary, the telegram and the behaviour of Lukomsky were a surprise to me. I did not think that Lukomsky would go that way. Even now, I consider it probable that Lukomsky was one of the last to join. After all, the pith of the affair lies no doubt in Zavoiko, Aladin and Co.

*Raupakh.*— The question just put by the Chairman is of interest to us, because the wording of the prosecution is that they are committed for trial for rebellion. What are the actual data that testified to their participation in a rebellion?

*Kerensky.*— You are now passing to the question of a definition of the crime they had perpetrated. We considered that Kornilov's open disobedience to the head of the Supreme Authority and his refusal to hand over his office, together with the appeals and orders to the troops that he had issued, constituted a "rebellion," while its

participators and adherents appear to be "abetting the rebellion." A crime is always defined by the acts of its chief perpetrator. I do not know by what other method it might be defined.

*Raupakh.*—By the degree of Kisliakov's, Lukomsky's, Denikin's, and Markov's participation?

*Kerensky.*—Really, any one would think that when the Provisional Government proceeds to measures of prosecution, it appears to be itself a rebellious organization! But this depends on the point of view. As for myself, I have no doubt whatever that a general, who allows himself to call the Provisional Government "agents of the German Staff," and declares himself to constitute a Government, is a rebel! I do not know wherein the irregularity of the definition consists.

*Raupakh.*—I do not object to the definition; but were there any data against Denikin, Lukomsky, Kisliakov, Markov, and others?

*Kerensky.*—They continued to co-operate with the insurgent general; these facts are quite sufficient. When General Lukomsky is ordered to take over the post of Supreme Commander-in-Chief, which he is bound in law to do, and to arrest Kornilov in case of resistance, he declares that he cannot do it because he is on the side of Kornilov. What else is required?

*Chairman.*—Now about Novossiltsev [the President of the Main Committee of the Officers' League]. Who carried out his arrest; was there no report concerning Novossiltsev's acts when he was arrested?

*Kerensky.*—Novossiltsev was arrested on the local initiative.

*Chairman.*—He was the President of the Main Committee; so was he not present at Headquarters?

*Kerensky.*—He had just left at the time.

*Chairman.*—It looks as if there had also been an order from here for his arrest.

*Kerensky.*—I think that if there had been such an order it would have been of an administrative character. The Government, the Premier and the Minister of the Interior have the right to arrest any one, if we consider it to be necessary.

*Chairman.*—I only meant to ask for information; perhaps, sir, you possess some?

*Kerensky.*—Exact information? No. Personally I am convinced (under the conditions of our detective system it will perhaps be impossible to prove it) that a portion of the Officers' League, and especially of its Main Committee, was very closely connected with all the attempts, including this one. I have already said that in the preparations that were made here, at Petrograd, a portion of the Officers' League had taken part. I will not mention what may be called the, so to say, "legal" telegrams, which were all signed by Novossiltsev. How did he behave during this affair? If he had not left, I think . . . Suppose, for instance, that de Semiterre were now to make his appearance (after hiding himself when they wanted to arrest him, which confirmed the suspicions to some extent); suppose he were to put in an appearance now, he would be reinstated in his office in the nicest way, for he is an officer of the General Staff and ought to be supported, whereas we, the Government, are, of course, incapable of displaying anything but open partiality and arbitrariness! He could remain in the service!

[According to trustworthy information, de Semiterre was one of the chief agents of the conspiracy at Petrograd. There "passed" through his hands those persons who

were sent from Headquarters and from the fronts to the capital "for purposes of co-operation." He kept one of the secret rendezvous where the conspirators "reported," and so on. The moment before the competent authorities arrived at his flat to search it and arrest him, he started for Finland. Unfortunately, the technical side of the conspiracy for preparing the movement has remained, so far as I know, utterly neglected in the labours of the Commission of Inquiry. That is why the personalities of Zavoiko, Aladin, and similar persons have become excessively prominent in this case. It is only the episode with Krimov that lifts a little the curtain from the technical side of the case. This blank may be explained, not only by the great cohesion of that *milieu* which directed the military and technical side of the conspiracy, but also by the fact that, under the influence of the "counter-attacks" ("provocations," "misunderstandings," etc.), made at the time, and of the clever campaign of defence carried out in the Press, in conformity to the German rule that "an offensive is the best defensive," the attention of the Commission of Inquiry was, in spite of themselves, chiefly concentrated on those sides of the affair in which public opinion had taken a particular interest at the time. In the meantime, the possibility of penetrating by the still fresh traces into the very laboratory of the conspiracy vanished. In referring to Semiterre, as a reply to the question about Novossiltsev, I meant to lay stress on my having had no doubt as to Novossiltsev's participation in Kornilov's movement, and to point out at the same time to the Commission of Inquiry what solid grounds we considered absolutely indispensable before proceeding to take measures of precaution by administrative order.

Generally speaking, it may be noticed from the text of

the stenogram that at this point of the examination I was speaking in a somewhat irritable tone. I confess that I was irritated at the *excessive* impartiality of some members of the Commission, which was already assuming the shape of an open inclination not to see anything criminal in the activity of the persons which were prosecuted in connection with the Kornilov case. In this mood of a part of the Commission I perceived an infringement of the almost single instruction I had given to the Commission of Inquiry at the outset of its work: "to carry on the inquiry without giving way to any outside influences." I think that the whole character of my examination testifies sufficiently to the fact that the Commission was more than free from any "influence" on the part of the Government. I was of opinion that even for the sake of its own dignity the Commission should not have allowed its individual members to reveal in their questions traces of the influence of that public opinion which was pro-Kornilovist.

I gave two more instructions to the Commission of Inquiry. In my telegram of the 2nd of September, No. 8887, addressed to the Chairman of the Commission, in which I referred to the inadmissibility of "influences," I instructed him to carry on the inquiry "in the most energetic manner and to finish it in the shortest term." The third and last instruction that was given by me to the Chairman of the Commission, verbally, was to the effect that the Commission of Inquiry should confine its work when dealing with the military element, to investigating, as far as possible, only the culpability of the chief participators. These two last instructions I gave because I considered it to be indispensable to paralyse within the shortest term the influence upon the army of what was probably the most terrible consequence of Kornilovism, viz. the revival

within the army of the distrust by the rank and file of the whole body of officers.]

### § 28

*Chairman.*—To come back to newspaper paragraphs: we have had no deposition by Alexeiev, whereas the newspapers mentioned an order given to Colonel Korotkov to take Mohilev. Was such an order given?

*Kerensky.*—Yes, it was like this: my plan, which happily was accomplished, consisted in settling the Kornilov episode as far as possible in a peaceful manner without any excesses. We summoned General Alexeiev, who undertook this most difficult mission. But precisely at that time we were besieged by a number of —

*Chairman.*—Of demands?

*Kerensky.*—Not only demands, but also items of information, which later proved to have been partly fanciful, such as Mohilev being surrounded by fortifications; artillery and machine guns being placed in position on the slopes of "Governor's Mount" and in the Governor's garden. Moreover, unauthorized detachments of troops began to arise everywhere, tending towards Mohilev in order to suppress Kornilov. Ultimately the Moscow Military District —

*Chairman.*—With regard to the movement of that echelon —

*Kerensky.*—The commander of the Moscow Military District, even after General Alexeiev had left for Headquarters, insisted most categorically that he should be allowed to move immediately a mixed detachment of infantry, artillery, and cavalry in the direction of Mohilev, and when Korotkov's detachment appeared at Orsha on its own initiative, I sent a telegram to Colonel Korotkov to the



effect that he should prepare and organize an offensive, but should only act in agreement with Alexeiev. In this way everything was brought into a certain shape.

*Chairman.*— So that all this movement of separate units, and particularly of the one organized by the Moscow Military District, was duly obeying the Provisional Government?

*Kerensky.*— We had to act cautiously in certain respects. Personally, I did not particularly believe all these items of information, but at any rate it was necessary to take all these rumours into account. Supposing we had not taken any measures, and afterwards these rumours had turned out to be true, I would then have definitely proved to be “a traitor and a counter-revolutionary.” The only thing that turned out to be true was that a state of siege had been proclaimed at Mohilev and that a rather serious state of terror had prevailed there. Kornilov declared outright that whoever was against him would be shot. Strictly speaking, this saves all the participators of the rebellion, since every one of them is now able to claim that he had been acting under the terror created at Mohilev.

[The peaceful settling of Kornilov's rebellion at Headquarters is one of those recollections which affords me the greatest moral satisfaction. Just as at the very outset of the Revolution, it became now necessary to protect at any cost the life of individuals from savage lynchings, and this I did. After some hesitation I insisted on General Alexeiev's acceptance of the post of Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander. In spite of all the irritation against Alexeiev in large democratic circles, notwithstanding his obstinate personal refusals for forty-eight hours, until the real correlation of forces had revealed itself, I kept on insisting on his accepting that office, as soon as I realized

that only Alexeiev, owing to his connections at Headquarters and to his enormous influence among the higher military circles, could carry out successfully the task of transferring the command painlessly into new hands from those of Kornilov. If I remember rightly, Alexeiev was summoned early in the morning of August 27th. That night he was already at Petrograd, and until the morning of August 30th he would not give any decisive reply to the offer made to him to take up the office of Chief of Staff. Meanwhile, time was passing; the question as to the Supreme Command remained obscure at Headquarters; in the very heart of the army there still remained Kornilov, continuing to issue technical orders. All this led to great nervousness among the masses, who had not yet recovered their senses from the panic that had seized them. On this ground, the disposition to start "by themselves" to "do away" with Kornilov was growing more rapidly from hour to hour, since the authorities either could not "clear him away" from Headquarters or were "in collusion" with him! The position was becoming truly critical since, not to mention any considerations of humanity and honour, it was impossible to permit the slightest interruption, and still less the shattering, of the work of Headquarters. The procrastination on one side and the nervous insistence on the other were becoming quite unbearable! I then had to take recourse to orders in the nature of an ultimatum towards those who were dilatory, at the same time restraining the nervous volunteers who were anxious to rush off to "suppress" Kornilov. I shall quote the Hughesogram sent on September 1st by the Chief of my Military Cabinet, Baranovsky, to Headquarters, which accurately describes the state of things at that time.

"A. F. Kerensky fixed for General Alexeiev the term of

two hours, which expired at 7.10 P. M., but there is no answer yet. The Commander-in-Chief [i.e. Kerensky] demands that General Kornilov and his accomplices should be arrested immediately, since any further delay would threaten innumerable calamities. The democracy is excited without measure, and keeps on threatening to break out with an explosion, the consequences of which it is not easy to foresee. Such an explosion in the shape of a move on the part of the Soviets and the Bolsheviki is expected, not only here at Petrograd, but also at Moscow and in other cities; at Omsk, the Commander of the troops has been arrested and the authority has passed to the Soviets. The circumstances are such that it is impossible to delay any longer; the alternative is either tardiness and the ruin of the whole work for saving the country, or immediate and resolute acts and the arrest of the persons pointed out to you. Then a struggle will still be possible. There is no other alternative, A. F. Kerensky expects that statesmanlike wisdom will prompt General Alexeiev's decision, and that he will arrive at it immediately: to arrest Kornilov and his accomplices. I am waiting at the apparatus for a quite definite and the only possible answer, to the effect that the persons who have participated in the revolt will be arrested. You ought to understand those political movements which arise from accusing the Government of inaction and connivance. It is impossible to talk any longer. It is necessary to make up one's mind and to act."

A little later there came the answer from General Alexeiev himself: "About 10 P. M., General Kornilov and the others were arrested."

At the same time General Verkhovsky, already Minister of War, requested me, and almost insisted on obtaining permission, to send a whole military expedition to Headquar-

ters, and forwarded the following telegram to Alexeiev:—

“I am starting today for Headquarters with a large armed detachment for the purpose of making an end to that mockery of common sense which is still taking place. Kornilov and the others (whose names follow) must be immediately arrested; this is the purpose of my journey, which I consider to be quite indispensable.”

The excessive nervousness and aggressive tone of Verkhovsky may perhaps be partly explained by the conversations which he had held on August 24th at Headquarters, as well as by the telegram No. 6457 which he had received on August 27th from General Kornilov to the following effect: “At the present threatening moment, for the sake of avoiding civil war and not to give rise to bloodshed in the streets of Moscow, I instruct you to subordinate yourself to me and to carry out my orders henceforth.”

To Verkhovsky's repeated inquiries, as well as to those of Colonel Korotkov, I kept on enjoining upon them “to make ready,” but not to start without my permission. Only with the greatest effort and by using all my influence and persistence, I managed to avert possible complications at Headquarters. Of course, in General Alexeiev's depositions all this striving of volunteers towards Headquarters is transformed into some “ill will” which wanted at any price “to push troops against Mohilev.” It is not difficult to guess where General Alexeiev is looking for the source of that ill will! Well, no matter. Anyhow, General Alexeiev carried out the task of settling the matter at Headquarters with which he had been entrusted. A prolonged co-operation was impossible for both of us. Alexeiev tendered his resignation, which I accepted without raising objections.

Meanwhile, I cannot help remembering that while I was

Generalissimo General Kornilov was constantly guarded, throughout his detention at the Bykhov prison, not only by soldiers, but also by his personal escort of Tekinians, the very same with whom, and with their machine guns, he had come to me at the Winter Palace. Such a double guard was instituted by the Chairman of the Commission of Inquiry, not only to prevent Kornilov from escaping, but also to protect him from being lynched by the soldiers. I well remember how fiercely I was attacked for it by the Press of the Left, and how the future conniver at the savage lynching of N. N. Dukhonin, General Bonch-Bruyevich, appeared before me at the head of a deputation from the local Soviet with the demand "to remove the Tekinians from Bykhov," as the revolutionary garrison did not trust them, and to strengthen the guard over Kornilov. I felt indignant at such behaviour on the part of a general of the Russian Army who had been in the past one of the most faithful servants of Tsardom, and wanted to remove him from Headquarters, while I also recollect how the honest Dukhonin interceded for him. Such is fate!]

### § 29

*Chairman.*—I have no general questions to ask. Perhaps my colleagues have some questions?

*Kolokolov.*—I have questions.

*Kerensky.*—I wish to accompany my deposition by a general conclusion. I think it will prove very difficult and perhaps impossible for the Commission of Inquiry to establish the actual trend of the events, and the very persons who took part in organizing the Kornilov movement. This is indeed partly the fault of the administration and of our Government, that, owing to the absence of a detective de-

partment, we are unable to furnish you with such materials, which the old *régime* could have supplied you with. We are unable to produce them. But personally, I have no doubt whatever that behind Kornilov there was at work a quite definite group of persons, not only united together for the preparation of the planned conspiracy, but also in possession of *large financial means and in a position to draw amounts from the banks. For me there is no doubt whatever about this.*

[General Alexeiev's famous letter to Miliukov of September 12th, which was published on December 12, 1917, in No. 249 of the *Izvestia* of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of the Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, has transformed this subjective conviction of mine, which was not binding upon anybody, into a visible matter of fact which nobody will be able to deny. The main purpose of General Alexeiev's letter claimed to be that of drawing the attention of the "honest Press" to the terrible position of the "apparent participators in the conspiracy" who had been arrested in connection with the Kornilov case and whom the "invisible participators in the conspiracy," the "masters of the destinies" and the "wirepullers of the inquiry," wanted to commit for trial before the most primitive of all tribunals, a revolutionary court-martial, with its inevitable death sentence. The purpose of such wicked actions on the part of the "masters of the destinies" the General explains very simply: "The crime of Kornilov was no secret to the members of the Government. This question had been discussed with Savinkov and Filonenko and *through them* with Kerensky. Only a primitive revolutionary court-martial could hush up the participation of these persons in the preliminary negotiations and agreements. Savinkov has already had to confess

it in the Press. . . . Kerensky's participation is *indisputable*."

First of all, General Alexeiev ought to have started, not merely by asserting, but by proving that very "through them with Kerensky," since up to that moment nobody in the world, apart from General Alexeiev, had known anything about that "through." Secondly, neither before nor after September 12th has Savinkov ever "confessed himself" in the Press as guilty of the conspiracy, but only referred to those actual negotiations and agreements which Kornilov did not keep, and which had nothing to do with Kornilov's move. On what other ground does General Alexeiev base his assertion of my "indisputable" participation? On the movement of the 3rd Cavalry Corps headed by Krimov; on Kornilov's telegram No. 6394 sent to Savinkov on the night of August 27th at 2:30 A. M., concerning the establishment of martial law at Petrograd; and, lastly, on Lukomsky's telegram No. 6406, referring to an offer made to General Kornilov "in my name" by Savinkov and Lvov. That is all. To anybody who has made himself acquainted with this deposition of mine and with my explanations to the same, it must be clear, I think, that it is quite impossible to prove by that evidence my participation in the conspiracy, unless one is to place an intentionally false interpretation on the facts. General Alexeiev could neither ignore the story of the Krimov corps nor the real meaning of Lukomsky's telegram, nor lastly the true reasons for summoning the troops for the disposal of the Provisional Government, since all the documents required for ascertaining the truth were accessible to him in his capacity of Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. In any case, early in September, when he was drafting his confidential denunciation, he had the opportunity of

receiving every explanation he might have required both from the Chairman of the Commission of Inquiry and from myself in person.

According to him, "the invisible participators want to destroy the apparent ones," whom those *who knew everything are bound* to save. Who are they? Alexeiev writes thus:—

"The Kornilov affair was not the act of a handful of adventurers; it was supported by the sympathy and assistance of large circles among our intellectuals. . . . You, Pavel Nikolaevitch (i.e. Miliukov), are aware to *some extent* that certain circles of our public not only *knew about everything*, and not only sympathized with the idea, but helped Kornilov as far as they could. . . . I have another request; I do not know the address of Messrs. V., P., *and others*. The families of the imprisoned officers are beginning to starve. . . . It is my instant request that they should come to their assistance. Surely, they are not going to leave to their fate and to starvation the families of those to whom they were united by the community of ideas and *preparations*. I beg you most instantly to take that work upon yourself and to let me know the result. In that matter we officers are more than interested."

The whole tenor of Alexeiev's letter would still not have constituted any serious indication of anybody's participation in the Kornilov conspiracy, especially when one takes into consideration General Alexeiev's extreme licence in dealing with facts. This "request," however, to render assistance and to start an immediate campaign in favour of the accused in the columns of the "honest Press" was accompanied by an addition which is fatal for those whom he had in view: "In that case [i.e. if Alexeiev's request is not immediately complied with.—A. K.], General Kornilov will be



*compelled* to unfold extensively before the court all the preparations, *all the negotiations with persons and bodies, as well as their participation*, in order to show the Russian people with whom he was acting, what were the real aims he was pursuing, and how at the critical moment, *abandoned* by all, he appeared with a small number of officers before a hurried tribunal. . . . This is the substance of my appeal to you."

When one is not in possession of any weighty proofs, even blackmailers do not accompany appeals for assistance by such unequivocal threats of exposure! I shall not touch upon the moral side of such a method of appealing, especially as General Alexeiev was evidently better acquainted with the *milieu* he was addressing than myself. At any rate, in the *Retch* of December 13, 1917, the writer of the leading article is of opinion that Alexeiev's letter contains nothing of a compromising nature, and that "it reflects the extraordinary purity and nobility of its author." Indeed, there are various conceptions of nobility and purity! The writer of that leading article makes haste, of course, to identify himself with "Alexeiev's perfectly correct view on Kerensky's double position" in the Kornilov affair. I shall not follow, in their methods of political warfare, either Alexeiev or the organ of Miliukov; I repeat once more that the letter of Alexeiev, which is so fatal for the participators and organizers of the Kornilov move, should under no circumstances be taken advantage of as an instrument for combating whole parties and groups of the population.]

### § 30

*Liber.*—Only one question, Alexander Feodorovitch. When the Government was about to establish martial law

at Petrograd, did it not consider that it might meet with opposition, or at any rate with a sharply negative attitude on the part of the Soviets, and if so, did it not intend to take some measures of precaution?

*Kerensky.*—I may say that if within the Government the Bolsheviks were spoken about, there were no conversations whatever about the Soviets, which at that time were *far from being Bolshevik*, or about the Central Executive Committee.

*Liber.*—I must say definitely that according to Savinkov's evidence this consideration has played a great part. He states positively that one might have expected opposition precisely on the part of the Soviet, and if such a supposition could be entertained, then the presence of a corps would come useful in such an emergency as well. It is of importance to us to establish whether the Government has been discussing such a contingency or not.

[In order to make clear the kind of opposition on the part of the Soviets to which Savinkov had referred, I quote the corresponding extract from the minutes composed by Generals Kornilov, Lukomsky, and Romanovsky, "About the stay of the Deputy Minister of War at Mohilev during the 23rd and the 24th of August." These minutes were drafted subsequently to August 27th, and consequently under conditions most favourable for setting out the words of Savinkov as near as possible to the intentions of Headquarters. According to these minutes, Savinkov said to Kornilov: "You know, of course, that approximately on the 28th or 29th of August a Bolshevik move is expected at Petrograd. The publication of your demands carried out through the Provisional Government would of course serve as an impulse for the Bolsheviks to make their move, if for some reason or another they might otherwise have had to

postpone it. Though we have enough troops at our disposal, we cannot altogether count upon them, all the more so as we do not know yet what will be the attitude of the Soviet of the Soldiers' and Workmen's Deputies towards the new law. The Soviet might also prove to be against the Government, and in such case we could not count upon our troops. If, besides the Bolsheviks, the members of the Soviet of the Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies should also come out, we would have to act against them as well."

Even from the above exposé of Savinkov's words, it is clear that he was only speaking of the Soviets conjecturally, with regard to their attitude to the future law, which at that time had not been discussed by the Provisional Government. But seeing that within the Provisional Government there were representatives of the Central Executive Committee of the Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, it is evident that even this hypothetical contingency was an impossibility, since either the Military Bill would have been adopted in a shape acceptable to the whole of the Coalition, and consequently to the Soviets as well, or the Coalition Government would have ceased to exist before the adoption of the Bill.

When Savinkov came to know about these minutes which had been drawn up *post factum* and in his absence, he made the following note on the text of the same: "I never used such words as 'the demands of General Kornilov'; nor did it ever occur to me that the Soviets of the Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies would be certain to act against the Provisional Government should disorders arise. I persisted in the argument that the 3rd Cavalry Corps I was asking for from the Commander-in-Chief, at the request of the Premier, should be placed at the disposal of the Provisional Government to defend the Government against any

hostilities, no matter from what quarter. If at the moment of a Bolshevik rising the Soviets of the Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies should happen to be Bolshevik, then the 3rd Cavalry Corps would be used against those Soviets as well."]

*Kerensky.*— You will perceive by the composition of the Government that there could not have been any conversation about the Central Executive Committee of the Soldiers' and Workmen's Deputies, nor about the Soviet as such. Nor had it ever been intended to establish martial law in such forms as might be odious to public opinion at large. Lastly, if any conversations concerning the Bolsheviks did occur (as you know, there were rumours in circulation as to the possibility of a repetition of the events of the 3rd–5th of July), it was assumed that the Bolsheviks would stand on one side, *while the whole country would stand on the other side* (against them).

### § 31

*Kolokolov.*— Allow me to put a question. You have stated, sir, that there is no evidence of a nature to establish with complete exactitude the existence of a conspiracy; still, have you any grounds, the verification of which might be necessary for the Commission of Inquiry?

*Kerensky.*— I can only tell you to ask M. T. Terestchenko, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, whether he recollects a conversation he repeated to me, in which Zavoiko had been speaking of the means "they" had at their disposal for overthrowing the Government.

[During my wanderings after the 25th of October, I met a person who told me that he had certain knowledge of similar conversations held by Zavoiko at the beginning of last year.]

I must say, however, that at present it is very difficult generally to give information. From the very moment of the Revolution, people have quite ceased to distinguish in our persons the Government from private individuals: any information we possess in our capacity as members of the Government very rapidly becomes the property of the man in the street, and is turned into a means of settling personal accounts, or into demands for proofs on the part of the persons interested, and so on. With regard to a conspiracy's being organized by a group of military men, of officers, we had very exact information, and we were watching its participators as far as we could do so. The Kornilov events have shown that we did know something. A portion of the Council of the Union of the Cossack Armies possessed, moreover, a great deal of "information" as well. I have no doubt whatever about that, too; but there again the thing cannot yet be proved formally, and so on. For many considerations, however, it is not desirable to carry on an investigation in that direction (among the military) at present; and this for the simple reason that its results would be a poor compensation for its inevitable consequences, to judge by the present temper of the masses. We do not wish, and I am personally averse from it, to provide new occasions for strife between various groups of the population, since *a group, as such, is not responsible for the acts of individual persons.*

*Kolokolov.*—What were your grounds for arresting Lvov?

*Kerensky.*—It was quite clear to me from the whole conversation that he knew much more than he was saying. I took it that he was warning me at the last moment of the danger to my person, either because he had simply got frightened or, perhaps, because his conscience had spoken.

After all, he had experienced nothing but good treatment from me. But the mood in which he retired from the Provisional Government pointed to the possibility of his having gone against me from the outset. Then again, how about Aladin? I am not sure whether you are aware of Aladin's visit to Prince G. E. Lvov at Moscow. Just before V. N. Lvov called on me, Virubov informed me, on behalf of Prince G. E. Lvov, that Aladin had called on the Prince, to whom he said quite seriously: "Let Kerensky bear in mind that henceforward there must be no changes within the Government without the consent of Headquarters." This had made an impression on the Prince. Now, with regard to agrarian reform. I was aware that they were engaged in preparing an agrarian manifesto or law; I forget the name of that Professor from Moscow.

*Chairman.*—Y——v.

*Kerensky.*—All this goes to confirm that preparations were going on.

*Ukrainsev.*—Coming to your statement that on the question of the conspiracy you had a "whole reel" of information from two sources, one of which was trustworthy, while the other was not reliable, could you not let us have it? This would enable us to find out the conspiracy.

*Kerensky.*—No. I may repeat that one set of information came from the agents and the other from the counter-espionage. There was also a third source, and subsequently a fourth one. I handed over that officer to the Intelligence Department. What was his name, though? Oh, yes, V——in. He had also come to warn me that I was threatened by an imminent —

*Ukrainsev.*—Was it not the same officer who used to move in Cossack circles and who denounced Zavoiko?

*Kerensky.*—Yes. About Zavoiko unfavourable news

reached us long before. He is altogether a man with a rather queer past. His stay and the part he played at Headquarters were strange and unintelligible. Still, that was the man *who exercised the greatest influence* upon General Kornilov. At the South-western front, Savinkov had once succeeded in removing him from there, as Zavoiko's influence was already injurious at the time. But he afterwards returned, and was, moreover, joined by Aladin.

[On his relations to Zavoiko, General Kornilov's evidence was to the following effect : —

“ I made the acquaintance of V. S. Zavoiko in April last at Petrograd. According to the information in my possession, he was a few years ago the Marshal of Nobility of the Haysin district, in the Government of Podolia. He had been working at the naphtha mines round Baku, and, as he told me, was engaged in exploring the mineral resources of Turkestan and Western Siberia. In the month of May he arrived at Tchernovitsy and, after having joined as a volunteer the Daguestan cavalry regiment, he remained at the Staff of the army in the capacity of my personal orderly. He wields the pen with perfection. I therefore entrusted him with the drafting of those orders and documents that required a particularly vigorous and artistic style.”

I have had to refer more than once to the proclamation “To the Russian People,” which is a splendid specimen, not only of the artistic style, but also of the cunning hands of Zavoiko. It may be seen from all the circumstances of the case that the position of Zavoiko, in the circles near to Kornilov, had nothing to do with his modest function of orderly. His past as a financier evidently stood Zavoiko in good stead in the way of promoting the flow of those means to Headquarters about which information could be imparted by V. and P., who are mentioned in General Alexeiev's let-

ter, as well as by the editors of several newspapers and leaflets which were baiting me so strenuously throughout the summer and glorifying General Kornilov. Zavoiko is one of the shadiest and most repulsive figures among the conspirators, and it is difficult to understand wherein lay the secret of his influence upon Kornilov.]

### § 32

*Ukrainitsev.*— You stated, among other things, that an offer of a dictatorship was made to you, and that you afterwards met the same persons among those by whom Kornilov was surrounded. Who were those persons?

*Kerensky.*— Conversations of that kind emanated from the same Cossack circles. Then, some public men —

*Ukrainitsev.*— This means that you are able to point out the circles, but no single person?

*Kerensky.*— I should not care to point them out.

*Krokhmal.*— But this did not bear the shape of a formal offer; it was, so to say, in the nature of advice?

*Kerensky.*— They would introduce it in this way: "If you were to agree, we should . . ." and so on. But it always fell on fruitless soil. Let us leave them alone!

*Ukrainitsev.*— In that case, it may be that the very offers did not bear the character of a concrete proposition?

*Kerensky.*— No; when this "public opinion" became disappointed with me as a possible organizer and chief worker for a change in the system of Government in the direction of a "strong authority," they then started to look out for another "man." I consider that the longing for finding a *man* was very strong. Even on August 26th, V. Lvov thus expressed himself when conversing with somebody:



"He would not agree to be a dictator, so we *shall give him one!*"

*Liber.*—Has it been reported to you that on the question you are referring to, and which was then being discussed, Kerensky, Savinkov, and Kornilov were named as candidates?

*Kerensky.*—Yes. Generally speaking, they were feeling the ground. After my refusal, some of them thought that the best I could do was "to get away," "not to interfere," and "not to shuffle the cards." Though they themselves were predicting that my retirement would be followed by a period of Bolshevik violence, they were nevertheless of opinion that this would afford them an opportunity of triumphing in the end. Kornilov was simply the unsuccessful executor of other people's plans, for in order to create a real dictatorship in Russia, one had to possess not only the "heart of a lion," but also some intellectual qualities which are neither given to all nor frequently to be met with.

[General Kornilov's personal qualities rendered his whole attempt to establish in Russia a personal dictatorship too naïve and thoughtless for it to be able to count upon even a momentary success. But even any other adventure, conceived more seriously and carried out more intelligently, would inevitably have come to the same end, after a more or less prolonged period of struggle; or it would itself have finally broken up the State and opened the gates to the Germans, as was actually done two months after Kornilov by the anarchist Bolsheviks, who were politically more experienced and clever. The tragedy of the position of Russia at the end of the summer of 1917 lay precisely in its not having yet attained such political maturity as would have afforded to its leading political circles the possibility of realizing to the very end and of carrying through the

*only* system of organizing the State authority which alone could still have stopped the threatening process of the collapse of the State, which had commenced together with the world-war, viz. the system of coalitions between all the political parties that were holding to the idea of a State, in order to create a common national Government. The condition of the economic organism and of the technical apparatus of the State had made it impossible to govern the country during war by the strength of any minority whatsoever, which is always and inevitably reduced to applying political terror as the sole means of keeping the majority in subjection. The stern reality which showed imperatively to all the conscious and responsible elements of the country the only way for saving the State, by subordinating all the interests and claims of the different classes and strata of the population to the needs of the State, united all those elements willy-nilly round the Provisional Government. Any minority that made up its mind to combat the Government would necessarily be found in the end to be in alliance either with the home-grown reaction or with its variety from across the frontier. We have seen what equivocal elements, in both the political and the social sense, were surrounding Kornilov. More recently we have seen something still worse: we have seen how the only "Communists" in the world have saved Prussian Junkerdom, to whom they have enslaved, both politically and economically, the Russian toiling masses!

Unfortunately, the leading political circles, which could not help recognizing that the coalition was indispensable, did not support it *actively and fairly*. They were only rather afraid to take upon themselves the political responsibility for the formal collapse of that system, while in their own mind they were waiting for a "saviour," whom some ex-

pected from the Right and others from the Left. In their "joyless love" of the Coalition they were dreaming of a "painless parting."<sup>1</sup> They were waiting all the time for the moment when I should "leave" at last, while they themselves would not let me go, as they were afraid of the responsibility. But while retaining me, they wanted somebody to come and overthrow me, in the hope of taking advantage of somebody else's crime for their own political interests. From October 24th to November 1st I observed that trembling expectation among my "friends" of the Left, just as I had noticed the same trembling expectancy in the Kornilov days among some of the "adherents of the Coalition" on the Right. Those who accuse me of not having "left" in time, and of having somehow stood in somebody's way, ought to remember once for all that I never sought power, nor did I hold on to it. I only interfered with usurpers and adventurers. Politically responsible circles, far from meeting with an impediment on my part, had they wished to form a Government without me, received repeated proposals from me to do so. Even a month before the Bolshevik rising, at a secret session of the Bureau of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of the Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, jointly with the Presidium of the Democratic Conference and the representatives of all the Socialist parties, including the Bolsheviks, I raised the question as to the attitude of those present towards the Government, and declared that on my part I would do everything that was possible for the painless and rapid transition of the State to a new system of Government, if those attending the meeting would take upon themselves the responsibility for dissolving the coalition with the propertied

<sup>1</sup> "Their love was joyless; their parting will be painless." (From Russian poetry.)

classes and point out a person willing to accept the task of forming a newly composed Provisional Government, as I personally could not carry out the task conscientiously. But the meeting did not prove sufficiently resolute and bold to undertake the responsibility for all the consequences of creating a "homogeneous Government." At the last Conference of the Social Revolutionary Party, one member of its Central Committee put the matter thus:—

"When one considers the helpless condition in which the democracy found itself (after the Democratic Conference), it will be perceived that it had not the strength for organizing the Government in any other way than by handing it over to Kerensky. The conclusion to be drawn from it comes to this: a sacrifice had to be made to the belief of the masses that it was possible to do everything, whereas really it is impossible to do everything. Still, that sacrifice was needed. We accordingly sacrificed Kerensky, who put up with being the victim, well knowing what was in store for him."

This was not, however, a sacrifice, but the conscious execution of one's duty to the very end. I saw that nobody was willing honestly to support that form of Government by which alone it would be possible to preserve the State from falling to pieces. But I could not, to save my own skin, meet the elemental force half-way and bring the explosion nearer, even by a single day, through my retirement. Moreover, in my heart there was still a glimmer of hope that the democracy would prove able to overcome all that is dark and brutish in itself!]

### § 33

*Ukrainitsev.*—In describing the conversation with V. Lvov, you mentioned that he made a proposal in the form

of an ultimatum; but have you not noticed that in his written report he had replaced the phrase "General Kornilov demands" by "General Kornilov *proposes*"?

*Kerensky*.—If I had noticed it, I should have said to him: "Write it down just as you said it." But I merely folded the paper and put it in my pocket.

[Strictly speaking, there is no difference whatever between "Kornilov demands" or "proposes" this or that. A proposal may be in the nature of an ultimatum, as a proposal is frequently merely a more delicate form of a demand or an order. I myself used often to write: "I propose to So-and-So to do this."]

*Ukrainsev*.—You only paid attention to the points?

*Kerensky*.—Yes, just to the points, and then I put it in my pocket. The very circumstances of the conversation were so convincing to me. Indeed, I never dreamt at the time that public opinion would ever see fit to make me out a sort of accomplice of the Kornilov conspiracy or of a rather unintelligible and equivocal personage. Had I been able to foresee anything of the kind, I should perhaps have arranged everything quite differently on that particular evening. But, at any rate, I consider that I did all that was essential by nipping the attempt in the bud with extraordinary rapidity.

*Ukrainsev*.—Were you in possession of any information to the effect that General Kornilov had precisely charged the 3rd Corps with an attack against the Provisional Government, or was such an attack only discerned in the movement upon Petrograd?

*Kerensky*.—No, I discerned it in the position that was occupied by Krimov, and also in the fact that, contrary to the decision arrived at, the "Savage Division" was on its way to Petrograd. All their calculations were generally

based on the "Savage Division." It seems to me that Lvov has simply exploded the whole thing. He perhaps let the cat out of the bag a day or two too early [or blabbed out more and in a different tone than he ought to have done]. Had Krimov's detachment managed to get here, it would not have proved so easy to dispose of it, seeing that in such a case there would *have come into play those forces that were waiting here for events to develop*, that is to say, those messengers who had gathered here, and those groups which had been organized for the purpose of rendering aid at the right moment *from the rear*.

*Ukrainsev.*—Did you have the impression from Savinkov's report on army reforms that greater importance was attributed to them from a general political point of view than from the purely military one?

*Kerensky.*—On August 10th, I accepted Savinkov's resignation because I considered his report to be an unwarranted act on the part of a man whom I had myself put into a responsible post. I was set before an accomplished fact.

It is altogether evident that Savinkov wanted at all costs to unite me and Kornilov in spite of ourselves. It seems to me that Savinkov and Filonenko had been taken advantage of in the whole affair. Savinkov never aspired at doing away with the Provisional Government or with myself. He never had such a plan. But he imagined himself to be the cleverest of all, whereas in reality there were people found who outwitted him. He was only an instrument that was made to do its share in the work that was carried on round Kornilov.

[In his deposition Savinkov confirmed my conjectures, when he said: "Though I witnessed all these increasingly strained relations, I did not give up the hope that, by working together, A. F. Kerensky and General Kornilov would

manage to realize a firm revolutionary Government, and I *endeavoured* with all my strength to *bring about a rapprochement* between A. F. Kerensky and General Kornilov.”]

*Ukrainsev.*— One more question concerning the conversation that took place on returning from Headquarters after the Conference of July 16th. Did not Filonenko propose the formation of a special War Cabinet within the Provisional Government?

*Kerensky.*— Not to my recollection. I had no conversations whatever with him. I remember the conversation held here on August 29th. As I said before, Filonenko was indeed endeavouring, with the help of Savinkov, to transform the conversation held at Headquarters about a dictatorship into one which might be represented as dealing with a subject which had also been talked about within the Provisional Government, viz. a War Cabinet. But the one was as distant from the other as heaven from earth, and they had nothing in common between them. One must be, or pretend to be, an idiot to suggest seriously that either the Provisional Government or myself could ever think of Filonenko as a possible member of the Provisional Government. It is not only an absurd, but a ridiculous supposition! It was merely an awkward expedient for getting out of a foolish position. I repeat once more that Filonenko did have a conversation with Kornilov, but that it had nothing to do with a “War Cabinet.”

*Chairman.*— Allow me to thank you, sir, for your evidence.

[Whoever reads my evidence to the end will understand what a will and what a degree of faith in the final triumph of truth one had to possess in order *silently* to bear all the furious baiting that was going on. To look on in silence

while the poison of doubt was penetrating ever deeper into the very masses of the people, severing one by one my close relations with them; to see how even the most conscious circles of democracy were unable to grasp the reasons for the Government's silence, which they mistook for a confirmation of "revelations" that had produced the impression of convincing "internal evidence." (I quote from resolutions of the Bureau of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of the Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies of September 12th.)

Who has raised his voice in the defence of the men who were being hunted down with impunity, merely because, in the fulfilment of their duty to the State and to the public, they kept silent, bound as they were by the secrecy of the Inquiry, which was shamelessly broken by the others? It is only now that I have obtained the possibility to put in my word.

Too late, as it seems. The work has been done.

The words I uttered at the Moscow Conference have turned out to be true: "If the people should prove short of sense and conscience, then the Russian State will perish, flooded by a wave of collapse, disintegration, and treachery."

And the people newly born to freedom, so great in the past, but now deceived and degraded, is dancing and grimacing in a repulsive fool's cap before its cruel master of Berlin.

But do not lose heart! Do not curse the popular masses; do not desert them. Go to the people with words of *stern truth*; rouse its slumbering conscience, and, sooner than you think, its manliness will revive and rekindle the sacrificial flame of its love of Motherland and Freedom!



## KERENSKY AND KORNILOV

### A REPLY

I MUST commence my observations on Mr. Wilcox's articles "Kerensky and Kornilov" in the September and October issues of the *Fortnightly Review* with a short introduction which is called for by some of his concluding words. On page 517 he says: "True, the chain of evidence is not yet complete. One of the chief witnesses has yet to be heard — Kerensky. So far he has withheld from publication his version of the affair, but by doing so he has left uncontradicted statements by his own colleagues and agents gravely impugning his constancy, stability, and consistency — not to say more! Perhaps he will now speak out and fill up the only serious gap that still remains in the story of the Kornilov affair." This only serious gap has long since been filled; my version of the Kornilov affair was published in Russia in June of this year. Immediately upon my arrival in England I took steps to prepare an English translation of my book on the Kornilov affair, and if this English version has not yet seen the light it is only because serious obstacles have crossed its path which could hardly have been expected in free England. However, this English version is due to appear in the near future, and this circumstance allows me to make my remarks about Mr. Wilcox's articles quite short and without detailed arguments.

I do not think there is any need for me to explain why I was silent as long as I was in power, and before the Bol-

sheviks' *coup de main* destroyed the possibility of General Kornilov being brought to trial. The Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Armies commits a grave crime of State at the climax of the war; he endeavours to compel the Government by force of arms to "carry out his program," *i.e.*, he openly attempts an armed rising against the governmental authorities of his country. After the failure of this attempt, the Provisional Government appointed a Special Commission of Inquiry to examine the circumstances of the affair and to bring to trial the General who had overstepped his duty, as well as his accomplices. Was it possible for me, the Prime Minister of the Provisional Government and the principal witness in the affair, to infringe the secrecy of the preliminary legal investigation and to announce before the trial my own opinion and my evidence about the affair? Of course not; silence before the trial is the elementary duty of all witnesses, and it was thus that every witness in the Kornilov affair behaved who was not interested in hiding the truth of the matter. But besides this last section of witnesses there were the accused and those who had participated too closely with them, and finally the accomplices of General Kornilov who remained at liberty outside the scope of the inquiry. Some of this group of people who were implicated in the Kornilov affair organized a Press campaign, systematically working upon public opinion for their own purpose. With this aim they at various times published parts of the materials from the inquiry, which were favourable to them, largely declarations of the accused and of witnesses who had grounds for fearing that they, too, would be accused; occasionally they even resorted to falsification. As far as I remember rightly, the President of the Extraordinary Commission of Inquiry into the Kornilov affair had twice to warn public opinion about the necessity of refraining from

all judgment and declarations about the affair until the trial. However, the more than biased campaign in the Press continued. But the Government did not resort to reprisals upon those organs of the Press which so rudely abused the young freedom of speech in Russia. The Government considered that a public and independent trial would be the best answer to this campaign of calumny; and that this trial, better than any repressions, would teach the need to use properly the liberty of the Press. But the anarchy which has temporarily enveloped Russia destroyed the possibility of a legal trial in the Kornilov affair. Hence the biased and lying information which had been published in the Press became for the time being the sole source of information about the Kornilov affair both in Russia and in all the rest of Europe.

I make these introductory remarks in order to show whence these fictions arise which are being circulated in all directions as the truth about the circumstances of Kornilov's rebellion and in order to emphasize that, while I shall set out the principal inaccuracies of Mr. Wilcox, I do not wish to cast any doubts whatsoever upon the mistaken good faith of their author.

It is to be confessed, however, that under the influence of the biased materials at his disposal, Mr. Wilcox has been drawn so strongly to the side of his hero — Kornilov — that he has sometimes been ready even to some extent to "correct" the facts if these did not fit in his scheme of events which is so well disposed towards General Kornilov; but of this I shall speak later.

Mr. Wilcox commences his article with the words: "Kerensky's open conflict with Kornilov" (thus he strangely terms General Kornilov's rising against the Provisional Government) "was the final turning point of the Russian Revolution." With this I am wholly in agreement. I agree also

that "From that moment the triumph of Bolshevism and the dissolution of Russia into primeval chaos became inevitable. The Brest treaties, with all they have meant for the Allies, followed as a matter of course, and, for that reason, probably no other single event has had so decisive an influence on the course of the war as the Kerensky-Kornilov imbroglio." Mr. Wilcox continues: "It is, therefore, of considerable importance that we should understand the true meaning of this incident, and be able justly to apportion the responsibility for the disastrous consequences that issued from it."

Mr. Wilcox's whole article, indeed, is an attempt to find this true meaning of the events in order to be able justly to apportion the responsibility, and certainly the true meaning of the events in Mr. Wilcox's version inevitably leads to the complete vindication of General Kornilov, and the whole responsibility for the disastrous consequences justly falls upon his opponents, and chiefly upon me. It cannot be otherwise; by the use of data collected with a previously determined purpose by people who are interested in hiding the truth, one cannot find the truth.

But I am not writing now in order to establish the truth; my task is much more modest. I wish only to show by a few examples the complete inaccuracy of the information upon which Mr. Wilcox founds his "true meaning of this incident." If I succeed in showing this, there will be exposed the complete contradiction between the events as set out by Mr. Wilcox and what actually took place; and if this contradiction is established, any conclusions whatever about the just apportioning of responsibility on the basis of Mr. Wilcox's historical study will be clearly quite impossible. Thus, in commenting on Mr. Wilcox's article, I am setting myself a quite negative task.

Turning to the facts, I must say that it is quite impossible not only to deal with, but even to note all the divergencies from facts of which the articles are full. For this it would be necessary for me to write whole series of articles. I shall, therefore, mention only the chief ones.

The first article in the September issue is of an introductory character. Indeed, it sets out facts which have very little connection with the history of Kornilov's conspiracy. In it Mr. Wilcox writes of the circumstances of Savinkov's acquaintance with General Kornilov, of their activities on the South-Western front, of the reformatory work of Savinkov and Kornilov, and of the fate of their memoranda. All these facts precede the rising only in point of time, but they have no internal connection with it whatever. The reformist activities of Kornilov and Savinkov and the conspirative work of Kornilov and Zavoiko, Krimov, and the others, are two quite separate processes, only parallel in time. To prove this, it is enough to say that not only was Savinkov not an accomplice in the conspiracy, but, as will be seen later, the conspirators actually deceived him at the critical moment. However, the history of Savinkov's acquaintance with Filonenko and Kornilov on the South-Western front, their mutual relations, the appointment of Kornilov as Commander-in-Chief, his journey to Petrograd with his memorandum to the Provisional Government, in short, all what happened before the Moscow conference, has a great psychological significance. In his exposition Mr. Wilcox continually assures his reader that everything good that was done in the Russian Army in the summer of last year, and all the initiative for reforms, all the attempts to improve the fighting capacity of the Russian troops and to save the front from disaster were entirely the work of Savinkov and Filonenko; and chiefly of Kornilov and his

party. On the other hand, all the events which serve as a kind of prologue to the tragic history of September 8th-12th are made to create the conviction in the mind of the reader that Kerensky and his friends were the whole time applying the brake to the reformers' great undertakings, and that Kerensky was wavering the whole time, so to speak, between good and evil, and only after the Moscow conference did he wish to enter on the path of good, *i.e.*, to come over to the side of Kornilov's party — alas! only in order once more and for the last time to betray this party — by his weakness, at best — and consequently the task of saving the country also.

Unfortunately lack of space prevents me from analysing the opening portion of Mr. Wilcox's work, and from showing fact by fact that his exposition does not correspond with reality. All his first article is artificially connected by Mr. Wilcox with the events of September 8th-12th by the following phrase: —

“When Kerensky returned to Petrograd on August 30th from the Moscow Congress he had perceptibly inclined to the side of the Kornilov party, for he asked Savinkov to continue in office as Acting Minister of War and withdrew his demand for the resignation of the Headquarters Commissary, Filonenko. He also acknowledged that in principle he was in agreement with Kornilov's recommendations, and instructed Savinkov to have the Bills embodying them finally revised and prepared for submission to the Cabinet.”

I will commence my examination of Mr. Wilcox's articles with this. It is true that after the Moscow Conference I altered my instructions about Savinkov's resignation and instructed him to complete his preparations for changes at the Ministry of War, but this was not at all because I had “perceptibly inclined” to the side of the Kornilov party, but from

quite different motives. On August 31st, *i.e.*, immediately after the Moscow Conference, Savinkov made the following announcement in the Press: "I may inform you that I am remaining at the head of affairs in the War Office, . . . and by Kerensky's instructions I can again work in complete agreement with him to bring to life that program which he indicated in some passages of his speech at the Moscow Conference, and with which I and the Commander-in-Chief, General Kornilov, are wholly in agreement. . . . It would be a mistake to think that I had proposed to impede the functions of the Army organizations, and the news to that effect which appeared in the Press is absolutely incorrect. . . . Neither I nor General Kornilov ever proposed anything of the sort. Like A. F. Kerensky, we stood for the preservation and strengthening of the Army organizations." It is clear from this statement that Savinkov was remaining at his post after the Moscow Conference only because he had promised beforehand to work in full agreement with me. And thus after the Moscow Conference not only did I not incline to the side of the Kornilov party, but Savinkov's and Kornilov's paths also completely separated. Savinkov returned to his work at the Ministry, where he fully completed his preparations for the projects of Army reforms which had been initiated in the War Office on my instructions long before Savinkov took charge there or Kornilov was appointed Commander-in-Chief. Savinkov, on the one hand, went to Headquarters on September 3rd with these projects to the conference which had been arranged there of the representatives of the War Office with the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, the Commissaries at the Front, and the representatives of the elective Army organizations. The Commander-in-Chief, on the other hand, and his party, *i.e.*, the group of conspirators, to which Savin-

kov had never belonged, were steadily engaged in preparing their rebellion. And as it happened those further *decisive* steps which, according to Mr. Wilcox, were taken by me two days after my return from the Moscow Conference in the same direction, *i.e.*, in the direction of the Kornilov party, were in fact in part directly aimed at liquidating the anti-Governmental movement which had grown up, and were partly called for by the necessity of guarding the Capital and the Provisional Government from all surprises from the Right and from the Left.

I need not tell here how already at the beginning of the year there had sprung up in certain circles of Russian society a notion of strong authority, and how a whole tendency in favour of a military dictatorship had gradually been organized and had spread, and how on this basis there were gradually founded conspirative organizations which set themselves the aim of establishing by force this *régime* in Russia. I will only mention that at the time of the Moscow Conference this conspirative movement had grown so ripe that its organizers thought even of declaring a dictatorship at the very moment of the Moscow Conference. Thanks to the temper of the great majority of the Congress it was found necessary to put this plan aside, and these people had to concentrate all their energy for the preparation of a real *coup d'état* prepared according to all the rules of conspiracy. The chief centre of this conspiracy was Headquarters. This is why I instructed Savinkov when he left for the conference about Army reforms to "liquidate," as Mr. Wilcox puts it, the political department of the Commander-in-Chief's Staff (page 502) and the Chief Committee of the Officers' League; the intention was not entirely to liquidate the last, but only to remove it from Mohilev to another town. Mr. Wilcox has set out Savinkov's first two instructions cor-



rectly; but he has given them a meaning which does not correspond with the facts.

But the other two instructions which Mr. Wilcox gives as if they were from me he expresses quite inaccurately: —

“Savinkov states that he was charged by the Minister President: . . . (3) to obtain Kornilov's consent to the formation of a distinct military district out of Petrograd and its immediate environs, so that a state of war might be declared in that area separately.”

In actual fact, after the taking of Riga, Kornilov himself insisted to the Provisional Government upon the declaration of martial law in Petrograd and upon the handing over of all the troops of the Petrograd military district, including the Petrograd garrison, to the exclusive orders of Headquarters. The Government realized the necessity of handing over to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief the troops of the Petrograd military district, in view of the proximity of the rear of the Army to the Capital after the taking of Riga, but it could not agree to the demand to hand over to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief the troops of Petrograd and its nearest environs, because the Provisional Government, like every Government, could not remain in its residence, especially in such a disturbed time of war and revolution, without any force to defend it which would be entirely and exclusively at its command. The Head of the War Office, together with the Head of my Military Cabinet, was only meant to work out at Headquarters the technical conditions for the temporary exclusion of Petrograd and its surroundings from the composition of the Petrograd military district, and

“ (4) To request the dispatch to the capital of a cavalry corps to help the Government to enforce its new policy there, and in par-

ticular to suppress a Bolshevik rising, which, according to the reports of the counter-espionage, was to take place almost immediately in conjunction with a German landing and an insurrection in Finland."

Nothing of the sort. The real motive for the summoning of the cavalry corps was published in the Press by Savinkov: "I asked the Commander-in-Chief for a cavalry corps at the demand of the Prime Minister in order to establish martial law in reality in Petrograd. This was called for by the strategic necessity of subordinating the Petrograd military district to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief in view of the last happenings at the front. The plan of declaring martial law in Petrograd was approved by the Provisional Government." It is obvious that this cavalry corps, as it was to be at the disposal of the Provisional Government, was meant to defend it from all the attempts to overthrow it, from whichever side they might come, as, for example, the combined force had protected the Provisional Government at the beginning of July from the attempts of the Bolsheviks.

Thus, of the four "decisive steps" towards the Kornilov party, two were directed directly against his party, and the two others were called for, as I have already said, by the necessity to protect the Provisional Government from all attacks both from the Left and from the Right. Mr. Wilcox would not pervert the meaning of my instructions to Savinkov thus if he had not been dealing with the materials collected by the Kornilovists, or if, at least, he had been able to deal with it critically. But yet, on page 503, our author has a passage which might lead one to doubt his impartiality and the genuineness of his desire to discover the true meaning of the events. Quoting the conversation in

regard to my four instructions which took place between Kornilov and Savinkov in the presence of Generals Lukomsky, Baranovsky, and Romanovsky, Mr. Wilcox, entirely on his own account, makes the following addition: —

“Of the plan thus outlined only one feature was the result of Savinkov’s independent initiative: that was the request that the cavalry corps should not be under Krimov. Also, on his own responsibility, Savinkov urged that the ‘wild’ or ‘savage’ division, which was composed of semi-civilized tribesmen, should not be included in the forces sent to Petrograd.”

Yet, without doubt, Mr. Wilcox had at his disposal the text of Kornilov’s private interview with Savinkov, passages from which are mentioned by the author on pages 502–503, from which it is plain that Savinkov was speaking about General Krimov and the savage division not on his own “independent initiative” and “on his own responsibility,” but exclusively *by my instructions*. Even if Mr. Wilcox had not had before his eyes the text of Kornilov’s conversation with Savinkov, even so he need not have spoken of the “independent initiative” of Savinkov, since he will not find any evidence of such initiative anywhere in the published materials about the Kornilov affair. This passage is the result of his own “independent creation.”

But why did Mr. Wilcox do this? What serious significance has this suggestion in the explanation of the “true meaning” of the events? I can answer plainly that it is of vast importance, because this invention is an attempt to conceal one of the principal proofs against General Kornilov. We must note the phrase that follows this interesting passage: —

“He states that Kornilov promised to fulfil both these requests, which, however, he failed to do.”

Trifles, indeed, to which it is not worth while to pay attention! Probably the reader of Mr. Wilcox's articles has simply passed over this phrase "promised to fulfil" but "failed to do" so. Nevertheless, this promise and non-fulfilment have a huge significance in the whole history of the dispatch of the cavalry corps to Petrograd, which in its turn is one of the principal episodes of the affair, without proper explanation of which it is quite impossible to understand the significance of the events of September 8th-12th.

My "agreement" with Kornilov is mainly shown by this call for troops, as if for the purpose of using them in joint activity with Kornilov at Petrograd. Again, my "betrayal" of Kornilov and his party is mainly shown by my sudden stopping of the movement of the cavalry corps which had been summoned to Petrograd by the Government itself in agreement with the Commander-in-Chief.

It is true that the Government, desiring to protect itself from all surprises, wished to have at its complete disposal a fresh and well-disciplined military force. Having reason to mistrust General Krimov and those in command of the savage division, and, moreover, considering this division to be insufficiently disciplined for service in a city, I asked Savinkov to tell General Kornilov from me that in the force sent for the disposal of the Provisional Government the savage division should not be included, and that General Krimov should not be appointed to the command of the force. Knowing that these two restrictions were absolutely necessary conditions for the dispatch of troops to Petrograd, Savinkov twice spoke about it to General Kornilov. Receiving his promise strictly to fulfil both these instructions of mine, Savinkov, "fully satisfied," as Mr. Wilcox himself says, returned to Petrograd and at once on the 7th of September he informed me of the matter and also of General

Kornilov's loyal attitude towards him. General Kornilov not only promised not to send Krimov to Petrograd, but at the proposal of the Commander-in-Chief General Krimov was appointed by the Provisional Government as Commander of the 11th Army on the South-Western front. But at the same time, however, that Kornilov was promising Savinkov not to send Krimov to Petrograd, General Krimov at Headquarters was working out a plan for the occupation of Petrograd and for introducing there a state of siege. Moreover, he was appointed Commander of the Petrograd Army without the Provisional Government's being informed, and he left for Petrograd with the cavalry corps, at the head of which marched the savage division.

Krimov left for Petrograd not to put himself at the disposal of the Government, but having with him special instructions from General Kornilov. On September 7th-9th, there approached Petrograd not troops which had been summoned by the Government, but in the guise of these the troops of General Kornilov's force whose aim was hostile to the Government. When these troops were near enough to Petrograd on the evening of September 9th, V. Lvov came to me with General Kornilov's ultimatum. Now, I think, the reader will understand why Mr. Wilcox or his inspirers had to invent the tale of Savinkov's "independent initiative." The whole story of General Kornilov's rising is dark and difficult to understand unless the circumstances of the dispatch of the cavalry corps to Petrograd are explained. It must be said that General Kornilov himself did not conceal his intentions to use force of arms against the Provisional Government. Thus, Mr. Wilcox himself says, on page 514:—

"In the Army Orders which he posted in Mohilev on September 10th and 11th, but which he was prevented by the Government pro-

hibition from circulating further, and in the statement prepared by him for the Judicial Commission, Kornilov gives a very full exposition of his motives for refusing to surrender the Chief Command and attempting to compel the Government by force of arms to carry out his program."

On page 515 we find:—

"Feeling that 'further hesitation would be fatal,' Kornilov, having assured himself of the support of most of the other commanding generals, decided to use the 3rd Cavalry Corps to compel the Government . . ."

But the conspirators and, like them, Mr. Wilcox are only unsuccessful in their attempts to represent all this story in such a way as to suggest that the decision to "use" the 3rd Cavalry Corps came into the head of General Kornilov "suddenly," when he was convinced that Kerensky was endeavouring to break his arrangement with him and that the Government had again fallen under the influence of the "Bolshevist majority in the Soviets."

According to the conspirators' version this sudden decision came to General Kornilov only on September 10th after he had received at Headquarters the text of my proclamation to the population of September 9th, where I seemed to declare General Kornilov a "traitor." General Kornilov himself gives the same explanation in one of his own depositions. But this explanation cannot withstand criticism. On September 6th Krimov at Headquarters was already working out his plan of approach upon Petrograd. On September 7th Kornilov's troops in the guise of the Government troops were already moving on Petrograd. On September 8th-9th there took place and were concluded General Kornilov's arrangements with the Generals at the front, by whom he was convinced "of the support of the

other commanding Generals." On September 9th General Kornilov sent a proposal to the Commanders of the military divisions at the rear to take orders only from him, and on the same day, September 9th, General Krimov's force began its march upon Petrograd. Finally, already on the evening of September 8th there took place at Headquarters the final conference about the nature of the dictatorship (General Kornilov, Aladin, Zavoiko and Filonenko took part), and General Kornilov by telegraph invited certain prominent politicians to come immediately to Headquarters to discuss "State matters" of extraordinary importance, *i.e.*, to establish a new Government attached to the dictatorship.

It is clear from this short chronology how energetically everything was being prepared for the moment of General Krimov's entry into Petrograd. The measures which I took simultaneously (on the night of September 10th) against the further approach of Krimov's force led to the complete failure of the adventure. "As soon as Kornilov realized that Krimov's expedition had failed he did everything in his power to prevent that civil war" (page 516), says Mr. Wilcox, thus in fact recognizing the significance of General Krimov's force in the events of September 8th-12th. I am sorry to have harped so long on Mr. Wilcox's invention of Savinkov's "independent initiative" in the episode of the dispatch of the Cavalry Corps, "at the disposal of the Government." Every one who has read the articles I am discussing and is now acquainted with my remarks about them will understand how important it is to determine the genuine facts which were connected with General Krimov's name, facts which, thanks to Mr. Wilcox's independent inventions, remained unknown to the readers of his articles, which were supposed to be an attempt to facilitate an un-

derstanding of "the true meaning of the incident." These facts destroy every possibility of connecting the summoning of the troops with any sort of agreement I am supposed to have made with General Kornilov's party, and at the same time prove beyond doubt the reality of the quite definite form of General Kornilov's and his party's activity.

But Mr. Wilcox writes mainly of the, so to speak, intimate side of my relations with General Kornilov and his party through V. Lvov (my "friend") whom I instructed "secretly" to conduct the negotiations with Headquarters.

"Lvov is a man of eminently mediocre talents, and the rôle into which he thrust himself here, on the grounds of his close personal friendship with Kerensky, was merely that of a messenger, but the effects of his intervention shook the political world like an earthquake." (Page 504.)

In the first place, there was never any close personal friendship, or even any friendship whatever, or close relations, between V. Lvov and me. Indeed, not only was there no friendship, but after the compulsory exit of V. Lvov from the Provisional Government in July of last year, he was extremely hostile towards me. He never hid this, and even declared that: "*Kerensky, c'est mon ennemi mortel.*" And on September 8th, late in the evening, he said to one of his friends, in a state of great excitement: "Kerensky did not want to be a dictator, so we shall give him one." Secondly, V. Lvov never was my "messenger."

"It may be stated here that Kerensky, in his evidence before the Special Commission, admitted that Lvov went to Headquarters at his request." (Page 505.)

says Mr. Wilcox. Nothing of the kind was said. On the contrary, when I gave my evidence before the Special



Commission I declared that even the word "Headquarters" was not mentioned during my first conversation with V. Lvov on September 4th. And that I never sent him with any instructions and that all this episode consisted mainly in that V. Lvov, like many others at that time, discussed the weakness of the Government and suggested to me that our authority should be strengthened by the inclusion in the Provisional Government of new elements who had actual strength in the country. This conversation took place immediately after the Moscow Conference, where the question had been raised of a closer union between the democracy and the privileged classes, and therefore this theme of conversation was quite natural on V. Lvov's part, all the more so as precisely at the time there had taken place at Moscow a political conference of the group of public men with whom V. Lvov had been in close connection in the Duma. I would enquire how Mr. Wilcox can affirm that I admitted on examination that which I never said and which is not in the stenographic report of my examination which is about to be published in England? This time Mr. Wilcox is not guilty of "independent initiative." He is only reproducing a phrase from the *forged* résumé of my examination which the Kornilovists published in the Press instead of my original deposition, which was in their hands. Besides this unsuccessful reference to myself, Mr. Wilcox adds that Aladin and Dobrinsky — the accused in the Kornilov affair — declared that, according to V. Lvov's words: "Kerensky empowered him to negotiate with Headquarters for the formation of a new Government." He said that "Kerensky wished the negotiations to be secret, as he feared that attempts might be made on his life from the side of the parties supporting him if anything was divulged before

a definite result had been reached." But Lvov, in spite of all his "invalid condition," does not confirm this rubbish in any way in any of his depositions.<sup>1</sup>

But Mr. Wilcox would probably not have referred to Aladin and Dobrinsky at all if he had considered the matter more seriously. He would have realized in that case that these two gentlemen together with Zavoiko were precisely the organizers of Lvov's journey to me, first on September 4th for reconnaissance, and later, on September 8th, to present Kornilov's secret ultimatum. The point is that, when the conspiracy was sufficiently ripe, when the troops and Krimov's detachment might enter Petrograd any day, the organizers of the whole adventure had to find a means of penetrating to me besides the normal methods of communication between Headquarters and me as Prime Minister and War Minister. At first Aladin personally undertook the attempt, but I categorically refused to receive him. Then he tried with equal unsucccess to penetrate to me with the help of the ex-Prime Minister, Count G. E. Lvov, who, however, refused to help him in this. But Count G. E.

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Wilcox, by the way, so blindly follows his favourite sources of information that occasionally he falls into quite humorous situations. Explaining by his invalid condition V. Lvov's "confused and fragmentary" declarations, Mr. Wilcox, without any attempt to be critical, repeats Lvov's words how "his health had been broken and his memory impaired by a month of solitary confinement in the Dowager Tsaritzza's room at the Winter Palace, where his sleep was continually disturbed by Kerensky singing operatic roulades in the adjoining apartment."

Could not Mr. Wilcox guess that, even if I had wished to disturb Lvov's valuable health with my arias, with the enormous amount of work which occupied me for twenty hours a day and compelled me the whole time to be with people, I could not have been able to spend whole nights in the neighbouring room to Lvov's singing "operatic roulades" there. I assure Mr. Wilcox that, if I had wished to break Lvov's health in some such manner, I should have placed ten big drums in Lvov's own room. Really, there should be some limits to human credulity.

Lvov thought it well to inform me of his uneasy surprise that, when Aladin received his refusal and was leaving him, he very significantly asked him to inform me, the Prime Minister, that henceforward no changes in the composition of the Provisional Government ought to take place without the consent of Headquarters. Aladin and Co. after this unsuccess decided to make use of V. Lvov, rightly considering that he, as a Member of the Duma and an ex-Member of the Provisional Government, could at any time easily have an interview with me. Thus, on September 3rd, after a conference with Aladin and Dobrinsky in Moscow, Lvov came to Petrograd, and at once, on September 4th, had an interview with me. On September 5th he was again in Moscow, meeting Aladin and Dobrinsky again. On the same day he left for Mohilev with Dobrinsky, and with *Aladin's letter to Zavoiko*. On September 6th he reached Headquarters, where he was in the company of the same Dobrinsky and of Zavoiko, and in the evening he was able to have an interview with General Kornilov. At this interview, at the conclusion of which Zavoiko also was present, he was given instructions by the Commander-in-Chief. With the first train after this interview with General Kornilov V. Lvov came to Petrograd, and on September 8th he came to me there almost straight from the station with General Kornilov's "proposal." This haste is quite intelligible when one remembers that at this time General Krimov's detachment was already fairly near to Petrograd.

But let us admit for a moment that I sent Lvov with instructions to General Kornilov. With what instructions? On this question it is impossible to receive any plain and coherent answer from the people in Kornilov's party. Mr. Wilcox refers, on page 505, to General Kornilov's state-

ment in his deposition to the Commission of Enquiry, that Lvov, coming in my name, had only made enquiries, but that he (Kornilov) himself in reply to these enquiries had spoken of the necessity of a dictatorship in some form or another. Meanwhile, on September 9th again, Kornilov himself told Savinkov on the direct wire that Lvov had come to him with a proposal from the Prime Minister to "accept the dictatorship and announce this fact through the present Provisional Government."

V. Lvov declared in all his depositions that he had proposed nothing in my name, but, in the deposition which Mr. Wilcox mentions, V. Lvov actually announces that Kornilov not only did not propose any ultimatum to him, but that

"Kornilov submitted to him 'no kind of ultimatum,' and what passed between them was a 'simple conversation,' in the course of which various desires in the sense of strengthening the Government were discussed."

And yet on the same September 8th Lvov himself confirmed before a witness that the proposals which he had set out in writing came direct from General Kornilov. Whence does this disagreement come between the two parties to the conversation? Why does General Kornilov report the same conversation with Lvov in a quite different way? Why did he in the course of time deny his own declaration that I myself had proposed to him through Lvov a *coup d'état* against myself?

The matter is easily explained. Neither those who sent Lvov to me, nor Lvov himself, knew until afterwards that my conversation with Lvov on September 8th, which they supposed had taken place between us two alone, had in actual fact been overheard, unknown to Lvov, by a third

person. This person, the Assistant of the Director of the Militia (Police) Department, gave the following evidence to the *juge d'instruction* on September 9th, the day after the conversation of Lvov with me. "I happened to be in Kerensky's room, and intended to leave in view of the conversation he was about to have with Lvov. But Kerensky asked me to stay and I remained in his room during the whole period of the conversation. Kerensky brought with him two documents: first, he read out aloud to Lvov the tape of the telegraphic direct wire from Headquarters, which contained Kerensky's conversation with General Kornilov, the same which you are showing me now. And Lvov confirmed the correctness of the conversation set out on the tape. Then Kerensky read aloud to Lvov Lvov's own note, which you are showing me now, and Lvov confirmed also the *correctness* of this document, declaring that all that was proposed in this note came from General Kornilov. . . . Further, Lvov said that the public and every one at Headquarters were so roused against Kerensky and the Provisional Government that General Kornilov could not answer for Kerensky's personal safety in any place in Russia, and therefore Kerensky's and Savinkov's journey to Headquarters was essential; and Lvov on his side gave Kerensky 'good advice' to accept and carry out General Kornilov's conditions. Advising Kerensky to fulfil General Kornilov's demands, Lvov said that General Kornilov offered posts in the new Cabinet of Ministers he was forming to Kerensky — as Minister of Justice — and to Savinkov — as Minister of War and, I think, of Marine."

On September 8th General Kornilov did not yet know of this witness's account, but afterwards he did know of it, and this explains the change. But here is the original text of the document which Mr. Wilcox so disdainfully calls

"a few detached thoughts." It is printed on page 106 of the Russian text of my book "The Kornilov Affair":—

"General Kornilov proposes (1) to declare martial law in Petrograd; (2) to give all the military and civil power into the hands of the Commander-in-Chief; (3) the resignation of all Ministers, including the Premier himself, and the transfer temporarily of control from the Ministers to their assistants until the establishment of the Commander-in-Chief's Cabinet.—(Signed) V. Lvov. Petrograd, August 26th (September 8th), 1917."

Thus, if Mr. Wilcox had made use of all the materials, and not only of the evidence cunningly shuffled by the conspirators, he himself could have shown that Lvov had not simply "jotted down a few detached thoughts," but set out in an accurate form General Kornilov's proposal, that I did not snatch the document and put it into my own pocket in order not to give Lvov the opportunity to become acquainted with what he himself had written, but, on the contrary, that I read him his document and he confirmed its correctness; that although Lvov was arrested, this was not immediately after his setting out on paper General Kornilov's proposal, but only after this had been confirmed on the direct wire by General Kornilov himself.

I would advise the reader now to read again my conversation on September 8th with General Kornilov on the direct wire (October issue, pp. 507-508), and to compare it with these "detached thoughts" of Lvov and with the above declaration made by our witness who was present with us during our conversation. Then every one will see plainly that I had good reason, after all these conversations, to conclude that Lvov was acting as a plenipotentiary for General Kornilov, and that General Kornilov himself confirmed to a sufficient degree what Lvov had said to me. "Yesterday evening during my conversation with the Prime Min-

ister on the direct wire I confirmed to him what I had said through Lvov," said General Kornilov on September 9th to Savinkov on the direct wire.

Even Mr. Wilcox agrees that

"The Minister-President asked for, and received, a confirmation of Lvov's message, but neither of the two speakers indicated what the message was, except so far as the single point of the journey to Headquarters was concerned."

Thus General Kornilov answers the questions, put in a conspirative manner, as only a man would answer who thoroughly knew what significance is contained in these questions, which would be mysterious for outsiders. One may ask why Mr. Wilcox did not think it necessary to give his readers the text of V. Lvov's "detached thoughts." Why does he hide in his pocket the little key to my mysterious conversation with General Kornilov? By the way, on page 508 Mr. Wilcox says that V. Lvov was not present at the apparatus at the time of my conversation with General Kornilov, that he did not know to what abuse his name was being put, and that afterwards he protested against the freedom which the Prime Minister had taken with it. From the evidence given above by the person who was present at my second conversation with Lvov when I had in my hands already the tape record of my conversation with General Kornilov, it is clear that Lvov not only did not protest against the abuse which I had made of his name, but on the contrary confirmed the conversation, *i.e.*, he acknowledged that I had not in my conversation with General Kornilov transgressed those limits which had previously been arranged between me and Lvov. I had to hold my conversation with General Kornilov on the direct wire without Lvov only because the latter arrived nearly

an hour later than the time we had arranged, and it was impossible to make General Kornilov wait any longer at the apparatus.

“ ‘Before the Special Commission,’ continues Mr. Wilcox, ‘Kerensky replied that in view of the gravity of the situation he felt entitled to make use of this ruse in order to induce Kornilov to talk more freely than he might otherwise have done.’ ”

I never said anything of the kind to the Commission of Enquiry; I said only what I have just repeated. In this case Mr. Wilcox has been made a victim of the falsification of my deposition of which I have already spoken. This silence of Mr. Wilcox about Lvov's document has served the same purpose as his act of direct creation in regard to the “independent initiative” of Savinkov. Because of this silence about Lvov's document the events of the evening of September 8th, which saw the beginning of the formal liquidation of the Kornilov adventure, remain for Mr. Wilcox's readers unintelligible and obscure. And Mr. Wilcox, following his sources, is able to explain the whole liquidation as a tragic misunderstanding brought about by the unexplainable interference of my “messenger,” V. Lvov. All attempts to liquidate this misunderstanding painlessly were in vain, since the Prime Minister, under the influence of this evil counsellor Nekrassov, and of the Petrograd Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, after some wavering refused to hold out the hand of reconciliation to General Kornilov, and “by the evening of September 10th the breach between Kornilov and Kerensky was complete and final.”

Of course, in reality, this was not at all the case. Lvov's arrival and the answers given to me by General Kornilov on the direct wire on the evening of September 8th, in con-



nection with the approach of the Cavalry Corps towards Petrograd, made the situation absolutely clear to me. Taking into account all that had preceded and all the serious information we had about the preparation of a conspiracy, I had no doubt that only by the most decisive and speedy measures was it possible to smother at the very outset the conflagration which was beginning, and to save my country from the upheaval towards which those short-sighted politicians and bold adventurers wished to drive it.

On the night of September 9th the Provisional Government gave me special plenipotentiary powers to liquidate the revolt. I took immediately the most essential measures in order to stop the further advance of General Krimov's force upon Petrograd, and I proposed to the Government to dismiss General Kornilov from his position and to call him to Petrograd, etc. Mr. Wilcox declares, on page 510, that I received on the night of September 9th "full powers," *i.e.*, that I became in fact dictator, and consequently

"Kerensky must bear the entire responsibility for everything that was done in the name of the Government during those days. In particular his appointment as Commander-in-Chief must have been his own work, and not, as it was officially announced to be, a Cabinet decision."

The responsibility for all that the Government did in those days lies upon me, and I am quite prepared to bear it. But still, I did not ask for full powers for myself on September 9th, nor did I receive the same; but I was given powers only "to take quick and decisive measures to cut off at the roots all attempts upon the sovereign power of the country and upon the civil rights which have been won by the Revolution," as was stated in my official proclamation to the population. Therefore my taking over the duties of Commander-in-Chief was not "my own work," but was

the common decision of the members of the Provisional Government, brought about by special circumstances of which this is not the place nor the time to speak.

I think that I have sufficiently established the lack of correspondence between Mr. Wilcox's exposition and the real events which took place in Russia between September 4th and 14th. Therefore I shall only briefly touch upon certain other contradictions, the significance of which is by itself sufficiently plain.

"During the 9th of September," says Mr. Wilcox, "Kerensky took no absolutely irretrievable step," but on the night of September 10th, at the time when General Alexeiev, whom Kerensky asked to resume the Chief Command, came to know in Kerensky's quarters in the Winter Palace of the documents about the Kornilov affair, Kerensky "apparently" received the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet. "We do not know what passed between Kerensky and the Committee," continues Mr. Wilcox, but he hints very plainly that the hostile and uncompromising position of the Petrograd Soviet after this conference acted disastrously on Kerensky's conduct and that the Soviet drove him to the uncompromising step of publishing the proclamation in which the word "treason" was for the first time used and applied to the activities of Kornilov. Not only does Mr. Wilcox not know what took place between me and the Committee on the night of September 10th, but nobody in the world knows, because no conference between me and the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet took place either on the night of September 10th or altogether during the whole time when the Kornilov affair was being liquidated. Not "apparently," but absolutely certainly in this instance, Mr. Wilcox or his inspirers have consciously de-

sired to give their suggestions the appearance of actuality.

So far as the terrible proclamation is concerned with the word "treason," inspired, forsooth, by the Soviet, "It has been admitted by Kerensky," says Mr. Wilcox, "that this proclamation was the work of Nekrassov, the Minister of Finance, and was sent along the railway lines without the Minister President's knowledge." According to Vladimir Bourtzeff, he adds, the text of the proclamation came as a complete surprise to me.

I never confessed anything of the kind, and here, once more, Mr. Wilcox is making a quotation from my forged deposition. The text of my proclamation to the people of September 9th from first to last was revised by me jointly with the Minister of Finance, Nekrassov, and, what is more, there is no word "treason" or declaration of Kornilov as a traitor in this proclamation. Here is the corresponding place in this proclamation: "Considering that in the presentation of these demands to the Provisional Government in my person there was evidenced the desire of certain circles of Russian society to take advantage of the serious position of the country to establish in it a state of Government which was contrary to the conquests of the Revolution, the Provisional Government has thought is necessary . . ." and there follows a list of measures taken by the Government and an appeal to the citizens to keep calm. That is all.

Mr. Wilcox again returns to the question of the disastrous influence of the Soviet upon me, and hints transparently why I refused Milioukov and General Alexeiev's request to allow them to interfere in my conflict with General Kornilov and to endeavour to bring the opposed sides to a compromise:—

"Bogdanoff, one of the chief Soviet officials, boasted at a meeting that the Political Department of the Petrograd Soviet, hearing of the mediation of Alexeiev and Milioukov, 'acted with all energy and prevented any kind of agreement between Kornilov and the Government.'"

Perhaps Bogdanoff boasted this, although I have never either heard or read anything about this before. But the Soviet could not have any influence upon my refusal to allow Alexeiev and Milioukov to interfere, however much it wanted to, for the simple reason that when I heard Milioukov's and Alexeiev's request, I refused it on the spot decisively and categorically. "At the same time the Soviets usurped to themselves many of the functions of Government," states Mr. Wilcox. Yes, indeed, Kornilov's rising, arousing in the masses a psychology of absolute distrust for the authorities, resuscitated Bolshevism in the Soviets and their tendency to usurp the functions of government, but this happened rather later, and the Government fought against it the whole time. The liquidation of General Kornilov's rebellion was conducted by the Provisional Government so independently of all influences that it was precisely from the side of the Soviet circles that I was reproached for not desiring in those difficult days to lean upon the Soviet and the Soviet organizations. One of the most prominent democratic leaders and my personal friend actually reproached me publicly for this, saying that my "head had been turned" by power.

At the end of his study Mr. Wilcox says that Kornilov "wanted to emancipate it [the power] from the illicit and paralyzing influence of the Soviets. In the end this influence destroyed Russia, and Kornilov's defiance of the Government was the last faint hope of arresting the process of destruction."

This quite corresponds with the first words of Kornilov's proclamation on September 9th where he declares war on the Government: "Forced to an open rising, I, General Kornilov, declare that the Provisional Government, acting under the influence of the Bolshevik majority in the Soviets, . . ." This is an obvious falsehood, since before the Kornilov rising there had not been a Bolshevik majority in a single Soviet, and, as it happened, in the time preceding Kornilov's rising the political influence of the Soviets was *less than at any other time* of the Revolution. In the summer the organs of local government which had been created on the basis of universal suffrage had begun to function; the excitement of the first months of the Revolution was wearing off, and the Soviets were losing their exclusive significance in the life of the masses. This healthy and normal evolution was acclaimed in the Press by the most active members of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets themselves. The absurd attempt of General Kornilov to force matters to a crisis destroyed all this intense half-year's labour to construct a national machine, and it again threw the masses on to the path of anarchy and ruin. Within a week after the Kornilov rising the Soviets were captured by the Bolsheviks. Then everywhere Bolshevik majorities came into being, and there began under the motto "All power to the Soviets" the fatal conflict of the unbridled masses with statesmanship and order in Russia.

The Kornilov adventure was the prologue to the Bolshevik's *coup d'état*. Had there been no September 9th, there would have been no November 7th.

But Kornilov himself loved Russia deeply in his own way, and it was not bad faith but lack of knowledge and political experience which urged him upon the disastrous path

whither certain irresponsible groups of political and financial jobbers and political adventurers enticed him. Zavoiko, Aladin, and the rest were only casual people, and with ambiguous pasts; behind their backs stood influential anonymities who at the decisive moment saved themselves, but abandoned Kornilov.

Permit me in conclusion to make a somewhat long quotation from a letter of General Alexeiev written on September 12th, 1917, to the now new-fledged Germanophil Milioukov; it throws a bright light behind the screens of the Kornilov rebellion:—

“‘The Kornilov affair was not the affair of a group of adventurers, and you know to a certain degree that certain circles of our society not only knew all about it, not only sympathized with the idea, but helped Kornilov as far as they could. . . . I have one more question: I do not know the addresses of Vyshnegradski, Poutiloff,<sup>1</sup> and the others. The families of the imprisoned officers are beginning to starve, and I insist on their coming to their aid. Surely they will not abandon to their fate and to starvation the families of those to whom they were linked by the common bond of an idea and preparation. . . . In that case [*i.e.*, if this demand is not immediately satisfied] General Kornilov,’ General Alexeiev continues, ‘will be forced to declare in detail before the court the whole plan of preparation, all the conversations with persons and groups and their participation, in order to show the Russian people with whom he was working what real aim he was pursuing, and how, abandoned by all in his moment of need, he had to appear before an improvised court with only a small number of officers.’”

Comment is needless.

A. KERENSKY.

<sup>1</sup> Well-known Russian financiers who stood at the head of a certain group of Banks.—A. K.

## A "WHO'S WHO" AND "WHERE'S WHERE" OF PEOPLE AND PLACES OCCURRING IN THE TEXT

**ALADIN.**—Member (for the Government of Simbirsk) of the first Duma. Belonged to the Toil Party. Acquired popularity and renown through his speeches in the Duma. On the eve of the dissolution of the first Duma, Aladin went to England as a member of the delegation sent by the Duma for the purpose of conveying its message of sympathy to the British Parliament, and when the Duma was dissolved he remained in that country. His subsequent activity was of such a character that it changed altogether the attitude towards Aladin of his political friends, so that he soon lost his prestige and even the esteem he formerly enjoyed in the Russian democratic and intellectual circles. During the latter years of his sojourn in England he even became the London correspondent of the *Novoie Vremia*. Aladin has been formally struck out from the rolls of the Toil Party. In the summer of 1917 Aladin returned to Russia.

**ALEXEIEV.**—General, Professor at the General Staff Academy. One of the highest military authorities in Europe. Played a prominent part in the Russo-Japanese War. During the first

period of the present war, under the Grand Duke Nicholas as Commander-in-Chief, General Alexeiev directed the operations of the North-western front and distinguished himself by his organizing ability and by the skill with which he managed to extricate his troops from awkward and critical positions. After the grave situation of 1915, when the Grand Duke Nicholas was relieved of the post of Generalissimo, General Alexeiev took over the Supreme Command in the capacity of Chief of the Staff of the nominal Commander-in-Chief—the late Tsar Nicholas. At the decisive moment of the Revolution, Alexeiev lent his support to the Duma and, together with other generals, advised the Tsar to abdicate according to the demand of the Duma. The Provisional Government appointed Alexeiev Commander-in-Chief, which office he held until the end of May, 1917. Immediately after Kornilov's rebellion, Alexeiev resumed for a short period his military activity in the capacity of Chief of the Staff of the Generalissimo, Kerensky; however, he only remained in this office for a fortnight, when his place was taken by General Dukhonin.

ALTVATER.—Rear-Admiral. In 1916 Altvater, then a captain, served in the Naval Staff at the Tsar's Headquarters. In 1917 was attached to the Commander of the Army Group of the Northern front. After the Bolshevik *coup d'état*, Altvater accepted service under the Bolshevik Government and participated, in an "expert" capacity, in the Brest-Litovsk negotiations. After that ignominious action Altvater continued to collaborate with Trotsky.

AVKSENTIEV.—A leader of the Social Revolutionary Party. In 1905 was a member of the Petrograd Soviet of Workmen's Delegates. Was arrested by the Witte administration in November of that year, together with other members of the Soviet, and deported to Siberia, whence he escaped and fled abroad. Until the amnesty of 1917 Avksentiev lived abroad, chiefly in France, taking an active part in the life of Social Revolutionary centres and the party Press. Not long before the war, Avksentiev with his friends founded a paper *Potchin* ("The Beginning"), an organ of Social Revolutionary revisionism, in which he emphasized the necessity of bringing Socialist principles into agreement with the ideas of State and nationality; he also struggled against the internationalist extremism in his party. During the war, Avksentiev, together with Plekhanov and other Russian Socialist supporters of national defence, started a

paper, *Priziv* ("The Appeal"), of a sharply pro-war and anti-German character, which emphasized the liberating effect of the war on Russia and the inevitable downfall of the autocracy. On his return to Russia in the spring of 1917, Avksentiev became one of the foremost representatives of that wing of the Social Revolutionary Party which supported national defence and national interests. The first All-Russian Congress of Peasants elected Avksentiev as Chairman of the Central Committee of Peasants. In July, Avksentiev became a member of the Provisional Government as representative of the peasants' organizations. He took the portfolio of Minister of the Interior, in which office he remained until the beginning of September. The Council of the Republic (a sort of provisional Parliament convoked by the Government to sit until the Constituent Assembly met) elected Avksentiev its Chairman. An ardent patriot and supporter of the national defence, Avksentiev was a bitter enemy of Bolshevism; it is no wonder that after their victory the Bolsheviks sought him out everywhere and, when at last they found him at Petrograd, imprisoned him in the fortress of SS. Peter and Paul. Avksentiev was elected to the Constituent Assembly by several constituencies.

BAGRATON.—Prince. A fighting general. During the summer of 1917 and the Kornilov rebel-



lion he was in command of the Caucasian native division ("the savage division").

**BAGRATUNI.**—General, Officer of the General Staff; participated in the present war. From the early summer of 1917 until the Bolshevik *coup d'état* he was Chief of Staff of the Petrograd Military District.

**BAKU.**—A town in Transcaucasia, on the coast of the Caspian Sea; centre of exceedingly rich oil wells.

**BALAVINSKY.**—A barrister. A well-known Moscow public man. Has taken part for many years in the revolutionary movement. Belonged to the Social Revolutionary Party, and has been prosecuted by the police. Has worked much during the war in public organizations under the Provisional Government. Has been invited by the Ministry of the Interior to act as one of the Directors in charge of the organization of the local administrative and police services.

**BALUIEV.**—General. Officer of the General Staff. During the summer of 1914 was in command of a special army on the South-western (Galician) front. Later he was appointed Commander of the Western front, in which office he remained until the Bolshevik *coup d'état*.

**BARANOVSKY.**—General. Officer of the General Staff. A fighting general. Fought in many battles in the Carpathians and East Prussia. During 1916 Bara-

novsky was active in the Staff of the General Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief. When Kerensky became Minister of War, Baranovsky was summoned by him to Petrograd and appointed chief of the Minister's military cabinet. In September, 1917, Baranovsky exchanged this post for that of Quartermaster-General of the Northern front. After the Bolshevik revolt he was arrested in Pskov and imprisoned in the fortress of SS. Peter and Paul, where he remained for several months.

**BEREDITCHEV.**—An important Jewish town; after the retreat from Galicia it was the residence of the Headquarters of the South-western front.

**BERNADSKY.**—Professor. Specialist on financial questions. Took part in the liberation movement of 1905. One of the founders of the Radical Democratic Party, which began to grow after the Revolution and strove to organize the consistently republican and democratic, although non-socialist, elements of the Russian urban population. In July, 1917, Bernadsky was appointed Deputy Minister to Nekrassov, the Minister of Finance; in September, after the Kornilov rebellion, he became a member of the Provisional Government as the Minister of Finance. After the Bolshevik *coup d'état*, Bernadsky was arrested and imprisoned in the fortress of SS. Peter and Paul.

**BIKHOV.**—A small town not far from Mohilev, where the G. H. Q. were situated. This town was selected for the confinement of General Kornilov and his accomplices up to the time of their trial. In the first days after the Bolshevik *coup d'état*, Kornilov and his friends escaped from Bikhov to the Don.

**BONTCH-BRUIEVITCH.** — General. Officer of the General Staff. Was a close collaborator of General Ruzsky. After the latter's retirement he remained Chief of the Staff of the Northern front until the beginning of September. He is a brother of the writer Bontch-Bruievitch (a prominent Bolshevik and a close collaborator of Lenin). After the Bolshevik *coup d'état* the general, until recently a zealous servant of the Tsardom, managed to adapt himself to the "Communist" Government. General Bontch-Bruievitch, together with Trotsky, Krilenko, and other Bolshevik military authorities, has had a hand in all ignominious acts of the Bolsheviks.

**BRUSILOV.**—General. One of the most brilliant fighting commanders of the Russian army; famous for his remarkable offensive in Galicia in the year 1916, which not only proved a serious blow to the Austrian army on the Russian front, but also saved the Italian army from the (up to then) successful offensive of the Austro-Germans. Although far from being equal to Alexeiev in military knowledge and theoretical

qualification for his high post, Brussilov was endowed with qualities inestimable in an army leader: initiative, boldness, and a talent for rousing the spirit of his soldiers. After the defeats of 1915, Brussilov began to sympathize with the liberation movement, supported the public organizations in their work at the front, and, on the eve of the Revolution, was in touch with representatives of the opposition groups of the Duma. When the Revolution broke out, Brussilov took openly and unhesitatingly the side of the people, thereby preserving to a considerable extent the South-western front (Galicia) from anarchy and disaggregation. In May, 1917, the Provisional Government, on the initiative of A. F. Kerensky (who then accepted the portfolio of Minister of War), appointed Brussilov Commander-in-Chief. Under his direction the Russian Revolutionary Army took the offensive on the 1st of July, 1917. It met with a serious check towards the end of that month, and General Brussilov, tired and overworked, was relieved by the Provisional Government of the Supreme Command, which was entrusted, on the initiative of A. F. Kerensky, to General Kornilov. During the bombardment of Moscow by the Bolsheviks, Brussilov was seriously wounded by a piece of shrapnel penetrating into his room, and one of his legs had to be amputated.

**BUBLIKOV.**—Important man of business. Graduate of the In-

stitute of Ways and Communications. Was member of the fourth Duma. When the Revolution broke out, Bublikov, on an order of the Duma Committee, occupied with a detachment the Ministry of Ways and Communications and the Central Railway Telegraph, thereby accelerating the "winding-up" of the old *régime*.

DAN (GURVITCH).—A leader of the Social Democratic Party (Mensheviks); a publicist; member of the medical profession. During the war was deported to Eastern Siberia in the "administrative manner" (i.e. without a court trial). From the first days of the Revolution was one of the leaders of the Petrograd Soviet. After Tchkeidze left for the Caucasus, Dan acted as Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets. Together with the majority of his party (Mensheviks), Dan recognized the necessity both of continuing the war and of the Socialist parties participating in a "bourgeois" Government, although personally he was far from being a warm supporter of these principles.

DE SEMITTER.—Colonel of the General Staff. Participated in the officers' plot. (Particulars in the book.)

DIBENKO.—Sailor of the Baltic Fleet. Prominent agent of Lenin and Trotsky at Helsingfors. After the Bolshevik *coup d'état* was appointed People's Commissary of Marine. Among

the Bolshevik agents this ignorant demagogue has been conspicuous for his impudence and cruelty. After the Brest-Litovsk peace he quarrelled with Trotsky and started a demagogic campaign against him in the navy. He was accused by the Bolshevik authorities of embezzling public money.

DOLGORUKY.—Prince. General; participated in the present war. In August, 1917, was in command of the army corps stationed in Finland.

DUKHONIN.—General. One of the most brilliant amongst the younger officers of the General Staff. Took a very active and important part in the planning and execution of Brussilov's offensive in Galicia in 1916. In the year 1917, Dukhonin, then Chief of the Staff of the South-western front, organized the July offensive. Dukhonin was endowed with an extraordinary organizing ability. He was intimately acquainted with the conditions of life of the common soldiery and understood their mentality, so that he managed to get on very well with his soldiers, while fully safeguarding the authority and the dignity of a Chief. Shortly after Kerensky became Commander-in-Chief, Dukhonin was appointed his Chief of Staff. He then proceeded, together with General Diedrichs (now commanding the Tchekho-Slovak troops in Russia), to work out a scheme for the reorganization of the Russian army in order to have its fight-

ing capacity restored by the spring of 1918. The Bolshevik revolt put an end to this work at its very beginning; as to General Dukhonin himself, he met a martyr's death at the very moment of his departure from his Headquarters after they had been captured by the Bolsheviks. He was torn to pieces by an infuriated mob of Bolshevik sailors, in the presence of the Bolshevik "military authorities"—Krilenko at their head—who looked on without interfering.

**DUTOV.**—A Cossack. Chairman of the Council of the All-Russian Union of Cossackdom. Has carried on an aggressive campaign against the Provisional Government-Ataman of the Orenburg Cossackdom. Took part in the organizing of a movement in the troops against the Provisional Government.

**ERDELLI.**—General. An exemplary Guards officer. During the third year of the war commanded an army at the South-western front. A typical representative of the high military bureaucracy, who managed to adapt himself for some time to the new state of things in the army. After the Revolution and before August, 1917, Erdelli was considered as one of the liberal generals and a friend of the elected soldiers' organizations. However, after the appointment of General Denikin to the post of Commander of the South-western front, Er-

delli sharply changed his policy and joined the military reaction.

**GOBETCHIA.**—Member of the Social Revolutionary Party; lived for many years in France as a political refugee. After the March Revolution he returned to Russia and went to the front, in the capacity first of the deputy of Savinkov, the commissary of the 7th Army, then of the commissary of that army.

**GOTZ, A.**—Prominent member of the Social Revolutionary Party and member of the Central Committee of that party. At the time of the old *régime* was a member of the terrorist organization of the Social Revolutionary Party. Belongs to that wing of the Social Revolutionary Party which is clearly in favour of national defence ("Oborontzy"). Supported the idea of a Coalition Government. Gotz returned to Russia after the Revolution from Siberia, where he was imprisoned with hard labour.

**GUTCHKOV, A. T.**—A representative of the wealthy Moscow merchant circles of old standing. One of the foremost Moscow Conservative public men. During the Japanese War, Gutchkov was the representative at the front of the Red Cross. Fought in the South-African War as a volunteer in the Boer army. During the liberation movement of 1905-6, Gutchkov placed himself at the head of the bourgeois elements which opposed that move-

ment. At the municipal and Zemstvo congresses he always fought the influence of the Cadet Party. Was a decided adversary of any kind of self-government of the small nationalities of Russia. He even was opposed to an autonomy of Poland, and approved of Stolipin's hostile policy towards Finland. Gutchkov founded the "Party of the 17th of October" (date of the famous Tsar's Manifesto in 1905), usually called the "Octobrist" Party. Gutchkov approved of all the reactionary measures of the Government in 1905, and with his and his party's authority supported the dissolution of the second Duma and the illegal restrictions of the electoral rights of the people, enforced by Stolipin on the 3rd of June, 1907. After this *coup d'état*, Gutchkov, together with his party, entered the third Duma, where he was the leader of the majority nearly for the whole time of its existence, and at one period was the Speaker of that Duma. As a member of the Duma, Gutchkov worked much in the Army and Navy Commission, and made many a disclosure concerning the shady aspects of the military bureaucracy. He also struggled against generals of the type of Sukhomlinov, and against irresponsible and disastrous interference of the Grand Dukes in military affairs. Gutchkov organized a group of military men who rallied to him, and thereby he gained from the Tsar the name of "Young Turk." In internal politics Gutchkov ener-

getically supported Stolipin, in whom he saw a strong weapon for the purpose of establishing in Russia a very moderate, strictly bourgeois constitutional monarchy. The ever-growing irresponsible influence of the nobility and Court circles in the Government, which was quickly relapsing into frankly autocratic ways, the servility of Stolipin himself, drove the very prudent and cunning Gutchkov towards the end of the third Duma into making speeches in the opposition spirit with steadily increasing frequency. Beaten at the elections for the fourth Duma in the Moscow constituency, Gutchkov became a member of the State Council, to which he was elected by the *Curia* of Industry and Commerce. The *régime* of a Rasputin, a Sukhomlinov and a Sturmer reconciled Gutchkov to the political tendencies against which he was struggling a short time before, if it did not bring him nearer to them. During the war, being at the head of the War Industries Committee, Gutchkov came in touch even with certain Labour circles. While travelling at the front, Gutchkov strengthened his old connections and established new ones amongst the High Command circles, which connections would have proved extremely useful in the event of a well planned and a prudent *coup d'état*. The outburst of the Revolution brought confusion into this game, but at first did not rebuff Gutchkov, who, notwithstanding his open monarchism, entered the first Provision-

al Government, naturally as the Minister for War. Such was the elementary force of the pressure of the soldier masses at the beginning of the Revolution, that it was the lot of Gutchkov, a Conservative and a partisan of strictest discipline, to sanction measures which resulted in destroying that discipline. The trial proved too much for him, and, foreseeing what would be the results of his own decrees, the prudent and cunning Gutchkov abandoned his dangerous post in good time.

**GUTOR.**—General. Was in command of an army on the South-western front under Brussilov. In the spring of 1917, when Brussilov was appointed Commander-in-Chief, Gutor, upon the recommendation of the latter, was entrusted with the command of the South-western (Galician) front, which he held when the July offensive began. After the German break through at Tarnopol, Gutor was deprived of his command for reasons explained later in the book itself, and his place was taken by General Kornilov.

**IAKUBOVITCH.**—General. A young officer of the General Staff. Took part in the Japanese War, particularly in the defence of Port Arthur. At the most critical moment of the Revolution, Iakubovitch, together with a few other officers of the General Staff, reported to the Revolutionary Committee of the Duma and put himself at its disposal for the fight for freedom. Iakubovitch was ap-

pointed member of the Military Commission of the Duma, of which the object was to direct the local garrison and to settle questions relative to military matters, until such time as the normal activity of the Ministry of War and of the local military institutions was completely resumed. When Kerensky became Minister of War, Iakubovitch was appointed Assistant Minister of War, in which office he remained up to the time of the Bolshevik counter-revolution.

**IVERSKAIA.**—The especially revered ikon of Our Lady of Iversk, which is kept in Moscow in a special chapel near one of the gates of the Kremlin. It was the customary proceeding of the Tsars, when coming to Moscow, to visit that chapel on their way to the Palace in order to pray before the ikon.

**KALEDIN.**—General. A Cossack. Took an important part in this war. After the old rights of self-government, of which the autocracy deprived the Cossacks, were restored to them by the Provisional Government, Kaledin was elected the first Ataman of the Don Cossacks, i.e., head of the executive power in the territories on the River Don inhabited by Cossacks. According to the old Cossack law, every district is governed by the "circle," a sort of elected body with both administrative and legislative functions, which nominates for a certain period all the officials, with the

Ataman at their head. On his entering that office, General Kaledin became a supporter of a wide autonomy of the Cossack territory and acquired a great popularity amongst the Cossacks. At the Moscow Conference (summoned by the Provisional Government in order that the critical situation at the front and in the country might be discussed by representatives of the nation), Kaledin declared in the name of the whole of Russian Cossackdom that the latter favoured a Republican form of government. After the Bolshevik counter-revolution, Kaledin placed himself at the head of the anti-Bolshevik movement on the Don. Kaledin did not underestimate the elementary force of the anarchist wave which carried off the whole of the soldier masses and was even spreading to the poorer elements of Cossackdom; he therefore acted in a very prudent way, avoiding collision with the Bolsheviks, which he considered then premature. This gave rise to conflicts between Kaledin and the other leaders of the movement. In February, 1918, Kaledin committed suicide by shooting himself.

**KAMENEV (ROSENFELD).** — A prominent Social Democrat of the Bolshevik wing. Propagandist and publicist. For many years a close collaborator of Lenin. During the war he carried out a propaganda on Leninist lines in connection with the war in Russian Labour circles and led the Bolshevik group in

the fourth Duma. At the beginning of 1915, Kamenev, together with the five Bolshevik members of the Duma, was arrested and tried for defeatist propaganda and for participation in the Social Democratic Party. When giving evidence, Kamenev declared that he did not in the least share Lenin's program in connection with the war. Together with the Bolshevik deputies, he was deported to Siberia. After the amnesty of 1917 he returned to Petrograd, and on Lenin's return to Russia, became his zealous collaborator. He has always acted in a very prudent and equivocal way. After the Bolshevik *coup d'état* he was for a short time one of the People's Commissaries, i.e. Lenin's Ministers, as well as Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet. However, with his customary prudence Kamenev soon chose to accept a diplomatic mission abroad. He was appointed "Ambassador" to Vienna, but on his way there fell into the hands of Finnish White Guards and was imprisoned. The first delegation to Brest-Litovsk included Kamenev, but he preferred to avoid participation in the second.

**KAMKOV (KATZ).** — Social Revolutionary. Prosecuted by the Tsar's Government for his revolutionary work, Kamkov at the very beginning of his activity fled abroad and spent there many years as a political refugee. Graduated at a German University; then studied in

Paris. During the war joined the extreme internationalist wing of the Social Revolutionary Party. For some time was editing in Switzerland a small paper for Russian prisoners in Germany. On his return to Russia after the amnesty, Kamkov became one of the leaders of the extreme internationalist "irreconcilables" of his party. That wing of the Social Revolutionary Party was in practice very near to the Bolsheviks, striving as it was for dictatorship of the proletariat and of the labouring peasants, and for transforming the war of nations into a social war of classes. The theoretical differences between the Left wing and the Centre of the Social Revolutionary Party soon led to an actual split. Even before the Bolsheviks' *coup d'état* the Left Social Revolutionaries were everywhere supporting the Bolsheviks; after the victory of Lenin, they openly joined the Bolshevik movement. Expelled from the Social Revolutionary Party at the Party Congress in November, 1917, Kamkov and his friends declared that they formed a separate "Left Social Revolutionary" Party, and sent their representatives to the Council of People's Commissaries, i.e., Lenin's administration. This co-operation with the Bolsheviks ceased after the Brest-Litovsk peace, since the majority of the Left Social Revolutionary leaders, including Kamkov, did not see their way to recognize that treaty and to share with the Bolsheviks the shame of it. Accord-

ing to latest information (as yet unconfirmed), Kamkov has fallen a victim to the Bolshevik terror for the part he took in the organizing of Count Mirbach's assassination in Moscow.

KARAULOV.—A Cossack of the Tersk region. Graduated at the Petrograd University. Was a member of the fourth Duma; was prominent in local and Cossack public affairs. When the right of self-government was restored to the Cossacks by the Provisional Government, Karaulov was elected Ataman (Head) of the Tersk Cossackdom. After the Bolshevik *coup d'état* Karaulov was killed in a skirmish with revolted Caucasian mountaineers.

KARTASHEV.—Son of an Ural peasant; an exceedingly gifted religious-philosophical thinker. A deeply sincere believer in Orthodox Christianity, he strove, under the old *régime*, for a complete liberation of the Church from the tutelage of the State, because the latter was killing the soul of the Church and had made it a kind of police institution. Professor at the Theological Academy of Petrograd, he was dismissed because of his religious democracy. Together with the well-known writer Merejkovsky and a few others, who strove for the regeneration of the Church, Kartashev founded in Petrograd the "Society of Religious Philosophy," where he has often spoken in defence of the peasant before the Russian Intelligentsia, and boldly de-



nounced the servility of the Synodal Church, pointing out the necessity of destroying the autocracy which was ruining and debauching the Church and depraving the masses of the people. It was because he thirsted after the regeneration of the Church that this remarkable religious thinker was driven to join the active enemies of the autocratic *régime*. Being a supporter of the separation of the Church from the State for the sake of the complete freedom of the former, Kartashev entered the Provisional Government after the abolition of the office of the High Procurator of the Holy Synod,<sup>1</sup> and became the first Minister of Cults, in July, 1917. In August of that year Kartashev, in the name of the Provisional Government, opened the All-Russian Church Congress in Moscow, the object of which was to establish quite independently a new and free constitution for the Orthodox Church of Russia. At the time of the Bolshevik *coup d'état* Kartashev was arrested and imprisoned in the fortress of SS. Peter and Paul.

**KISHKIN.**—A member of the medical profession. A prominent member of the Liberal opposition. Leader of the Moscow Left Cadets. Took part in the municipal work of Moscow. During the war was one of the founders of the All-Russian Union of Zemstvos, and, in

spite of Government opposition, rendered inestimable services to the Russian army by organizing the sanitary department and supplying the army with clothes and better food. In his struggle against the autocracy Kishkin always strove to unite all the Liberal, Democratic, and Socialist parties for the fight against the common enemy. During the first days of the Revolution Kishkin's activity in Moscow was very important, in that he united all the revolutionary forces for their common objects. The old *régime* was overthrown in Moscow in a perfectly painless and bloodless way. Kishkin was then appointed Commissary of the Provisional Government in Moscow. He remained in that office till September, 1917, when he was offered, and accepted, the portfolio of Minister of Public Assistance. Kishkin always enjoyed the full confidence of wide circles of Russian society because of his loyal character and consistent democratic activity. During the Bolshevik *coup d'état* he was arrested at a sitting of the Cabinet and was imprisoned in the fortress of SS. Peter and Paul.

**KISLIAKOV.**—General. Military engineer. Was assistant Minister of Ways of Communication. Has been attached to the General Headquarters and was in charge of all matters connected with transport for military purposes. Was arrested together with General Kornilov.

<sup>1</sup> Under the old *régime* a government official with wide powers to control the church.

**KLEMBOVSKY.**—General. Was in command of the Northern front during the summer of 1917. After Kornilov's rebellion Klembovsky was relieved of his command, his place being taken by General Tcheremissov.

**KOKOSHKIN.**—Learned historian; an authority on public law and a publicist. Prominent Moscow politician; belonged to the opposition. One of the founders and leaders of the Constitutional Democratic Party ("Cadets"—the most important Liberal party in Russia), Kokoshkin was elected to the first Duma, and, when the latter was dissolved, he signed the manifesto of Viborg (inviting the nation to refuse to provide recruits and to pay taxes, etc.), for which action he was condemned to prison and disfranchised. Kokoshkin was a permanent member of the Central Committee of the Constitutional Democratic Party. At the very beginning of the Revolution Kokoshkin, as an authority on the constitutional law, was invited by the Provisional Government to preside over an Extraordinary Legal Commission attached to that Government. Later he presided over the Commission entrusted with working out the Electoral Law of the Constituent Assembly. In July, 1917, Kokoshkin was invited by Kerensky (upon recommendation of the Constitutional Democratic Party) to enter his Coalition Cabinet, in which Kokoshkin received the portfolio of State Controller, and

he remained in that office up to the time of Kornilov's rebellion. He was elected to the Constituent Assembly, and in December, 1917, came to Petrograd from Moscow, the 11th of that month being the date (new style) primarily fixed by the Provisional Government for the opening of the Constituent Assembly. There Kokoshkin was arrested by the Bolsheviks (while on a visit to the Countess Panin) and imprisoned in the fortress of SS. Peter and Paul. With a weak constitution and suffering from tuberculosis, his health rapidly declined there, and his friends succeeded in having him transferred (together with Shingarev) to a private nursing home. There, on the very night of his arrival and on the eve of the Constituent Assembly, the suffering Kokoshkin was atrociously murdered in his bed by the infuriated Red Guards. Such was the tragic end of this man, whose knowledge, impartiality, and energy were instrumental in creating the most perfect and just Electoral Law of the Russian Constituent Assembly.

**KOLOKOLOV.** — A civil judge. Member (appointed by the Government) of the Commission of Inquiry for the Kornilov Affair.

**KONOVALOV.**—One of the most important Moscow manufacturers, a well-known Liberal public worker of Moscow. Was a member of the fourth Duma, where he belonged to the Progressive group; and, during

the last years, took an active part in the liberation movement. As a politician Konovalov always strove to create a single wide front in opposition to the Government, to unite Liberal, Democratic, and Socialist Parties for a joint attack on the autocracy. After the defeat of the Russian armies in 1915, Konovalov participated in organizing a *coup d'état* which was then being prepared. Konovalov was a member of the first administration of the Provisional Government, where he was the Minister of Commerce and Industry. In June, 1917, Konovalov resigned that office, but in September he resumed it in the last administration of the Provisional Government, where he was also Vice-President of the Council of Ministers. During the Bolshevik *coup d'état* Konovalov was arrested at the sitting of the Cabinet and remained imprisoned for a long time in the fortress of SS. Peter and Paul.

KORNILOV.—General. A Cossack, an officer of the General Staff, and a fighting officer of exceptional bravery. When a young officer, Kornilov made an extremely dangerous journey in Afghanistan for intelligence purposes. During the present war he became famous for his escape from an Austrian prisoners' camp. His further activity is described in this book. According to reliable information, Kornilov was killed during his struggle against the Bolsheviks.

KOROTKOV.—Colonel. A fighting officer. Member of the Executive Committee of the Armies' Group on the Western front. At the time of Kornilov's rebellion Korotkov with a detachment of troops marched on the Stavka (G.H.Q.).

KOVEL.—This town was captured by the Austro-Germans in 1915. The attempts made in 1916 to retake this important strategic centre were badly organized and therefore unsuccessful, and cost the Russian army terrible sacrifices.

KOVNO.—A first-class fortress, not far from Vilna. Has been captured by the Germans, together with the whole of its artillery and immense ammunition stores, owing to criminal negligence of the High Command. The Governor of the fortress, who left Kovno at the most critical moment, has been condemned and imprisoned with hard labour.

KRILENKO.—Ensign. Participated in the present war. An active member of the Bolshevik Party. In 1905 Krilenko, then student of Petrograd University, became conspicuous in party propaganda and was widely known as a powerful speaker (under the nickname of "Comrade Abraham"). Was tried for participating in the Petrograd Social Democratic organization. Later Krilenko graduated at the University and was in the Civil Service in the provinces. After the Revolution of 1917, Kerensky was elected first a member, then Chairman, of

the Executive Committee of the 11th Army on the Galician front, where he carried on an energetic propaganda in favour of Bolshevism and against the offensive. After the Bolshevik rising in Petrograd in July, 1917, Krilenko was arrested by the military authorities, but was released later by the judicial authorities, the evidence against him being deemed insufficient. He was appointed Commander-in-Chief in the first days of the Bolshevik counter-revolution, and, with a detachment of sailors and Red Guards seized the General Headquarters, where the Chief of the General Staff, General Dukhonin, was atrociously murdered at the railway station, under the very eyes and without the interference of Krilenko. Even before the Brest-Litovsk peace, Krilenko completely destroyed the Russian army by his ignominious and treacherous order authorizing each unit at the front to conclude a separate armistice with the enemy, which order was fully exploited by the German Staff. At the critical moment of the Brest negotiations, Krilenko, without waiting for definite information about their result, ordered the demobilization of the army, thereby leaving Russia completely at the mercy of the Central Powers and making the German Staff the unchallenged master of the Bolshevik Government.

**KRIMOV.**—General. A fighting officer. Full particulars in the book.

**KROKHMAL.**—Barrister. Prominent member of the Social Democratic Party; elected by the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet of Soldiers' and Workmen's Deputies to sit on the Commission of Inquiry for the Kornilov Affair.

**KRONSTADT.**—A fortified city on the Gulf of Finland. Built by Peter the Great to protect the approaches to Petrograd, Kronstadt has lost of late its strategic importance. In the times of Tsardom there were quartered in Kronstadt the disciplinary battalions of the Baltic Fleet, whither the worst characters of all the crews were sent for punishment and correction. There were also a garrison, docks, workshops, etc. In 1906 the Kronstadt garrison responded to the dissolution of the first Duma by an unsuccessful rising. When the Revolution broke out in 1917 most revolting acts of violence were committed in Kronstadt on the officers, mostly by the punished sailors of the disciplinary units. The Commander of Kronstadt was torn to pieces; many officers were murdered; others were thrown into military prisons and kept there in conditions even more cruel than those in which sailors had been kept in the same prison before the Revolution. Such was the fury of the sailors' revenge for the past, that neither the first Minister of Marine in the Provisional Government, A. T. Gutchkov, nor the military judicial authorities could do anything to better the lot of their officers. The situation was only

altered through the intervention of the Cabinet, more especially of Kerensky. The sailors allowed a special commission delegated by Kerensky to investigate the position of the officers and gradually to release them and to bring them out of Kronstadt. The unhealthy past of Kronstadt, the concentration there of vicious elements of the navy, of political police-agents and German spies in great numbers—all this made Kronstadt an especially easy prey for the corrupting Bolshevik propaganda.

KUZMIN.—Captain in the Russian army. Graduated as an engineer. Took part in the Japanese War. During the revolutionary movement of 1905 Kuzmin placed himself at the head of the revolted garrison of Krasnoiarsk (Siberia) and of the revolutionary municipal authorities. He was sentenced to death (in his absence) by the punitive expedition of General Rennenkampf. He fled from Russian territory and lived first in Paris, then on Mount Athos. Later he voluntarily returned to Russia, surrendered to the authorities, and was sentenced by court-martial to a long imprisonment with hard labour. On his return to Petrograd after the Revolution Kuzmin was appointed, in May, 1917, Deputy-Commander of the troops of the Petrograd Military District. Owing to his revolutionary record, Kuzmin enjoyed a great moral authority among the soldiery and successfully fought

against Bolshevik tendencies in the army.

LEBEDEV.—A Social Revolutionary under the old *régime*. Organized and participated in the revolutionary movement amongst the troops. Prosecuted because of this activity, Lebedev was compelled to take refuge abroad and lived for a long time in France. After the declaration of war Lebedev fought in the ranks of the French army, and returned to Russia when an amnesty was granted in Russia to officers of the French army who won military distinctions. After Gutchkov's withdrawal from the Ministry of Marine, the new Minister of Marine (Kerensky) appointed him Chairman of the Commission for the purpose of revising the Statute of the Navy. In that capacity he resisted with considerable success the excessive demands of the sailors, a task which proved to be too much for the previous Chairman of that Commission, the Right Octobrist Savitch. Later entrusted with the administration of the Ministry of Marine, Lebedev carried on an energetic struggle against the Bolshevik defeatist propaganda amongst the sailors, and was nearly always busy in visiting for that purpose the ships of the Baltic navy. An enthusiastic patriot and a warm supporter of the national defence, Lebedev has been compelled, since the Bolshevik revolution, to remain in hiding, as he is being sought for by undisciplined bands of Bolshevik sailors.

**LETCHITSKY.**—A fighting general of old traditions. After the Revolution it became impossible for him to serve in the army under the new conditions.

**LIBER.**—A prominent Social Democrat (Menshevik). At the time of the Provisional Government Liber was one of the most active members of the Presidency of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet of Soldiers' and Workmen's Deputies. Member (elected by the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet of Soldiers' and Workmen's Deputies) of the Commission of Inquiry for the Kornilov Affair.

**LUGA.**—A provincial town halfway between Pskov and Petrograd, on the Warsaw railway.

**LUKOMSKY.**—General. An officer of the General Staff; professor at the War Academy. Has had a brilliant military career and, when still a comparatively young man, was appointed Deputy-Minister to the Minister for War, General Polivanov. When the place of the latter was taken by General Sukhomlinov, Lukomsky went into the army as a divisional commander and fought with his division in a number of battles, having especially distinguished himself during most difficult operations in the Carpathians. His double experience as an administrator and as a fighting general made him particularly suitable for one of the highest posts in the army; and in May, 1917, Lukomsky

was appointed Chief of the Staff of the Generalissimo Brussilov, in which office he remained up to his arrest in connection with Kornilov's rebellion.

**Lvov.**—Prince G. A. well-known Zemstvo worker. Was a member of the first Duma. A veteran of the Liberal-Constitutional movement of the Zemstvos. Was a member of the famous delegation of Zemstvos and towns in 1905 which presented Tsar Nicholas II with an address pointing out the necessity of establishing a constitutional government. A remarkable organizer, Lvov created at the beginning of the war the All-Russian Union of Towns, and rendered inestimable services to the Russian army by creating an exemplary system of sanitary institutions and by supplying the army with food, clothes, and even with ammunition. All the best elements of the Zemstvos rallied around Lvov, and the Union of which he was the leader has played an exceedingly important part in uniting during the war the enemies of Tsardom for the fight against the latter. When the old *régime* was overthrown, Prince Lvov proved to be the only one whose candidature to the premiership was unopposed, as both Liberal and Democratic circles recognized how greatly he had deserved of the State, and held him personally in great esteem. After the Bolshevik rising in July, 1917, Lvov left the Provisional Government, in which he held office both as Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior.

Lvov, V. N.—A big landowner. Was a member of the third and fourth Dumas. Belonged to the parties of the Right. In the fourth Duma was a member of the so-called Centre, a small group consisting mainly of Conservative landowners and occupying a middle position between the Octobrists and the Nationalists. When, during the war, a new Conservative-Liberal majority was formed in the Duma, under the name of "Progressive Coalition," the group of the Centre formed its right wing. Lvov represented that group in the first Provisional Government, where, having been considered in the Duma a specialist on Church questions, he was given the portfolio of the High Procurator of the Holy Synod of the Orthodox Church. In July, 1917, Lvov left the Provisional Government and the office of High Procurator was discontinued, as being contrary to the principle of the autonomy of the Orthodox Church and hateful to the Church because of its historical traditions.

MAKLAKOV.—A Moscow barrister, powerful political and courts speaker, one of the foremost Liberal politicians. In 1904, when certain political crimes were taken out of the jurisdiction of the administrative authorities to be tried by special courts, and thus the so-called "political cases" were resumed in Russia, Maklakov with a few of his colleagues organized the Moscow Group of Counsel for the defence of political criminals. Maklakov was a member

of the Cadet Party, where he occupied a position on the right wing. Was a member of the second, third, and fourth Dumas. During the war Maklakov was in sympathy with the *coup d'état* which was then being prepared. In the first days of the Revolution, before a Provisional Government was formed, the Duma Executive Committee appointed Maklakov Commissary of the Ministry of Justice. In the summer of 1917 Maklakov was appointed Ambassador of the Provisional Government to France.

MARKOV.—General. One of the younger generals belonging to the General Staff; a close collaborator and adviser of General Denikin and a permanent Chief of Staff of the latter. His attitude towards the elected military organizations contributed much towards straining the relations between these bodies and General Denikin. Markov helped to prepare the Kornilov movement at the South-western front.

MARTOV (ZEDERBAUM).—One of the oldest Social Democratic leaders in Russia; publicist. For many years collaborated in the leading party organs; under the old *régime* lived mostly abroad as a political refugee. After the split of the Russian Social Democratic Party into Bolsheviks (under Lenin) and Mensheviks, Martov assumed the leadership of the latter. During the war Martov neither shared the anti-Marxian and extremist attitude of Lenin towards the war, nor did he join the sup-

porters of the national defence ("Oborontzy"); he was the most important representative of the so-called "internationalist" point of view, which may be described as a sort of malevolent neutrality towards the war. On his return to Russia after the Revolution, Martov, together with a small group of his friends, adopted in his articles an attitude of hostility towards the Provisional Government and the national democratic movement of the "oborontzy." During that first period of the Russian Revolution, Martov, while keeping in practice aloof from Lenin's enterprises, lent to Bolshevism his theoretical and moral support, mostly by his contributions to the *Novoia Jizn*, edited by the famous Russian writer, Maxim Gorky. After the Bolshevik *coup d'état* Martov became a bitter opponent of Lenin, Trotsky and Co., whom he proclaimed the greatest and most dangerous enemies of the proletariat and of the whole of democracy.

MILIUKOV.—Learned historian; late lecturer at the Moscow University; author of the well-known works "The Russian State under Peter the Great," "Essays on the Russian Culture," and others. One of the founders and the leader of the Constitutional Democratic Party. Member of the third and fourth Dumas. Has taken a prominent part in the liberation movement which has been going on in Russia for the last twenty years. Actively participated in

the March Revolution (of 1917), first as a member of the Executive Committee elected by the Duma to direct the events, then as the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the first Provisional Government. After having been in office for nearly two months, Miliukov, who supported an aggressive policy in the question of war aims, disagreed with the views held by the majority of the members of the Provisional Government upon the immediate object of the Russian foreign policy, and at the beginning of May, 1917, he resigned office. Since then Miliukov has been in opposition to the Government.

MIRONOV.—Sanskrit scholar and a Social-Revolutionary journalist. Took part in the liberation movement of 1905-6. Lived long in Paris as a political refugee. On his return to Russia collaborated in the Academy of Sciences. In the spring of 1917, after the Revolution, Mironov placed himself at the disposal of the Ministry of War for work of counter-espionage. He was the head of the counter-espionage department of the Staff of the Petrograd Military District, and specialized in the matter of German influences in the Bolshevik Party.

MITAVA (=MITAU).—The capital of Courland. Captured by the Germans at the beginning of the war. In the winter of 1916 a Russian offensive took place in the direction of Mitava, which was badly organized and unsuccessful.



**MOHILEV.**—Administrative centre of the Province (Government) of Mohilev. Was the residence of the General Headquarters from the summer of 1915 up to the Bolshevik counter-revolution. It was the scene of the murder of General Dukhonin. At present Mohilev is in the hands of the Germans.

**MOJAISK.**—A provincial town, not far from Moscow.

**MURAVIEV, Captain.**—Naval officer. Participated in the present war. Muraviev was a flag-captain attached to the Minister of Marine, Kerensky.

**NABOKOV, V. D.**—Son of a Minister of Justice under Alexander the Second; a big landowner; specialist on penal law. Was a lecturer upon penal law in the "Privileged School of Law" until the time of the liberation movement of 1905-6, in which movement he participated as a publicist and a prominent member of the Constitutional-Democratic Party. Nabokov was a member of the first Duma and was sentenced to three months' imprisonment and deprived of political rights for having signed the Viborg Manifesto (which invited the nation to refuse levies and moneys to the Government on account of the dissolution of the Duma). Previously Nabokov had been deprived of his rank at Court for having published articles against the Government, more especially one protesting against the Jewish pogrom at Kishinev (1903). After the Revolution

Nabokov was appointed Director of Affairs to the Provisional Government, member of a special Legal Commission attached to the Government, and to report on Caucasian affairs. Later he was appointed member of the Senate.

**NEKRASSOV.**—Graduate of Institute of Ways and Communications. Member of Tomsk (Siberia) in the third and fourth Dumas, where he was prominent as the leader of the Left wing of the Cadets, in opposition to the Right wing under the leadership of Miliukov. His political work began when he was elected to the Duma, in whose assembly Nekrassov soon took his place amongst the foremost and most active members of the opposition and worked hard in trying to effect a coalition of different groups of the opposition (Liberals, Democrats, and Socialists), which coalition Nekrassov (together with his political friends) considered most essential as a preparatory step towards the struggle for wresting the power from the old *régime*. When war was declared Nekrassov temporarily abandoned politics and went to the front as the Chairman of the "Union of Towns," for the purpose of organizing at the front hospitals, supply-centres, baths, etc.

After the terrible defeats of 1915, when the criminal activity of the Court Camarilla (Rasputin and others) became even more apparent, Nekrassov resumed his political life and took an active part in the work of

the organizations which were preparing the *coup d'état*. The spontaneous outburst of the suffering masses in March, 1917, put an end to the work, and, instead of an organized *coup d'état*, resulted in a people's revolution, which for a while made of the Duma a national revolutionary centre. The Government created by that centre naturally included Nekrassov, who became Minister of Ways and Communications. During the first four months of the Revolution Nekrassov (with a few others) also represented in the Government the Cadet Party. At the beginning of July Nekrassov went to Kiev as a member of the Government delegation for the settlement of the Ukrainian question. As his views upon this matter proved irreconcilable with those of other Cadet members of the Government, Nekrassov left both his party and the Government, but shortly afterwards re-entered the Cabinet as a non-party politician. He received the portfolio of Minister of Finance, and was also appointed Vice-President of the Council of Ministers. After the Kornilov rebellion Nekrassov went to Finland as Governor-General, where he was still at the time of the Bolshevik revolt.

NOVOSSILTSEV.—A big landowner. A Zemstvo worker and a politician. Cadet (Constitutional-Democrat) of the Right. Was a member of the fourth Duma, but resigned his seat a considerable time before the expiration of his mandate. Upon the

declaration of the war Novossiltsev was called to the colours as a reserve officer. First he was at the front, then was transferred to General Headquarters, where he took an important part in organizing the All-Russian Officers' League. Was Chairman of the Main Committee of that League. After the Kornilov rebellion was arrested by the Government.

OLDENBURG.—Member and Permanent Secretary of the Academy of Sciences of Petrograd; an authority on Sanskrit and Buddhism. Member of the Central Committee of the Constitutional-Democratic Party (Cadets). Although a brilliant scholar, he has never kept himself within the sphere of purely academic interests; even from an early age he took an active part in the liberation movement and has done all he could to promote the education of the Russian people. In July, 1917, Oldenburg was invited to join the Provisional Government as Minister of Education.

OMSK.—Seat of administration of the Steppes region of Western Siberia.

ORANIENBAUM.—A small town on the coast of the Gulf of Finland, opposite the Isle of Kotlin, where Kronstadt is situated. An imperial residence.

POLIVANOV.—General. Very able General Staff officer. Was for some time (in the days of the third Duma) Assistant Minister for War. Belonged to the

officers' circles which rallied to Gutchkov; and, together with the latter, carried on a struggle against Sukhomlinov and his camarilla. After the *débâcle* of the Russian armies in 1915 and the fall of Sukhomlinov, Polivanov was appointed Minister for War; he tried to meet Russian society half-way in its efforts, resisted by the majority of the Government, to come to the aid of the army. Polivanov also tried to organize collaboration with the Duma. In short, his policy was to a certain extent a Progressive one. He did not remain long Minister of War, because of his differences on many points with the ever-growing reaction of Government circles. After the Revolution Gutchkov, then Minister of War, appointed Polivanov Chairman of the Extraordinary Commission newly established by the Ministry of War for the purpose of revising the Military Code with a view to bringing it into agreement with the new revolutionary conditions of life in the army. This Commission, which was known as "Polivanov's Commission" and is well remembered for its disastrous results, was composed partly of military officials appointed by the Ministry, partly of elected delegates of soldiers' organizations and representatives of the Petrograd Workmen's and Soldiers' Soviet. Under the influence of the general atmosphere in the first period of revolutionary excitement, the Commission imprudently went much too far in meeting the wishes and demands of the soldiers and the

Soviet's representatives, who wanted radically to modify the whole army discipline and the relations between the body of officers and the rank and file. When in May Kerensky became Minister of War, he stopped the work of this Commission and started gradually to wind up the awkward legacy of its reformatory activities.

PRONIN.—Colonel. Officer of the General Staff. In 1917 served on the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief. Was Vice-Chairman of the Main Committee of the All-Russian Officers' League (for particulars of which see book).

PROTOPPOV.—The last Tsarist Minister of the Interior; big landowner of the Government of Simbirsk and an important manufacturer, supplying cloth to the army. In 1916 was elected Marshal of the Nobility of his province. A retired officer. Was a member of the third Duma and Deputy-Speaker of the fourth Duma. Protopopov belonged to the Octobrist Party and displayed always rather Progressive tendencies. He tried to be on good terms with the moderate and even the extreme opposition groups of the Duma, at the same time conserving very friendly relations with the bureaucratic circles. When the Special Commission was formed for the purpose of inquiring into the criminal conduct of Sukhomlinov, the Minister for War, Protopopov became the representative of the Duma on it, both by election and by appoint-

ment of the Government. During the war Protopopov became intimate with the Rasputin circles and came under the patronage of Rasputin. In September, 1916, Protopopov was appointed Minister of the Interior, being designated for that post by the Rasputin circles and insistently supported by the Tsarina. Once Minister of the Interior, at the very time when the whole of Russian society, the Duma, and even his own party were carrying on a bitter fight against the crumbling Tsardom, Protopopov soon forgot his "Liberalism" and became a docile tool in the hands of the Court Camarilla. He rapidly became one of the best hated men in Russia. After the assassination of Rasputin, Protopopov tried to keep his position by assuring the Tsarina and her intimates that Rasputin was in mystical communication with him, and even that Rasputin's spirit had incarnated in him. When the Revolution broke out, Protopopov, who only with difficulty escaped lynching, appeared before the Duma and voluntarily surrendered to the revolutionary authorities. Protopopov was recently shot by the Bolsheviks.

**PUGATCHEV MOVEMENT** (*Pugatchevstchina*).—Towards the end of the eighteenth century, during the reign of Catherine the Great, an exceptionally powerful spontaneous rising of the peasant-serfs broke out in the Urals and in the Volga provinces. Taking revenge on their age-long oppressors—the landlords—the

peasant masses everywhere massacred their masters and burnt down the estates and plundered the property of the nobles. At the head of the mutineers was an ignorant Cossack, Emelian Pugatchev, who declared himself to be the Emperor Peter III (the husband of Catherine the Great, who was dethroned by her and later strangled by one of her lovers). Violent anarchical mass movements are often called in Russia "pugatchevstchina" after this leader of the peasants' rising.

**PURISHKEVITCH.**—A militant reactionary. In Plehve's time was in the Civil Service in the capacity of official for special missions. Publicist. In 1905 he helped to organize the "Black Hundreds." A violent anti-Semite. Participated in the "League of United Nobility" and the "Union of the Russian People." Later created the rival reactionary "League of Archangel Michael," subsidized by the Government. Purishkevitch specialized in systematic attacks on the Universities and on public men prominent in popular education. Was a member of the second, third, and fourth Dumas, where he became notorious for his unbearable and scandalous behaviour. For some time Purishkevitch enjoyed exceptional patronage in the highest governmental circles, when he and his League and its provincial branches played the part of a voluntary police organization, literally terrorizing the people by their espionage and denunciations. Purishkevitch carried on a violent

campaign against all non-Russian nationalities and cults within the Empire. In the fourth Duma, upon the declaration of the war, Purishkevitch stopped his destructive and anti-public work and displayed considerable energy in his activity with the Red Cross. Under pressure of the horrors of the Rasputin *régime*, Purishkevitch, although a monarchist, began to act as an opponent of the *régime*, and finally participated in the assassination of Gregory Rasputin.

РАУПАКН.—A colonel. Military lawyer; member (appointed by the Government) of the Commission of Inquiry for the Kornilov Affair.

РОДЗИАНКО.—A big landowner. Has been many times elected "Marshal of the Nobility" of the provinces where his estates were situated. During the liberation movement of 1905 he joined the reactionary forces of bureaucracy and nobility. At the time of the first Duma he was elected by the nobility to the State Council (the Upper House). Was a member of the "Union of the Nobles" which demanded and obtained the dissolution of the first Duma and directed the reactionary policy of Stolipin. During the period of reaction which set in after the dissolution of the first Duma, Rodzianko was the leader of his Government (province) in the campaign of the reactionary nobility against the Zemstvos and against all the acquisitions gained through the libera-

tion movement of 1905. After the reforms of the electoral law of the Duma illegally enforced by Stolipin, when a reactionary majority was artificially created by means of a curial system of elections, Rodzianko was sent to the third Duma by the landowner curia of the Government of Ekaterinoslav (Ukraine). There he joined the Octobrist Party led by Gutchkov. That party formed, together with the Nationalist group, the majority in the third Duma. The Russian people remember well the activity of that majority, tending to destroy all the cultural and constitutional gains of 1905-6; the persecutions of the non-Russian nationalities of the Empire (Finns, Poles, Jews, etc.), and finally, its Land Act, contrary to the interests of the immense majority of the Russian peasantry. During the last years of that Duma, Rodzianko was elected Speaker. He was re-elected to the fourth Duma, of which he also was the Speaker during all the five years of its existence; and, together with the majority of that Duma, Rodzianko performed a rapid evolution towards the Left. The *régime* of Rasputin drove even the most devoted supporters of the Tsardom into the opposite camp. The criminal anti-patriotic activity of the Court Camarilla during the war not only allayed the fear of revolution in the mind of people like Rodzianko, but actually convinced them that the Revolution was possible, nay, inevitable. During the winter of 1916 Rodzianko had even some-

thing to do with the preparatory organizing of a *coup d'état*. And so the Revolution did not take by surprise this former reactionary; after a short hesitation Rodzianko, on the afternoon of February 27th, 1917, definitely joined the movement, accepted the chairmanship of the Executive Committee of the Duma, and sent to the Tsar Nicholas the famous telegram in which he urged him to abdicate. Rodzianko was also a member of the delegation to the Grand Duke Michael which presented the latter with a similar demand. Having been left out of the Cabinet of the Provisional Government, Rodzianko remained, after the Revolution, Speaker of the Duma. As the importance and the authority of the Duma were rapidly diminishing, Rodzianko went even more into the shade, and since then did not take any positive part in the events. After July, 1917, Rodzianko openly went over to the opposition to the Provisional Government and again passed through a rapid evolution—this time from Left to Right. The political story of Rodzianko is interesting because he may be considered a typical representative of his class.

ROMANOVSKY.—General. Officer of the General Staff. In 1917 was Quartermaster-General at the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief. Romanovsky was arrested with General Kornilov.

RUZSKY.—General. Took a prominent part in the war, at the beginning of which he partici-

pated in the first offensive in Galicia; afterwards he was in command of the Northern army. For some time Ruzsky has been very popular in wide circles of Russian society.

SAMARIN.—General. Officer of the General Staff and a fighting officer. Took part in the present war. For a time was Chief of Staff of General Kornilov. Under Kerensky as Minister of War, Samarin held the office of Assistant-Chief of the Military Cabinet of the Minister; later he was appointed to command the troops of the Irkutsk Military District in Siberia.

SAN.—A river in Eastern Galicia. There the German army under General Mackensen effected the famous break through of 1915, when Russian troops, lacking ammunition, almost entirely without artillery (owing to the criminal policy of the Minister of War, Sukomlinov, and others), were subjected to a sweeping drum-fire and were compelled to a hurried retreat from Galicia. Shortly upon this retreat, followed the fall of Warsaw, the retaking by the Austrians of the first-class fortress of Peremyshi (Przemysl), taken by the Russians at the cost of enormous sacrifices, and so on.

"SAVAGE" DIVISION.—The Caucasian cavalry division formed by the Tsar's brother, the Grand Duke Michael, of representatives of Moslem Caucasian tribes which were exempt from

conscription. This division consisted of exceedingly brave but utterly uncivilized mountaineers, and was commanded by officers selected by the Grand Duke. Among these officers there were many Guards and young men belonging to aristocratic families. The division was considered quite "free from infection" of revolutionary propaganda, and therefore particularly suitable for carrying out the plan of the plotters. The division distinguished itself in the war by the exceptional boldness of its cavalry charges on the enemy and by its rather easy ways with the peaceful population.

**SAVINKOV.**—One of the foremost revolutionaries; member of the Social Revolutionary Party. A partisan of terrorism, Savinkov organized and co-operated in the most important political assassinations in Russia (Plehve, Grand Duke Sergius, and others). Spent many years abroad as a political refugee, and has written during that period several novels from the life of revolutionaries, which enjoyed a great success. On his return to Russia after the Revolution, Savinkov went to the Galician front as the Commissary of the 7th Army, to which post he was appointed by the Minister of War, Kerensky, upon a recommendation of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet. There Savinkov carried on an intense struggle against the Bolshevik tendencies, and at the peril of his life, restored discipline in some of

the most debauched regiments. By that activity Savinkov considerably contributed to the success of the offensive on the 1st of July, 1917, at Brzezany.

When Kerensky became acquainted on the spot with Savinkov's work, he appointed him First Commissary of the Minister of War attached to the Commander of the Army group of the South-western front, thereby creating a new office with very wide powers. Savinkov's activity since that appointment is described in the book itself.

**SAVITCH.**—Member of the third and fourth Dumas. Octobrist. One of the close collaborators of Gutchkov. In the Duma he was considered a specialist on matters connected with the navy. Was for some time Chairman of the Army and Navy Commission of the Duma. After the Revolution the Minister of War and Marine (Gutchkov) formed at his Ministry a Commission similar to that of Polivanov (*q.v.*) at the Ministry of War, and appointed Savitch to act as its Chairman.

**SELIVANOV.**—General. A fighting general. During the July offensive was in command of an army corps; then was in command of an army at the Galician front.

**SHABLOVSKY.**—Military - Naval Prosecutor (Procureur) General; Chairman of the Extraordinary Commission of Inquiry for the Kornilov Affair. Under Tsardom, Shablovsky was a

prominent barrister who specialized in the defence (mostly in the Baltic provinces) of persons prosecuted by the Tsar's Government on account of their revolutionary and political activity.

**SHINGAREV.**—Member of the medical profession. Was prominent in the Zemstvos both as medical man and as Zemstvo-Councillor. Publicist. After having graduated at the University, Shingarev gave up his University career and settled in the country in order to treat peasants. Shingarev took part for many years in the Zemstvo and liberation movement. He was a member of the second, third and fourth Dumas. Was a member of the Cadet Party, vice-chairman of its Duma group and a member of the Central Committee of the party. In the third Duma he specialized in questions of finance. In the fourth Duma he also worked much in the Army and Navy Commission, and later became its chairman. He was a popular speaker in the Duma. After the Revolution Shingarev became Minister of Agriculture, and then Minister of Finance. He left the Government at the beginning of July, together with other representatives of his party, because of their differences with the Government on the Ukrainian question. Under Shingarev as Minister of Agriculture were laid the foundations of the radical agrarian reforms. Having been elected to the Constituent Assembly in November, 1917, Shingarev came to Petro-

grad in time for the date fixed by the Provisional Government for the convocation of the Assembly—the 28th of November. On the eve of that day Shingarev, together with Kokoshkin (*q.v.*), was arrested by the Bolsheviks and imprisoned in the fortress of SS. Peter and Paul. Transferred to a private nursing home on the day before the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, the suffering Shingarev was atrociously murdered in bed by the Bolshevik guards.

**SKOBELEV.**—Descendant of schismatic peasants (Molokani) who were in past time deported to the Caucasus. Son of an important Baku trader. Was educated at the Vienna Polytechnical Institute. A social Democrat (Menshevik), Skobelev when still a young man was elected to the fourth Duma by the Russian population of Transcaucasia. Joining the Social Democratic group in the Duma, Skobelev by his frequent speeches and questions on important occasions came to the foreground and acquired a wide reputation. Skobelev did not remain within the bounds of party activity, and participated in the general opposition and revolutionary movement, not being afraid of co-operating with the bourgeoisie. Skobelev took a most intimate part in the Revolution from the first day, and when the Petrograd Soviet of Workmen and Sailors' Delegates had been formed, he was elected its Vice-Chairman. In the Soviet Skobelev



always energetically supported the necessity of national defence and of a co-operation of the Revolutionary democracy with the Liberal bourgeoisie, if the country and the Revolution were to be saved. In the month of May Skobelev became a member of the first coalition Provisional Government as the head of the then created Ministry of Labour, in which office he remained up to the time of Kornilov's rebellion.

**SOLDAU.**—A town in East Prussia, near which was routed the Russian detachment under General Samsonov, whereupon Russian troops began a disorderly retreat in the autumn of 1914.

**STCHEGLOVITOV.**—A prominent reactionary politician of the last years of Tsardom. A lawyer and a well-known specialist on penal law. Stcheglovitov up to 1906 always emphasized his liberal ideas and independence of the governmental influences. When (in the late 'nineties and first years of 1900) Stcheglovitov was High Prosecutor (Ober-Procuror) of the Criminal Court of Error (Cassation) of the Senate, he even gained the nickname of the "Red Procurer," because of his bold actions in defence of the law courts and courts statutes. During that period Stcheglovitov was a contributor (together with most of the prominent jurists in opposition to the Government) to the judicial review *The Law*, which carried on an energetic struggle against the autocracy.

After Stcheglovitov had been

appointed Minister of Justice, in the time of the first Duma and before the dissolution of the latter, he strove to keep friendly relations with its Constitutional Democratic majority. The dissolution of the Duma and the decisive victory of the Stolipin reaction at a stroke transformed the "Red Procurer" into one of the blackest heroes of the last ten years of Tsardom. Stcheglovitov literally "burnt all that he used to adore, and adored all that he used to burn." Like all renegades, Stcheglovitov tried to make people forget his old sins; thus, he knew no bounds in his jeering mockeries at justice and humanity. Being one of the few clever ministers educated in statesmanship among the many ignorant high dignitaries of the last period of the old *régime*, Stcheglovitov became the source of ideas and inspirations to the Government reaction; and he was clever at giving political and civilized appearances to the wildest enterprises of the Black Hundreds. He protected assassins hired by reactionaries from a judicial prosecution; shut his eyes to the fact that torture was being employed during inquiries into political crimes; and under his rule the judicial authorities manufactured false documents for the purpose of concocting evidence to convict the enemies of the autocracy. He hunted down the independent Press and all the non-Russian nationalities of the Empire, more especially the Jews, Poles, and Finns. The crowning "judicial" achievement of this

renegade jurist was when he used the barbarous mediæval judicial procedure, which he had introduced, for the purpose of manufacturing evidence against Beiliss, the Jew accused of a ritual murder of a Christian boy. Stcheglovitov actually succeeded in destroying all justice in the courts of Tsarist Russia, and thereby contributed perhaps more than anybody else to the fall of Tsardom. In spite of all those efforts, however, this former Liberal always remained somewhat suspect to the pillars of the Court reaction; and so Stcheglovitov's dream of becoming Prime Minister was never realized. In 1916, he retired from the Ministry of Justice and was appointed President of the State Council. He was the first of the Tsar's dignitaries to be apprehended (on the first day of the Revolution, at his house by a group of citizens), and was brought to the Duma and handed over to Kerensky, who had him arrested in the name of the Revolutionary Authority. Recently Stcheglovitov has been shot by the Bolsheviks.

STRUVE.—Professor, learned economist, publicist and philosopher. Collaborated with Plekhanov and Lenin. In the 'nineties Struve was one of the foremost followers of and authorities on Marxian doctrines in Russia. He wrote the first manifesto laying down the program of the Russian Social Democratic Party, and actively contributed to the first successes of that party both among the

Intelligentsia and in Labour circles. Later, he lost faith in the philosophical and political ideas of Marxism and left the Social Democratic Party. Struve then took a prominent part in the idealist (neo-Kantian) movement, which at that time was rallying a considerable part of the Russian Intelligentsia. At the same time in politics he joined the Liberals. Before the liberation movement of 1905, Struve went to Stuttgart, where he edited a Russian newspaper, *Osvobojdenie* ("Liberation"), devoted to propaganda against the Tsardom and in favour of a parliamentary constitution for Russia. In spite of all measures taken by the Tsarist police, that periodical was brought into Russia in great numbers by the agents of the "Union of Liberation," a very large Liberal-Democratic secret organization which arose in Russia towards the end of the last century for the purpose of carrying on a struggle against the Tsardom. This union absorbed and organized all the non-Socialist elements among the Intelligentsia, the Zemstvo and municipal workers, scientists and writers. There is hardly a single prominent public man in Russia who has not been at some time a member of this secret society. The paper edited by Struve abroad was its secret organ. In 1905, after the famous Manifesto of the 17th of October, when open political work became possible in Russia, the "Union of Liberation" fell to pieces, its main body forming the Cadet Party, while its

Right wing joined the Octobrist Party, and its democratic elements were dispersed among different Socialist parties. On his return to Russia after the 17th of October, Struve became a prominent Constitutional Democrat and a member of the Central Committee of that party. He was a member for Petrograd of the second Duma. In his evolution from Social Democracy to Liberalism, Struve reached the Right wing of the Constitutional Democratic Party, passed through it, and was working with the political elements occupying a position still further Right who may be described as Liberal-Conservatives. Being an ardent supporter of the centralist idea, Struve was rather hostile to the aspirations of the non-Russian nationalities. After the Revolution of 1917, Miliukov, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, placed Struve at the head of the newly formed Economic Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was also very active in the High Council of Economics attached to the Provisional Government, and later was a member of the Provisional Council of the Republic (Provisional Parliament). At present Struve is a leader of the monarchist movement in Russia.

STUTCHKA.—A Lett barrister, a violent Bolshevik. After the Bolshevik *coup d'état* Stutchka took a very active part in the destruction of the Russian judicial machinery. The absurd and barbarian "courts" estab-

lished by the Bolsheviks have received in Russia the contemptuous nickname of "Stutchka's courts."

TARNOPOL.—A town in Eastern Galicia. It was near that town that the Austro-German troops succeeded on the 19th of July 1917, at the very moment of the Bolshevik revolt in Petrograd, in breaking through the Russian front, whereupon the Russian army was compelled to evacuate Galicia. This retreat was of such a character as to remind one of many episodes of the catastrophic retreat of the Russian army at the time of the old *régime* in 1915.

TCHEREMISSOV.—General. Professor at the War Academy. One of the ablest officers in the Russian army, who, however, did not enjoy the general confidence of the Staff circles, owing to his somewhat hesitating policy. At the critical moment of the Bolshevik revolt. Tcheremissoff, then at Pskov (south-east of Petrograd), in the capacity of the Commander of the Northern front, adopted a passive attitude, and thereby contributed, perhaps unwillingly, to the success of the revolt.

TCHERNOV.—One of the founders of the Social Revolutionary Party; Chairman of its Central Committee; publicist. As a political refugee has spent many years abroad, in France, and especially in Switzerland. On his return to Russia after the Revolution he became (in May, 1917), member of the Pro-

visional Government as Minister of Agriculture, in which office he remained until the Kornilov rebellion, when he joined the opposition, demanding the formation of a homogeneous Socialist Government. Before the Bolshevik *coup d'état* Tchernov carried on a personal campaign against Kerensky, trying to induce his party to come to an agreement with the Bolsheviks and occupying a somewhat ambiguous position towards the question of the continuance of the war.

TCHERNOVITSI (CZERNOVICH).—

The capital of the Austrian Province of Bukovina.

TERESTCHENKO.—Belongs to a well-known Russian family of very wealthy sugar-refiners. A gentleman of independent means Terestchenko from the beginning of the war devoted himself entirely to work in public organizations at the front; he was one of the creators of the Military Industrial Committees which, after the *débâcle* of 1915, took the initiative in re-equipping the Russian army. While working at the front and in those public bodies, Terestchenko was driven to believe definitely in the necessity for a *coup d'état*. His wide social connections, which included military circles, made it possible for Terestchenko to do considerable work in that direction. When the Provisional Government was being formed, Prince Lvov, Chairman of the All-Russian Union of Zemstvos, who was himself marked out for the post

of Prime Minister, proposed (together with several other persons) that Terestchenko should be made Minister of Finance. Thus Terestchenko became a member of the first Revolutionary Government, where he was the only one who had never before been elected to a Legislative Chamber. After Milinkov left the Government, Terestchenko accepted the portfolio of Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which office he remained until the Bolshevik *coup d'état*. Having been arrested by the Bolsheviks at the sitting of the Cabinet, Terestchenko was imprisoned in the fortress of SS. Peter and Paul, where he remained for several months.

TROTZKY (BRONSTEIN).—Well-known Social Democrat; propagandist and publicist. A remarkable demagogic speaker. During the Revolution of 1905 he was a member of the Petrograd Soviet of Workmen's Delegates, then formed for the first time. Trotzky was among those Labour leaders who contributed much to the defeat of the first Russian Revolution by their extremist watchwords and their irreconcilability. Having been arrested, together with the other members of the Soviet, on an order of the Government of Count Witte, Trotzky was, with the others, sentenced to be deported to Siberia, whence he escaped and fled abroad. Until 1917 Trotzky lived in different European centres and took an important part in the Russian Social-Democratic movement, where he stood for a middle course be-

tween the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks. During the present war Trotsky joined the militant Socialist Pacifists, being especially hostile to England. The Revolution of 1917 found him in America, whence he returned in April to Russia, via England and Sweden. Profiting by the full freedom reigning there, Trotsky, who knew how to remain prudently in the background until the right moment, carried on a tenacious and utterly unscrupulous struggle for power, together with Lenin. The ill-fated Kornilov rebellion exasperated the workmen and soldiers and drove them, from supporting a Social Revolutionary and Menshevik Government, into the arms of the Bolsheviks and Anarchists; thus the road was opened for Trotsky to the chair of the Petrograd Soviet. After this Trotsky began openly to work for an armed rising and the disorganization of the defence of the country. It is most characteristic of the man and his kind that, while preparing a dictatorship and the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, the Bolshevik demagogues, with Trotsky and Lenin at their head, adopted as their war-cry the immediate convocation of the Assembly and the alleged resistance to it of the Provisional Government; similarly, the destruction of Russia's military power was started in the name of the "Revolutionary Organization by Workmen and Soldiers of the Defence of Petrograd," which the Provisional Government began to evacuate in order (the Bolsheviks pretended) to

surrender it to the Germans.

With the chairmanship of the Petrograd Soviet begins a new period of Trotsky's activity, not yet concluded and intimately connected with the terrible and treacherous work of Lenin and his collaborators.

TRUBETZKOY.—Prince G. N. Diplomat. Supporter of an active policy in the Balkans. Has been Russian Minister to Serbia, then was Director of the Near East Department in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. One of the close collaborators of Miliukov at the time when the latter was Minister for Foreign Affairs. Later, when that office was taken over by M. I. Terestchenko, Trubetzkoyn became head of the Diplomatic Department attached to the General Staff, which office he relinquished after Kornilov's rebellion.

TSERETELLI.—A Georgian (of Georgia in the Caucasus). One of the leaders of the Social-Democratic Party (Mensheviks). His speeches in the second Duma in 1907 gave him a wide renown. That Duma was dissolved by Stolipin after a life of a few months, and on an order of the Government the whole of its Social-Democratic faction was committed for trial on a false charge of organizing an armed mutiny of the troops. Together with several of his comrades, Tseretelli was condemned by the Imperial Court to imprisonment in Siberia with hard labour, and he was only liberated and returned to Russia after the amnesty pro-

claimed by the Provisional Government. On his arrival in Petrograd in April 1917, Tseretelli became one of the beloved leaders of the Russian democracy and the guiding leader of the Soviets. A very decided defender of the necessity of continuing the war for the sake of the national defence, and an honest supporter of the idea of a coalitional government based upon the co-operation of the Liberal, Democratic and Socialist Parties, Tseretelli, became in May, 1917, a member of the first Coalitional Cabinet as Minister of Post and Telegraph, and later as Minister of the Interior. At the beginning of August, Tseretelli relinquished office, because it was highly necessary for him to concentrate his efforts in directing the policy of both the Petrograd and the Central Soviets and in the struggle against the Bolshevik agitation.

**TUMANOV.**—Prince. Officer of the General Staff. In the very first days of the Revolution Tumanov reported at the Duma, together with a few other officers of the General Staff, and placed himself at the disposal of the people for the struggle against the autocracy. Was a member of the Military Commission of the Duma, which during the transition period of the revolutionary days played the part of the Supreme Military Authority and restored order in the Petrograd garrison. Was Assistant Minister of War during Kerensky's office at that Ministry. During the Bolshevik counter-revolution

Tumanov was atrociously tortured to death in the street, and his body was thrown into the Ekaterininsky Canal.

**UKRAINTSEV.**—A colonel. Military lawyer, member (appointed by the Government) of the Commission of Inquiry for the Kornilov Affair.

**VASSILKOVSKY.**—General. A Cossack. Participated in the present war. After the July Bolshevik rising was appointed Commander of the troops of the Petrograd Military District.

**VELITCHKO.**—General. Professor of military engineering; a well-known specialist. In 1917, Velitchko was at the head of all engineering troops and organizations at the front.

**VERDEREVSKY.**—Rear-Admiral. A remarkable naval officer. Served first in the Black Sea then in the Baltic. After the Japanese War, Verderevsky took a very active part in the work of recreating and reorganizing the Baltic Fleet. He was a member of the Staff of Admiral Essen. A few months before the war, he retired from the service on his own initiative. After the declaration of war Verderevsky returned to the Baltic Fleet, where he was placed in command first of a cruiser, then of the first cruiser squadron, and afterwards of the submarine division comprising the British submarines on Russian service. At the moment when the Revolution broke out, Verderevsky was at Revel,

where a considerable part of the Baltic Fleet was concentrated; he directed the events in the fleet in those days, and has done much to maintain order and peaceful relations between officers and men. The Minister of Marine, Gutchkov, appointed him Chief of the Staff of the Baltic Fleet; later, in May 1917, he was appointed by the then Minister of Marine, Kerensky, Commander of the Baltic Fleet. Verderevsky held this post at the time of the first Bolshevik rising (July, 1917). Under pressure of the sailors, who were in sympathy with the Bolsheviks, he refused to carry out the orders of the Provisional Government to send a destroyer squadron to the Neva to fight the mutineers. The Provisional Government then ordered Verderevsky to come to Petrograd, to be arrested and tried for high treason. A judicial inquiry which took place immediately established that Verderevsky's real motive in his act of open insubordination towards the Government was his wish to save the officers of the Baltic Fleet from being lynched by the sailors, and to maintain to some extent the fighting capacity of the fleet. When all the circumstances of the affair were cleared up, the inquiry against Verderevsky immediately ceased. After the Kornilov rebellion Verderevsky was appointed Minister of Marine.

**VERKHOVSKY.**—General. A young officer of the General Staff. Before the revolution of 1905, when a pupil of His Maj-

esty's Own *Corps de Pages*, he was sent to the army as a private, because of his sympathy with the liberation movement. He participated in the Japanese War and was awarded the soldier's Cross of St. George. Took part in the present war. After the Revolution Verkhovsky participated in the organization of the Central Executive Committee of the Black Sea Fleet, an elected body where the sailors worked in harmony with the officers, and for a long time conserved the discipline, organization, and fighting capacity of the Black Sea Fleet. In May 1917, Verkhovsky was promoted colonel and given a command on a fighting sector of the front. During the same month he was appointed Commander of the Moscow Military District, where he remained up to the Kornilov rebellion, after which he was appointed Minister for War. Not long before the Bolshevik *coup d'état* Verkhovsky, without being authorized by the Provisional Government, declared in the Army and Navy Commission of the Council of the Republic that it was necessary to conclude peace immediately, for which declaration he was *de facto* relieved of his ministerial duties and was ordered to depart immediately from Petrograd "on leave."

**VIRUBOV, V. V.**—An ex-officer. Was active in the Zemstvos. One of the close collaborators of Prince Lvov in the organizing of the All-Russian Union of Zemstvos. A Moderate Liberal,

but an active adversary of autocracy and the dynasty. Took an important part in the liberation movement of the last years. During the war Virubov stayed nearly always at the front as a representative of the All-Russian Union of Zemstvos. He has studied thoroughly the needs and conditions of army life. When Kerensky was Commander in Chief, Virubov was appointed Assistant of the Chief of his Staff for civil matters.

**ZARUDNY.**—Son of the famous collaborator in judicial reforms under Emperor Alexander II. Himself a prominent jurist, Zarudny retired from the bench as a protest against its reactionary policy and went over to the bar, where he soon became prominent. A remarkable speaker, Zarudny in 1904 was continually travelling all over Russia in order to defend in civil and military courts hundreds of political criminals, i.e., active opponents of the autocracy. By his energy he saved many of them from the gallows or imprisonment with hard labour, and revealed the crimes of Stcheglovitov's "justice." Immediately after the revolution of 1917 Kerensky invited Zarudny to the post of First Assistant to the Minister of Justice.

Zarudny was entrusted with the direction of the legislative work at the Ministry, and prepared a series of reforms in the spirit of the noble traditions of the judicial reformers of the 'sixties, among whom his father had been prominent. In the summer of 1917, Zarudny became Minister of Justice, in which office he remained until September, 1917.

**ZAVOIKA.**—A character-sketch of Zavoiko will be found in the text of the book.

**ZENZINOV, V.**—Prominent revolutionary journalist. Leading member of the Central Committee of the Social Revolutionary Party. Partisan of terrorism in the time of the old *régime*. Belongs to that wing of the Social Revolutionary Party which is clearly in favour of the national defence ("Oborontsy"); supported the idea of a coalitional government, i.e. based upon the co-operation of the Liberal, Democratic and Socialist Parties. Zenzinov returned shortly before the Revolution from "Russkoie Usstie," his place of exile in Siberia, a little village situated to the north of the Polar Circle, on the coast of the Arctic Ocean, where he spent five years.













